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 During the 1930s, Puerto Rico experienced acute infrastructural and public health crises 
caused by the economic contraction of the Great Depression, the devastating San Felipe and San 
Ciprián hurricanes of 1928 and 1932, and the limitations of the local political structure. Signed 
into law by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration 
(PRRA) replaced all other New Deal activity on the island. As a locally-run federal agency, the 
PRRA was very unique and yet very representative of the “Second” New Deal in the United 
States—which attempted to move beyond finding immediate solutions to the most critical 
problems of the day and make permanent changes to social and economic life for all U.S. 
citizens.  
 As the first archival analysis of the PRRA, this dissertation argues that the PRRA actively 
shifted federal policy in Puerto Rico from a paradigm of relief to one of reconstruction focused 
on the island’s specific needs in the wake of the hurricanes and Depression. This shift mirrored 
the larger change from the laissez faire individualism of the 1920s to the more prominent use of 
federal power to intervene in socioeconomic life during the New Deal. By building the island’s 
first truly public works and establishing its first public authorities to administer them, the PRRA 
constructed a new public infrastructure capable of addressing three interrelated goals: increasing 
life expectancy through concrete interventions in public health; providing more egalitarian public 
 
 v 
access to a safer and more permanent built environment; and limiting the private corporate 
control of Puerto Rico’s natural resources. Designed by Puerto Rican engineers and built by 
Puerto Rican workers, PRRA public works projects made concrete contributions to the physical 
security of millions of Puerto Ricans through the construction of hurricane-proof houses, 
schools, hospitals, roads, sewers, waterworks, and rural electrification networks. These projects 
not only made lasting contributions to local social and economic life, they also had a 
transformative effect on Puerto Rican politics during the 1940s and the meaning of U.S. 







 This study of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration originated with a suggestion 
from Laird W. Bergad during a seminar on modern Latin American history in Fall 2010, when he 
made the casual observation that no one has really examined the New Deal in Puerto Rico. 
Between that class and now, Laird became my dissertation advisor and one of the most important 
influences on how I approach historical research and analysis. His criticism, advice, and support 
on this project have been constant in equal measures, and his careful reading of this dissertation 
proved extremely valuable to me.  
 In addition to his individual supervision, Laird fosters a spirit of collegiality between his 
students, and one of the greatest contributions he made to this project was introducing me to 
Teresita Levy. While Teresita’s knowledge of Puerto Rican history contributed to this 
dissertation, it was her support as a mentor and friend that had the greatest impact on me. For a 
range of reasons—from travelling to Belize for a panel on Puerto Rico to cooking delicious 
Puerto Rican meals for Vanessa and me—I am very fortunate to have worked with her. 
 This dissertation would not have been possible without the financial support of the 
Graduate Center of the City University of New York. As an Enhanced Chancellor’s Fellow and 
recipient of a Dissertation Fellowship, I also benefitted from financial support via a Doctoral 
Student Research Grant and a Conference Presentation Support Grant from the office of the Vice 
President for Student Affairs. Additionally, I would like to thank the History departments of 
Hunter College and Queens College, where I have taught during the writing of this dissertation. 
This project would not have been possible without the supplemental funds provided by these 
schools. Special thanks should go to the graduate and undergraduate students who took my class 
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on the Great Depression and New Deal in 2013 and spent six weeks of the summer discussing 
the politicization of the public during the 1930s and 1940s. 
 At the CUNY Graduate Center, I was fortunate to meet a number of professors, 
colleagues, and friends who assisted me in both direct and indirect ways. Special thanks must 
first go to David Nasaw, Gerald Markowitz, and Herman Bennett for their support on this 
project. Their critical reading of the dissertation and attention to the larger development of my 
career as an academic and intellectual has been humbling. I would also like to thank some of the 
professors who contributed to my overall experience at both the Graduate Center and Hunter 
College MA program. These include: Carol Berkin, Clarence Taylor, James Oakes, Josh Brown, 
Josh Freeman, Helena Rosenblatt, Jonathan Sassi, José Luis Rénique, Barbara Welter, Michael 
Luther, Daniel Hurewitz, and Jack Salzman. I am also grateful to friends at the Graduate Center 
who read or discussed parts of this dissertation and offered me their insightful feedback. These 
include: Jorge Matos, John Blanton, Ben Becker, Joe Murphy, and Cara Caddoo. Two chapters 
of this dissertation were presented at conferences, and I would like to thank my co-panelists: 
Anne Macpherson, Teresita Levy, and Antonio Gaztambide-Géigel from the Association of 
Caribbean Historians in 2013; Anna Alexander, Mike Bess, Tucker Sharon, and Samuel 
Martland from the American Historical Association Conference on Latin American History in 
2014. 
 I would also like to thank the archivists who assisted my research in both Puerto Rico and 
New York. Thanks go to the National Archives and Records Administration of New York City, 
especially Dennis Riley, Bonnie Sauer, and Kevin Reilly; the Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín in 
Trujillo Alto, especially Dax Collazo; the Archivo General de Puerto Rico in Puerta de Tierra; 
and the Ponce History Museum. I would also like to thank the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt 
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Institute and Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York for a research 
grant for this project. Special thanks should also go to staff of the Mina Rees Library, the CUNY 
Library Inter-Campus Service, and the Interlibrary Loan office for their assistance in retrieving 
many of the books and articles used in this dissertation. 
 When all else has failed, I have received tremendous love and support from my family 
and friends. For reasons too numerous to list here, I’d like to give special thanks to: Nancy 
Burrows, Bob and Juanita Burrows, Holly and Bruce Dahm, Kathryn and Vincent Demming, 
Marco Balderrama, Vic Gonzalez, Kevin Cooke, Sam Weller, and Gwen and Terry. To my 
parents and in-laws—George Burrows, Deby Romero-Clopton and Jim Clopton, and Barbara 
and Al Weller—I cannot express the depth of my gratitude for your support, especially as the 
completion of this dissertation was delightfully complicated during the last year by the birth of 
our beautiful twin daughters, Charlotte and Ysela. I would also like to briefly mark the memory 
of a few family and friends who are no longer with us, having passed during the decade or so that 
I have been in graduate school: Isabelle Romero, Bill Burrows, Cenovio Balderrama, Ryan Noel, 
Bill Pietsch, and Jim Shaw. 
 Above all, this dissertation is dedicated to Vanessa Burrows. As a scholar, historian, 
friend, and wife, Vanessa continues to inspire and challenge me by setting such a fine example of 
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 On Thursday morning, September 13, 1928, Puerto Ricans living on the southern coast of 
the island awoke to a suspicious wind coming onshore from the southeast. For some residents, 
such as Don Taso, the narrator of Sidney Mintz’s Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life 
History, the swirling wind did not alter their daily routine. While San Juan received repeated 
radio reports that a well-formed tropical storm had been located about 1,000 miles southeast of 
Guayama by the S.S. Commack, a cargo ship sailing from Bahia, Brazil to Philadelphia, residents 
of the rural south coast received no warning that the deadly San Felipe hurricane would reach 
land around 11:00 or 11:30 that morning. But as the wind increased and the warm tide rose, 
workers like Don Taso were sent home to brace themselves and their families for what was to 
come. Few could have realized how dramatically the coming storm would affect nearly all 
aspects of social, economic, and political life in Puerto Rico during the 1930s.
1
 
 San Felipe (also called Okeechobee) was the most powerful hurricane to ever strike 
Puerto Rico. Having ravaged the island of Guadalupe the day before, the storm continued 
northward across the Bahamas on Friday and Saturday and struck the south coast of Florida 
somewhere between Jupiter and Boca Raton on Sunday, September 15—where it killed nearly 
2,000 people when the waters of Lake Okeechobee flooded. By September 20, a week after it 
                                                 
 
1
 Sidney W. Mintz, Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History (1960; repr., New 
York: Norton, 1974), 111-112. For information about the 5,000-ton S.S. Commack, see Robert 
Mykle, Killer 'Cane: The Deadly Hurricane of 1928 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2006), 113; Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (1960; repr. New York: 
Da Capo Press, 1974), 1; Oliver L. Fassig, “San Felipe—The Hurricane of September 13, 1928, 
at San Juan, PR,” Monthly Weather Review 56, no. 9, September 1928 (December 8, 1928): 351, 




struck the southern sugar cane fields of Puerto Rico, San Felipe had moved up the Atlantic coast 




 For Puerto Rico, a small Caribbean island and unincorporated territory of the United 
States since 1898, the storm’s destructive force was exacerbated by its timing. Not only did it 
arrive one year before the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange and beginning of the Great 
Depression in the U.S., the “once in a lifetime” storm also struck just four years before the 
devastating San Ciprián hurricane of 1932. Together, the two storms leveled many parts of the 
existing infrastructure and caused considerable environmental damage—combining to create a 
growing crisis in public health. By inflicting damage on nearly all aspects of the agricultural 
sector, the hurricanes also compounded the economic contraction of the global Depression and 
influenced local political life for the rest of the 1930s. As studies of natural disasters in Latin 
America and the Caribbean have shown, environmental phenomena such as the San Felipe and 
San Ciprián hurricanes become human events that require historical study of the ways in which 
local political structures are tested and reshaped by the long-term impact of natural catastrophes.   
Not only did the hurricanes expose the weaknesses of existing political parties and relationships, 
they shaped the available strategies of response to the Great Depression as well.
 3
 
                                                 
2
 Fassig, 350-352; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National 
Weather Service, Weather Forecast Office, Miami, Florida, “Memorial Web Page for the 1928 
Okeechobee Hurricane,” accessed June 11, 2013, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/?n =okeechobee; 




 On hurricanes, see Stuart B. Schwartz, “The Hurricane of San Ciriaco: Disaster, 
Politics, and Society in Puerto Rico, 1899-1901,” Hispanic American Historical Review 72, no. 3 
(Aug., 1992): 303-334; Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Winds of Change: Hurricanes and the 
Transformation of Nineteenth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 




 The 1930s were a critical time for Puerto Rico, a decade in which local political 
structures and external political relationships were in flux. These political changes were part of 
broader socioeconomic transformations associated with Puerto Rico’s recovery from the Great 
Depression. This recovery, like nearly all other aspects of life on the island during the decade, 
cannot be discussed without reference to the scale of the 1928 and 1932 hurricanes. 
 Like most people affected by the Great Depression, Puerto Ricans struggled to find the 
appropriate response to the social, political, economic, and environmental crises of the decade. 
As elsewhere, their decisions were conditioned by external factors, such as the collapse of the 
U.S. stock market, the sharp decline of international trade, and the rise of totalitarianism in 
Europe and Japan. Their choices were also shaped by internal factors, such as local political 
concerns and environmental conditions. Though these factors presented numerous challenges 
and limitations to the island’s response to the Depression, the story of Puerto Rico in the 1930s is 
a story of the ideas, decisions, and labor of Puerto Ricans in constructing and securing a lasting 
and widespread recovery from intertwined global and local crises. As elsewhere, these ideas and 
decisions were not always achieved with an easy or complete consensus. Despite numerous 
disagreements, however, a cross-section of Puerto Rican engineers, teachers, doctors, farmers, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Historical Quarterly 83, no. 4 (Spring 2005); Schwartz, “Differential Disasters: The 1928 
Hurricane and the Shaping of the Circum-Caribbean Region,” ReVista: The Harvard Review of 
Latin America (Winter 2007). On droughts, earthquakes, and fires, see Mike Davis, Ecology of 
Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (New York: Vintage Books, 1998); Davis, 
Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Families and the Making of the Third World (London: 
Verso, 2002); Ted Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disasters (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Mark Healey, The Ruins of the New Argentina: Peronism 
and the Remaking of San Juan After the 1944 Earthquake (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2011); Sherry Johnson, Climate and Catastrophe in Cuba and the Atlantic World in the Age of 




and workers found common ground on pragmatic solutions, and shared a vision of permanent 
recovery made possible by new alliances, choices, and compromises.  
 Among these new choices, Puerto Ricans invested intellectual, physical, and financial 
capital in an alliance with the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), the second 
major New Deal program to operate exclusively on the island. The PRRA, which replaced the 
Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) and coordinated all other New Deal 
activity between 1935 and 1955, was made possible by the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
1932 and his reelection in 1936.
4
 Through a variety of economic programs, the New Deal 
attempted to provide lasting recovery from the Depression while, at the same time, enhancing the 
power of the federal government to more directly influence the daily lives of U.S. citizens. 
Through direct legislative and executive action, the New Deal created new long-term federal 
commitments to the public welfare. These commitments included new regulations of economic 
activity, new security through the creation of a federal safety net for workers, and new large-
scale public works projects designed to make lasting changes in social and economic life. 
Together, these changes redefined the relationship between the public and the government, and 
embodied the beginning of a more fair and democratic understanding of U.S. citizenship. As 
Marlene Park and Gerald Markowitz have argued, although its “goals were inadequately pursued 
and implemented, the New Deal . . . broadened the concept of democracy and based it in the 
economic sphere.”
5
 This concept of a more publicly experienced democratic economy contrasted 
                                                 
4
 A note on pronunciation: In Puerto Rico, the PRERA and PRRA were not referred to by 
their initials, but rather pronounced as one word—the PRRA was called “la pra” on the island. 
  
5
 Marlene Park and Gerald E. Markowitz, Democratic Vistas: Post Offices and Public Art 




sharply with the policies of his three Republican predecessors in the White House: Warren G. 
Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover.  
 During the New Deal, this new and more democratic understanding of citizenship also 
applied to Puerto Ricans, who had been U.S. citizens since 1917, and the PRRA proved to be a 
pivotal turning point from three decades of previous federal policy. Coinciding with the growth 
of New Deal liberalism, an economic policy that believed the federal government had a unique 
responsibility to reconstruct and manage the economy, the PRRA sought to relieve the most 
critical daily hardships of the Great Depression while attempting to make permanent democratic 
changes to social and economic life in Puerto Rico.  
 The most significant component of the PRRA in addressing these twin aims was the 
Engineering division. Coordinating the type of work performed by a host of New Deal “alphabet 
soup” agencies in the United States—such as the Public Works Administration (PWA), Works 
Progress Administration (WPA), Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Civilian Conservation 
Corps (CCC), Resettlement Administration (RA), and Farm Security Administration (FSA)—the 
Engineering division of the PRRA made a lasting contribution to the physical security of 
millions of Puerto Ricans during the Great Depression and after through the construction of 
hurricane-proof houses, schools, and hospitals and modern water supply and waste disposal 
systems. From a public health standpoint, this publicly-built infrastructure contributed to one of 
the largest increases in life expectancy and opportunity in the island’s history.
6
 At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                                             
New Deal’s democratic legacy, see Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An 




 As the World Health Organization has argued, “housing and built environments have a 
profound impact on human health.” World Health Organization, “International Workshop on 




improved transportation and communication networks built by the PRRA—ranging from hiking 
trails to connecting roads to electric service wires—expanded the physical mobility of Puerto 
Ricans in both rural and urban areas. Combined with the vastly improved public health 
infrastructure, the expansion of transportation and communication networks produced one of the 
most long-lasting contributions to the overall social mobility of Puerto Rican citizens in the 
island’s history.  
 By building the island’s first truly public works, the Engineering division constructed a 
hurricane-proof infrastructure capable of addressing three interrelated goals: increasing life 
expectancy through concrete interventions in public health; providing more egalitarian public 
access to the built environment; and limiting the power of private corporate holdings on the 
island’s natural resources. Led by a predominantly Puerto Rican staff of engineers and 
administrators, and built by Puerto Rican workers, PRRA public works projects included the 
establishment of the Cataño cement plant, the construction of thousands of concrete houses, 
schools, and medical care facilities in both rural and urban areas of the island, and the building of 
seven major hydroelectric power projects designed—for the first time—to bring electric service 
to residents of the rural interior of the island. Officially operating until 1955, the PRRA made its 
most significant infrastructural and public health contributions in Puerto Rico between 1935 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
environment – mitigation and adaptation responses,” Meeting Report, Geneva, October 13-15, 
2010, 3, accessed March 8, 2014, http://www.who.int/hia/house_ report.pdf. See also Susan 
Klitzman, Thomas D. Matte, and Daniel E. Kass, “The Urban Physical Environment and Its 
Effect on Health,” in Cities and the Health of the Public, edited by Nicholas Freudenberg, 
Sandro Galea, and David Vlahov (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006), 77. For an 
examination of the political dimensions of building a public health infrastructure, see Judith W. 
Leavitt, The Healthiest City: Milwaukee and the Politics of Health Reform (Madison: University 





 Conceived, planned, and built largely by the Engineering division, these large-scale 
construction projects would not have been possible without an alliance between Puerto Ricans 
and the New Deal. 
 As in the U.S., the alliance between Puerto Ricans and the New Deal was shaped by 
conflicting and contested decisions. The reason for this is that the New Deal was not a 
monolithic government program imposed from the top down, but oftentimes shaped by local 
control of federal resources. Demonstrating the New Deal’s creative, flexible, and experimental 
nature, FDR continually moved capital and human resources from one agency to another to 
negotiate the many ups and downs of his administration’s policy. Often, administrative and 
policy changes were the result of serious challenges to New Deal policy from FDR’s left and 
right, ranging from: Huey Long, the populist “dictator” of Louisiana who stood poised to 
challenge Roosevelt in the 1936 Democratic primary with his “Share Our Wealth” campaign; to 
breakaway conservative liberals, mostly Southern Democrats such as Senators Carter Glass (D-
VA), Thomas P. Gore (D-OK), and Millard Tydings (D-MD); to the 1935 and 1936 Supreme 
                                                 
 
7
 By the turn of the twentieth century, the term “public health” was understood to include 
the “protection of the community against communicable diseases and sanitation of the 
environment.” George Rosen, A History of Public Health, Expanded Edition (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 320. Global concern for public health was shifting from 
community to state-level intervention and combined a mixture of ideas such as sanitary reform, 
bacteriological discoveries, and the training of a professional class of public health practitioners 
and educators. For a much needed discussion of how new ideas and concerns for public health in 
the United States were articulated with foreign and territorial policy during the progressive era, 
see Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene 
in the Philippines (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006) and Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco 
A. Scarano, eds., Colonial Crucible: Empire and the Making of the Modern American State 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), particularly 273-326, Part 5: Imperial Medicine 




Court decisions that struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA), two seminal pieces of legislation from FDR’s “First Hundred Days.”
8
  
 In Puerto Rico, popular alliance with the PRRA negotiated the fluidity of FDR’s policy 
through the many changes in and challenges to the New Deal. While historical scholarship on 
Puerto Rico has long acknowledged the New Deal, however, there has been little critical 
examination of the PRRA by historians of Puerto Rico or by historians of the New Deal. As the 
first archival analysis of the most important New Deal agency to operate on the island, this 
dissertation will argue that the PRRA was a locally-run New Deal agency that made possible the 
shift from a paradigm of relief to one of reconstruction. Both discursive and physical, this shift 
signified one of the most important changes to the overall relationship between Puerto Rico and 
the United States during the 1930s. Contrasting the overwhelming focus on the island’s 
“colonial” status in the historical literature, this dissertation will also argue that the actions and 
ideas of average Puerto Ricans—such as the engineers and teachers mentioned above—have 
been obscured by theoretical and political concerns that have overshadowed the substantial 
historical changes in Puerto Rican daily life since the Great Depression.
9
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 Mason Dixon, “Huey Long Facing Test of His Power: He Is Still Louisiana's Dictator, 
But His Enemies Are Gathering Strength,” New York Times, September 10, 1933; Alan Brinkley, 
Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1983), 9; James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatives and the New Deal 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 13, 18-26; Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative 
Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America (New 
York: Norton, 2005), x; A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); 




 This dissertation seeks to contribute to the expanding discussion on the “mutually 
transformative nature” of the U.S. empire since 1898. See Alfred W. McCoy, Francisco A. 
Scarano, and Courtney Johnson, “On the Tropic of Cancer: Transitions and Transformations in 
the U.S. Imperial State,” in Colonial Crucible: Empire and the Making of the Modern American 




 The transition from a paradigm of relief to one of reconstruction created a new focus on 
long-term economic development through capital investments in public works and new 
interventions in public health. These changes were not imposed on Puerto Rico from above, but 
rather designed and developed on the island. Key to this transition was the creation of federally-
funded but locally-owned public authorities established by the PRRA between 1935 and 1943 to 
assure local control of the island’s natural resources regardless of current or future political 
status. The two most important public agencies created during the Great Depression were the 
Puerto Rico Cement Corporation (PRCC) in 1939 and the Puerto Rico Water Resources 
Authority (WRA) in 1941. Designed to combat the conditions of hurricanes and Depression, 
each was a direct product of the mass-based alliance between Puerto Ricans and the New Deal 
that helped foster a new understanding of public power on the island.  
 The creation of these publicly-owned agencies paralleled similar developments in the 
U.S., as the “Second” New Deal featured considerable new federal investments in public works 
and interventions in public health. In the U.S., public works were constructed through the Public 
Works Administration (PWA) run by Harold Ickes, and the Works Progress Administration 
(WPA) run by Harry Hopkins—which were consolidated into the Federal Works Agency (FWA) 
                                                                                                                                                             
McCoy, Scarano, and Johnson remind us that through direct colonial rule or indirect influence 
(such as economic leverage or cultural hegemony), empires have perpetually existed.  Taken as a 
whole, the 44 essays collected in this volume suggest the difficulty of using a static model of 
colonialism or imperialism to describe U.S. extraterritorial expansion (either direct or indirect) 
over the past century, and the futility of using this model as an analytical framework. The 
relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S.—like that of the U.S. and the world since 1900—
has been one of constant change. Because the Great Depression was such a pivotal moment in 
global history, the New Deal in Puerto Rico was one of the most pivotal moments of change in 
this relationship. For a more theoretical discussion of the problems with both colonial and 
postcolonial academic research, see Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, 




under the Reorganization Act of 1939.
10
 Under these agencies, federal spending on infrastructure 
was not only increased but transformed into public works by the creation of public authorities 
and corporations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which served as a model for the 
WRA in Puerto Rico.
11
  
During the 1930s, as Puerto Ricans recognized the pronounced differences in federal 
administration during the transition from Hoover to Roosevelt, new public works included: the 
construction of hurricane-proof houses; the development of a new public health infrastructure 
including concrete storm drains, water supply, and sanitation systems; and the creation of 
publicly-owned hydroelectric facilities. Toward the end of the decade, as the U.S. began 
preparing for a potential war with Nazi Germany, public works included the construction of new 
military bases, landing fields, and naval docks in Puerto Rico and, after the Destroyers for Bases 
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 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on the Reorganization Act,” April 25, 
1939, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, University of 




 There is an important distinction between infrastructural building and public works, as 
during the twentieth century public works became identified by their quasi-independent status as 
state owned but autonomously run agencies. In the most widely accepted definition of public 
works, Ellis Armstrong wrote that they are “the physical structures and facilities developed or 
acquired by public agencies to house government functions and provide water, waste disposal, 
power, transportation, and similar services to facilitate the achievement of common social and 
economic objectives.”
 
Ellis L. Armstrong, ed., History of Public Works in the United States, 
1776-1976 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 1. The same definition is used by 
Jason Scott Smith in his recent analysis of the PWA and WPA. See Smith, Building New Deal 
Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 1933-1956 (Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 2n3. On the use of public authorities during the New Deal, see Robert Caro, The Power 
Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), 615-636. As 
Gail Radford has recently warned, however, the over-reliance on public authorities in the 
twentieth century contributed to the growth of a fragmented, semi-secretive bureaucracy that is 
largely unaccountable to the electorate. See Gail Radford, The Rise of the Public Authority: 
Statebuilding and Economic Development in Twentieth-Century America (Chicago: University 




Agreement of 1940 and Lend-Lease Act of 1941, throughout much of the British Caribbean as 
well. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in December 1941, which 
resulted in a nearly complete pan-hemispheric alliance against fascism, Puerto Rico was 
transformed into a primary center of the Caribbean defense against Nazi U-boat and Luftwaffe air 
attacks through increased military spending on public works.
12
  
The construction of these public works during both the Depression and WWII was made 
possible by the pragmatic alliance between Puerto Rican New Dealers and the PRRA, which also 
helped legitimize the expanded role of the federal government in Puerto Rico. As in the U.S., 
where increased spending on public works underwrote public acceptance of the New Deal by 
“intellectually and physically” justifying the turn toward Keynesian liberalism, the social and 
economic impact of PRRA public works construction had dramatic consequences on both local 
political structures and external political relationships.
13
 By the end of the 1930s, as the world’s 
most intractable depression gave way to its most deadly war, all four major political parties in 
Puerto Rico had ruptured; the Republican, Socialist, Nationalist, and Liberal parties were 
depleted or torn apart by a unique combination of partisan differences, ideological compromises, 
and/or state repression. Into the vacuum created by the breakdown of party politics stepped the 
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 By January 1, 1942, much of the western hemisphere had declared war on the Axis 
Powers. These included the U.S., Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, Honduras, and Nicaragua. By 1943, Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia 
had joined the Allies, as had, by 1945, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela, Uruguay, Ecuador, and 
Argentina. Non-independent islands of the Caribbean and North Atlantic also contributed to the 
Allied war effort, including: Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Antigua, the Bahamas, Bermuda, British 
Guyana (Guyana), British Honduras (Belize), St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Newfoundland. Though much of the U.S. defense system was geared to defend against Luftwaffe 




 For an analysis of how PWA and WPA patronage helped shaped the political 




only political faction capable of continuing the PRRA public works programs. Indeed, even 
though Luis Muñoz Marín and his Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) had very little 
connection to the PRRA after 1937, he was able to position himself as the leader of a populist 
political coalition that was formed around the basic program of PRRA public works and land 
reform.
14
 This coalition, officially brought together under the banner of “pan, tierra, y libertad,” 
was also united by the increased federal spending but substantial local control over patronage 
and public works. While previous analyses have tended to mythologize or criticize the electoral 
success of the PPD in the 1940s, this dissertation will examine the role of New Deal liberalism in 
the emergence of Puerto Rican “populism” between 1937 and 1940, paying special attention to 
the active participation of Puerto Rican professional and working classes in conceiving and 
constructing PRRA public works.
15
 
                                                 
 
14
 The study of populism in Latin America and the Caribbean differs considerably from 
the study of populism in the United States. While in the U.S., “populism” refers to a series of late 
nineteenth-century agrarian reform movements that aligned under the banner of the People’s 
Party in the 1892 and 1896 elections, “populism” in other areas of the western hemisphere 
generally refers to several distinct state-led political movements during the 1930s and 1940s that 
were urban based, and often supported by military rule. Puerto Rico’s experience with populism 
after 1940 shared some elements with other regional areas, but differed sharply from the 
ostensibly “democratic” dictatorships that held power in many areas of Latin America between 
the 1930s and 1980s. For contrasting views on Populism in the United States, see Richard 
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (1955; repr. New York: Random House, 2011) and Charles 




 A large number of works have addressed the rise of the PPD and the 1940 elections. 
For a positive assessment of the PPD, see A.W. Maldonado, Luis Muñoz Marín: Puerto Rico’s 
Democratic Revolution (San Juan: La Editorial, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2006). For critical 
views, see Emilio Gonzalez Diaz, “Class struggle and politics in Puerto Rico during the decade 
of the 40’s: the rise of the P.D.P.,” Two Thirds 2, Iss. 1 (1979): 46-57 and Emilio Pantojas-
García, “Puerto Rican Populism Revisited: The PPD during the 1940s,” Latin American Studies 
21, no. 3 (Oct. 1989): 521-522. For a more nuanced analysis of the PPD and its relationship with 
the federal government, see Rafael Alberto Bernabe, “Prehistory of the ‘Partido Popular 




For Puerto Rico, the success of Muñoz Marín and the PPD in the 1940 election ensured 
the continuity of New Deal public works at the local level while, at the same time, altering the 
larger political relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. While the political status 
of Puerto Rico remains heavily debated today, the transformation of the unincorporated territory 
into the Estado Libre Asociado (Free Associated State) or Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 
1952 was a product of the 1940 election. The following year, as Muñoz Marín was sworn in as 
President of the Senate, FDR appointed Rexford Guy Tugwell as the Governor of Puerto Rico. 
Not only was he the first New Dealer to serve as governor, but he was the last American-born 
governor of the island as well.   
 Rex Tugwell was important not to the creation of the New Deal in Puerto Rico in the 
1930s, but in its continuation by local public agencies in the 1940s. By 1941, Tugwell had been 
virtually run out of the Roosevelt administration as his public image devolved from a lightning 
rod to a political liability, despite his continuing close ties to FDR and the progressive wing of 
the New Deal, which included Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture and Vice 
President from 1941-1945, and Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior and director of the 
PWA and PRRA (after 1937). Tugwell had been the original director of the Resettlement 
Administration (RA), which had led a “spirited attack on rural poverty” that aimed to “enable 
destitute and economically distressed farm families to achieve a measure of economic 
independence.”
 16
 Tugwell was so unpopular, however, that the Resettlement Administration was 
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replaced by the Farm Security Administration (FSA) in part to distance the idea of rural 
rehabilitation from Tugwell after his departure.
 
His appointment to Governor of Puerto Rico in 
1941 reflected both the popularity of New Deal public works on the island and the depth of local 
support for continuing the PRRA through the newly-elected PPD. Rejuvenated by his 
appointment, Tugwell hoped to expand the progressive elements of the New Deal on the island. 
As he wrote, at the time “there seemed to be no place in the Federal Government where I could 
be effective, considering my accumulation of enmities. But the Puerto Rican situation seemed to 
be one of those fortunate opportunities which sometimes join personal desires with convenient 
circumstances. I could bring the New Deal to an island where its coming had been delayed for a 
decade.”
17
 Between 1941 and 1945, Muñoz Marín and Tugwell supported laws that enhanced the 
role of New Deal liberalism on the island and made Puerto Rican public works permanent by 
creating a series of new public agencies modeled on the PRCC and WRA, including the Puerto 
Rico Transportation Authority, Development Company of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Agricultural 
Development Company, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewerage Service, Puerto Rico Land 
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 Michael Namorato, ed., The Diary of Rexford G. Tugwell: The New Deal, 1932-1935 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 312. Tugwell also took pride in assisting in the transition 
to self-rule in Puerto Rico, writing that he “could also have a part in the great events now 
shaping up. So I responded to the suggestion of Harold Ickes and became Puerto Rico’s war-time 
Governor. I also became her last appointed outside Governor. It was my last public post. I still 
held it when President Roosevelt died.” 
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 Law 252, “An Act to Create the Development Bank of Puerto Rico,” May 13, 1942, 
accessed August 15, 2013, http://www.gdb-pur.com/about-gdb/documents/LeyNum252de13 
demayode1942-CreacionBcoFomento-Engl.pdf; Law 272, “An Act Authorizing the 




 The creation of these numerous public agencies highlights the ambiguous ways in which 
the rise of “populism” in Puerto Rico corresponded to both the mass-based support for New Deal 
liberalism in the U.S. and to contemporary political developments throughout Latin America and 
the Caribbean. To demonstrate how unique political changes in Puerto Rico coincided with and 
contradicted the many manifestations of “colonialism” and “populism” in other parts of the 
region, this dissertation will employ a comparative analysis of the ways in which other areas of 
Latin America and the Caribbean responded to the continuing crisis of the Great Depression and 
onset of World War II. Of particular interest will be how recovery efforts in other areas of the 
Spanish Caribbean operated in relation to the U.S., as the entire region attempted to recover from 




 There has been little scholarly analysis of the New Deal in Puerto Rico. There are two 
reasons for this. First, historians of Puerto Rico have largely focused their work on the external 
explanations for the island’s many problems during the global crisis of the 1930s. Not 
surprisingly, Puerto Rico’s “colonial” relationship with the United States has been cited as the 
most distinguishing aspect of the island’s social and cultural life and most decisive cause of its 
political and economic dependency.
 20
 Over the last four decades, the study of colonialism in 
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 Surprisingly, little comparative work has been done on this subject. Two of the best 
recent works are Antonio Gaztambide-Geigel, Tan Lejos de Dios… Ensayos sobre las relaciones 
del Caribe con Estados Unidos (San Juan: Ediciones Callejón, 2006) and McCoy and Scarano, 




 For a thorough examination of Puerto Rican historiography from the age of Spanish 




                                                                                                                                                             
Caribbean: Vol. VI: Methodology and Historiography of the Caribbean, ed. B.W. Higman 
(London: UNESCO Publishing, 1999), 417-450; Emilio Pantojas-García, “End-of-the-Century 
Studies of Puerto Rico’s Economy, Politics, and Culture: What Lies Ahead?,” Latin American 
Research Review 35, no. 3 (2000): 227-240; Pantojas-García, “The Puerto Rican Paradox: 
Colonialism Revisited,” Latin American Research Review 40, no. 3 (2005): 163-176.  
 
 Historical scholarship on Puerto Rico was revolutionized in the 1970s, as a new 
generation of researchers in Puerto Rico and New York explored the island’s political and 
socioeconomic development through dynamic new lenses of social history. Influenced by the 
emergence of the New Left, and deeply concerned with contemporary political issues and social 
protest movements, this group was largely associated with the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad 
Puertorriqueña (Center for Studies on Puerto Rican Reality), the Center for Social Research and 
Department of History at the University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, and the El Centro de 
Estudios Puertorriqueños (Center for Puerto Rican Studies) at Hunter College, City University of 
New York. Scholars working today are deeply indebted to the renaissance of Puerto Rican 
studies started by this generation, and their examinations continue to influence research into how 
the political status of the “oldest colony in the world” has affected organized labor, gender, race, 
education, bureaucracy, social control, and nationalist uprisings, among other topics. These 
interpretations contrasted with earlier institutional histories of Puerto Rico that had been written 
in the United States, many (but not all) by liberal economic policy planners and political insiders 
during the cold war. For examples of the post-1970s historiography, see Ángel G. Quintero 
Rivera, Conflictos de clase y politica en Puerto Rico (Rio Piedras: Ediciones Huracan, 1977); 
Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños History Task Force, Labor Migration Under Capitalism: The 
Puerto Rican Experience (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Sakari Sariola, The Puerto 
Rican Dilemma (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1979); Arturo Morales Carrión, Puerto 
Rico: A Political and Cultural History (New York: Norton, 1983); Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: 
A Colonial Experiment (New York: Vintage, 1984); Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme Court and 
Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate and Unequal (Rio Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de 
Puerto Rico, 1985); Kevin A. Santiago-Valles, “Subject People” and Colonial Discourses: 
Economic Transformation and Social Disorder in Puerto Rico, 1898-1947 (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994); Maria del Pilar Argüelles, Morality and Power: The U.S. 
Colonial Experience in Puerto Rico from 1898-1948 (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1996);  Ronald Fernández, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United 
States in the Twentieth Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); José Trias Monge, Puerto Rico: 
The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); 
Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall, eds., Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, 
American Expansion, and the Constitution (Duke University Press, 2001); Ileana M. Rodríguez-
Silva, Silencing Race: Disentangling Blackness, Colonialism, and National Identities in Puerto 
Rico (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). For examples of institutional histories, see: Victor 
S. Clark, Porto Rico and Its Problems (1930; repr. New York: Arno Press, 1975); Esteban Bird, 
Report on the Sugar Industry in Relation to the Social and Economic System of Puerto Rico (San 
Juan: Government Office of Supplies, Printing and Transportation, 1941); Harvey S. Perloff, 
Puerto Rico's Economic Future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); Rexford G. 




Puerto Rico has produced several theoretic models, ranging from a world system’s approach that 
divided the world into hegemonic core and dependent periphery regions, a class-based analysis 
of the island’s political elite as a colonial bourgeoisie, and an examination of the island as part of 
a global neo-liberal and neo-colonial “subalternality.”
21
 While these models have provided a 
series of provocative questions about the external conditions and theoretical dimensions 
surrounding Puerto Rico’s geopolitical and national status, they have obscured the internal 
aspects of the island’s many problems during the Great Depression, such as the breakdown of 
party politics in the 1930s and the infrastructural, environmental, and public health effects of the 
San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes of 1928 and 1932.  
 The focus on external explanations has, at times, reduced the complexities of the Great 
Depression into a narrow understanding of U.S. “colonialism” that has slighted the intellectual 
and physical participation of Puerto Ricans in articulating a secure and lasting recovery. 
However, as a growing number of new works on Puerto Rico during the Great Depression and 
                                                                                                                                                             
1976); Tugwell, The Art of Politics, as Practiced by Three Great Americans, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, Luis Muñoz Marín, and Fiorello H. La Guardia (1958; repr. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1977); Tugwell, The Place of Planning in Society (San Juan: Puerto Rico 
Planning Board, 1954); Thomas G. Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal 
(Jacksonville: University of Florida Press, 1960); Dorothy Dulles Bourne and James Russell 
Bourne, Thirty Years of Change in Puerto Rico: A Case Study of Ten Selected Rural Areas (New 
York: F.A. Praeger, 1966); Henry Wells, The Modernization of Puerto Rico: A Political Study of 
Changing Values and Institutions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); James 
Dietz, Economic History of Puerto Rico: Institutional Change and Capitalist Development 




 For the best examples, see Gordon K. Lewis, Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution: An 
Essay on American Dominance and Caribbean Resistance (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1974); Emilio Pantojas-García, Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto Rico's Export-led 
Industrialization Experience (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Ramón Grosfoguel, Colonial 





World War II have argued, the relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. has displayed a 
greater complexity than was previously assumed, and has been marked by fluid and not fixed 
boundaries of federal citizenship and national identity. As César Ayala and Rafael Bernabe have 
argued, the focus on colonialism cannot explain all aspects of Puerto Rican history in the 
“American Century.”
22
 To be sure, the territorial or “colonial” context of U.S.-Puerto Rican 
relations should be near the heart of every historical question we ask about the relationship 
between the island and mainland. What has been missing, however, is analysis of how that 
context has changed over time. In seeking to demonstrate the social and economic impact of 
public works in Puerto Rico and the political consequences of public authorities, this dissertation 
will contribute to a better understanding of Puerto Rico since the Great Depression.  
The second reason for the lack of academic attention to the PRRA is the nearly total lack 
of analysis of the New Deal in Puerto Rico by historians of the United States. While knowledge 
of the New Deal is widespread on the island, where its long-term interventions in public health 
and hurricane-proof construction remain a tangible part of everyday life, awareness that the New 
Deal even existed in Puerto Rico is slim in the United States. As a sampling of the extensive 
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Since 1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 10. See also Gabriel 
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historiography of the New Deal reveals, there has been a nearly complete lack of study on any 
component of the New Deal in Puerto Rico. Some of the most important works do not mention 
the island at all.
23
 Neither colony nor state, Puerto Rico is generally viewed in the academic 
literature as a liminal space, existing both outside and within the historiographic borders of Latin 
America, the Caribbean, and the United States. As both a Puerto Rican story told in U.S. 
archives, and a U.S. story told in island politics, the New Deal in Puerto Rico transgresses some 
of the disciplinary spaces we are familiar with and accustomed to.
24
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 It is impossible to analyze the history of Puerto Rico since the 1930s without using 
U.S.-based archival sources. The vast majority of New Deal-related archives are located in the 
National Archives at New York City, including the complete archive of the PRRA. Microfilm 




The New Deal helped shift local and federal policy away from a paradigm of relief to one 
of reconstruction, which began a series of remarkable social and economic changes spurred by 
new investments in public works and other physical interventions in public health. With the rise 
of new public authorities such as the PRCC and WRA, these public works contributed to a 
growing concept of economic citizenship. Supported by a broad alliance of Puerto Rican 
engineers, teachers, doctors, and workers, the PRCC responded to the uniquely Caribbean 
exigencies of Puerto Rican life by allowing for the construction of hurricane-proof houses, 
schools, and hospitals made of locally-produced cement. Similarly, the WRA was designed and 
constructed by Puerto Rican engineers and workers who had long fought to break the corporate 
control of local water and electric power resources, which had been previously harnessed 
primarily to the benefit of large and (in part) absentee-owned sugar mills.  
 Public agencies such as the PRCC and WRA cannot be understood through a narrow 
focus on the “colonial” status of Puerto Rico and the hegemonic influence of the United States. 
Rather, these developments must be placed into the historical context of the sweeping changes in 
U.S. social and political life brought by the election of FDR in 1932, the enhanced power of the 
federal government to intervene in the daily lives of U.S. citizens during his presidency, and the 
increased federal commitment to public works that began during the New Deal. While the legacy 
of these changes has been sharply debated by U.S. historians, most have agreed that their 
                                                                                                                                                             
While important documents are also located on the island at the Archivo General de Puerto Rico 
in Puerta de Tierra and the Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín in Tujillo Alto, for example, it is 
telling that nearly every single archivist I spoke to in Puerto Rico during my various research 
trips told me to begin my research in New York. What I have found is that the archival trail of 
Puerto Rican social, economic, and political life during the twentieth century’s greatest crises—
the Great Depression and World War II—is intimately woven through locations in both Puerto 
Rico and the United States. As in so many other aspects of the daily experience of citizenship 
under U.S. empire, Puerto Rican life continues to be distinguished by a bilingual, bicultural, and 
bi-national character. The story of the New Deal in Puerto Rico displays this same character. 
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emergence was made possible by a combination of pragmatic and popular-based alliances that 
created the New Deal’s tenuous and, at times, patronage-driven political coalition. In Puerto 
Rico, popular alliance with the PRRA was also a pragmatic response to the Great Depression that 
recognized the unexpected and unprecedented changes within the U.S. government during the 
New Deal, and took advantage of new opportunities and new capital to radically alter Puerto 
Rican society. These changes, in turn, transformed many aspects of the local and “colonial” 
political systems as they had previously existed. 
 The New Deal was a break from all previous federal policy. One of the oldest and 
longest-held Spanish colonies in the “New World,” Puerto Rico has been a “possession” of the 
expanding U.S. empire since December 10, 1898, when the Treaty of Paris ended the Cuban-
Spanish-American War.
25
 The small island, measuring about 3,500 square miles, had been 
invaded by U.S. troops nearly five months before, when the U.S.S. Gloucester harbored in the 
bay of Guánica and raised the American flag on Puerto Rican soil for the first time.
26
 As Arturo 
Morales Carrión has noted, the invasion of Puerto Rico was little more than an “offshoot” of the 
larger war in Cuba, as the island was not the initial object of U.S. imperialist desire. Rather, its 
value from the U.S. perspective lay mostly in its strategic location as a gateway to the Caribbean 
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and Isthmus of Panama.
 27
 As Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. later wrote of U.S. interests in Puerto 
Rico, “…we had no definite ideas, for when we declared war we had not thought of them.”
 28
  
 Initially governed by military rule, Puerto Rico was transferred to U.S. civilian control by 
the Foraker Act (or Organic Act), which was signed into law by President William McKinley on 
April 12, 1900.
29
 Under the new law, the Puerto Rican government was controlled by 
Washington, as the President had the power to appoint most of the local leadership without 
popular consent, including the Governor, cabinet, executive council, Supreme Court and U.S. 
District Court justices, and the non-voting Resident Commissioner in Congress. The only 
exceptions were the 35 members of the House of Representatives, who were directly elected on 
the island. The Foraker Act also established the primacy of federal law over the island, and gave 
the U.S. Congress the right to veto Puerto Rican legislation. 
 Acquired via purchase, treaty, or annexation, new U.S. island possessions in the South 
Pacific and Caribbean were subject to wide-ranging interpretations of Constitutional and legal 
status. The Insular Cases—a series of Supreme Court rulings during and after 1901—changed 
U.S. policy regarding its territories in significant ways, as previous policy dating to the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had put continental territories on a path to eventual statehood. By 
contrast, the Insular Cases created a new legal division between “incorporated” and 
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“unincorporated” territories. As an unincorporated territory, Puerto Rico was not placed on a 
path to statehood.
30
   
 This unincorporated status was unchanged by the Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917, which was 
signed on March 4, 1917, just as President Woodrow Wilson sought to build moral consent for 
entry into the Great War by arguing that the U.S. must “make the world safe for democracy.”
31
 
Replacing the Foraker Act, the Jones Act of 1917 extended U.S. citizenship to all Puerto Ricans 
and restructured the local government. While the President still appointed the Governor, cabinet, 
and all federal judges, the act created a popularly-elected Puerto Rican Senate and made the 
position of Resident Commissioner subject to popular election as well. Significantly, the Jones 
Act also exempted the sale of Puerto Rican bonds from federal, state, and local taxes.
32
 
 During the New Deal, the alliance between Puerto Ricans and the PRRA marked the 
beginnings of a new brand of mass-based politics that shared similarities with and expressed 
clear differences from developments in other areas of Latin America and the Caribbean. By 
comparing Puerto Rico’s experience in the 1930s and 1940s with the rest of the Spanish 
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Caribbean, we will gain an appreciation for the uneven ways in which the rise of Puerto Rican 
populism corresponded to other political developments throughout the region. Examination of 
these similarities and differences, however, is not an exercise aimed solely at Latin American 
and Caribbean audiences. For historians of the U.S., the New Deal in Puerto Rico offers three 
new ways to examine the Great Depression and New Deal.  
 First, the study of the PRRA offers a unique opportunity to connect local and regional 
experiences of the New Deal to broader national developments. Demonstrating the regional 
variability of New Deal policy, the substantial amount of local control over the shape and scope 
of New Deal projects, and the participation of local actors as both workers and administrators, 
PRRA engineering projects also demonstrate the significance of federally funded public works 
beyond the immediate need for relief from the employment crisis of the Depression. 
 Second, the study of the PRRA provides a new understanding of the effect that New Deal 
policy had on the relationship between the U.S. and the world. Initially conceived as a part of the 
Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbor policy with Latin America, the PRRA refocused its 
energies on long-term economic development as federal perspectives about Puerto Rico changed 
from diplomacy to development. Originally run by Ernest Gruening, a leading U.S. diplomat to 
Latin America, the PRRA was viewed by FDR as a diplomatic gesture that could help sell the 
administration’s nonintervention and noninterference policies to the rest of Latin America. When 
Gruening was replaced by Harold Ickes in 1937, however, the PRRA was reoriented toward 
public works construction. As will be discussed below, this was largely due to Ickes’ nearly 
complete lack of day-to-day involvement in running the PRRA; swamped with more pressing 
matters closer to home, Ickes delegated most administrative duties to Miles Fairbank and 
Guillermo Esteves, the Assistant and Regional administrators, who ran the PRRA directly from 
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San Juan. Interestingly, the new emphasis on public works and public health drew considerable 
attention from other areas of Latin America and the Caribbean in ways that fulfilled many of the 
original diplomatic aims of the Gruening administration.  
 After the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, PRRA public works became essential to the 
defense of the Caribbean region and the waging of the Battle of the Atlantic. As the United 
States became the leader of the Western Hemisphere’s nearly complete alliance against fascism 
in the 1940s, the New Deal in Puerto Rico was imbued with a new global significance. By 
drawing attention to the relationship between FDR’s domestic and foreign policy, this study may 
help highlight the New Deal’s role in building a hemispheric alliance against fascism during 
World War II. 
 Third, the study of the New Deal in Puerto Rico also poses the question of whether the 
emergence of New Deal liberalism altered the overall legacy of U.S. imperialism. Many 
historians of Puerto Rico have argued that the PRRA is best understood as a kind of colonial 
reform project that conserved and enhanced U.S. control of Puerto Rico. If this is true, and the 
PRRA was indeed a “velvet glove” that balanced the “iron fist” of repression, then what does 




 As anyone who has spent any amount of time on the island knows, the New Deal 
continues to have a living presence in Puerto Rican daily life. Thanks to the considerable amount 
of scholarship on Puerto Rican politics over the last four decades, we know that the New Deal 
had long-lasting political ramifications—this is one point that is agreed on by the critics and 
champions of U.S. policies in Puerto Rico alike. This analysis of the PRRA, which hopes to 
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strengthen our understanding of how federal policy was articulated in Puerto Rico during the 
Great Depression, will examine the role that Puerto Ricans from different class backgrounds 
played in intellectualizing, administering, and constructing the New Deal in Puerto Rico. To do 
this we must not read Caribbean history backwards from the Cold War to the Cuban-Spanish-
American War, or assume that the trajectory of U.S. policy in the region followed an unbroken 
arc from Theodore to Franklin Roosevelt, or from the New Deal to the present. For Latin 
American, Caribbean, and U.S. historians alike, a more nuanced understanding of how public 
works helped transform Puerto Rico’s “colonial” status—and thus the nature of U.S. 
imperialism—during the 1930s and 1940s will hopefully provide a stronger understanding of the 
complexities of the U.S. role in the Caribbean region and world, and a more sound footing to 
either critique or support that role in the future.  
 While this dissertation will not analyze the concepts of colonialism, imperialism, and 
populism on an abstract level, it will embrace some of the conceptual frameworks and theoretical 
dilemmas that have marked previous scholarship on the relationship between Puerto Rico and the 
United States. In searching for a lexicon of colonialism that can incorporate the kinds of 
socioeconomic and political changes that Puerto Rico experienced during the 1930s and 1940s, 
this dissertation will resist the temptation to refer to Puerto Rico as a colonial puzzle or paradox. 
Instead, it will concentrate on how the internal aspects of Puerto Rico’s problems during the 
Great Depression conditioned Puerto Rican response to the many challenges of the decade. As 
one of the most complex and sometimes contradictory episodes in U.S. history, the New Deal 
introduced a series of profound social, economic, and political changes that reshaped many 
aspects of American life during the Great Depression and WWII, including the role of the federal 
government in everyday life and the concept of economic citizenship. Similarly, the changes in 
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public health engineered by New Deal public works construction produced widespread, 
unanticipated, and long-lasting changes in social, economic, and political life in Puerto Rico 
during the 1930s and after.  
At the same time, however, it must be noted at the outset that the New Deal did not 
“transform,” “modernize,” or completely “solve” the crisis of the Great Depression in Puerto 
Rico. Like other New Deal programs, however, the PRRA represented a decisive break from 
laissez faire federal policy and established a new commitment to public works and public health 
in Puerto Rico that outlived the lifespan of the New Deal. While addressing the critical and 
immediate realities of the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes and the Great Depression in 
Puerto Rico, the PRRA also attempted to make permanent changes to social and economic life—
embodied discursively in the change from relief to reconstruction. Federally financed but locally 
controlled, the PRRA helped produce a creative and significant new understanding of the 
“public” in Puerto Rico. 
The emergence of New Deal liberalism—in many ways symbolized by public works 
construction—helped create a pragmatic popular alliance with Puerto Ricans who shared a 
collective vision of permanent recovery. This recovery, while incomplete, made lasting 
contributions to the lives of millions of Puerto Ricans who have been U.S. citizens for nearly 100 
years since the passage of the Jones Act in 1917. While we may not always be satisfied with how 
these developments played out over time, the actions and opinions of Puerto Ricans living 
through the series of infrastructural, agricultural, environmental, and public health crises of the 
Great Depression deserve closer examination.   
This dissertation is divided into three parts: Political Transformations—an overview of 
the political landscape of Puerto Rico during the 1930s; Engineering a New Deal—a detailed 
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analysis of the PRRA’s massive public works program; and Caribbean Contexts—a comparison 
of the New Deal in Puerto Rico with other areas of the Spanish Caribbean. This organization is 
designed to underscore the extent to which the New Deal was a reaction to the social, political, 
economic, infrastructural, and environmental crises of the Great Depression. It was not an 
ideology, but a pragmatic and experimental alternative to what currently existed. Because the 
New Deal was most effective in areas where private capital was absent and local politics were 
hindering recovery, it is important to establish the local conditions that worsened the Depression 
and obstructed reconstruction in Puerto Rico. Part one, Political Transformations, will analyze 
the scale of the 1928 and 1932 hurricanes, the failure of existing political parties to lead recovery 
efforts, and the emergence of the New Deal in 1933 and 1935. Part two, Engineering a New 
Deal, will feature a close archival study of the creation of the Cataño cement plant, the 
construction of hurricane-proof public works, and the extension of hydro-electric power to the 
rural Puerto Rican countryside. Part three, Caribbean Contexts, will examine the political 
consequences of the New Deal in Puerto Rico by comparing the rise of populism in Puerto Rico 
during the 1940s with the rise of populism in Cuba and the Dominican Republic during the 





Part 1: Political Transformations: Puerto Rico During the Great Depression 
 
 The Great Depression left a large imprint on Puerto Rican politics. While the following 
three chapters are not a traditional history of Puerto Rico in the 1930s, they will serve to 
highlight three political developments that have had dramatic effects on the daily life of millions 
of Puerto Ricans in the years since World War II. These developments greatly shaped the ways 
in which Puerto Rico recovered from the Great Depression and the ways in which New Deal 
policy was implemented and experienced on the island. 
 Rather than retrace previously documented aspects of Puerto Rican politics such as the 
“colonial” governorships of Robert Gore and Blanton Winship, or changing conditions of the 
global sugar industry, these chapters will focus on three interconnected political developments 
that produced long-term changes in Puerto Rican society and politics: 1) the devastating San 
Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes that magnified all aspects of the Great Depression and resulted 
in the shift from a political economy of relief to one of reconstruction after 1935; 2) the 
breakdown of party politics in Puerto Rico between 1932 and 1940, during which time the four 
largest political parties fell apart and were replaced by new political parties and movements; 3) 
the emergence of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration—a locally-run New Deal 
agency that operated on the island from 1935 to 1955 and worked to build Puerto Rico’s public 
infrastructure and transfer its natural resources away from corporate control to permanent local 
ownership and administration. 
Perhaps no aspect of the Great Depression placed more stress on the political structure in 
Puerto Rico than the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes of 1928 and 1932. The hurricanes 
ravaged the infrastructure of the island, severely depressed the agricultural economy, and 
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increased some of the island’s most dangerous threats to public health. Beyond these social and 
economic effects, the hurricanes had important political ramifications as the local government 
struggled to provide immediate relief or long-term recovery from the storms.  
 In the course of the struggle to provide immediate relief or recovery, the existing 
structure of partisan politics went through a serious transformation as the four major political 
parties—Republican, Socialist, Nationalist, and Liberal—each lost popular support and viability 
in local elections during the 1930s. There were several factors contributing to this political 
transformation, including the successful but unsustainable “Coalition” of the island’s two leading 
pro-statehood parties, the Republicans and Socialists. Although the Coalición won narrow 
victories in the 1932 and 1936 elections, the Republican and Socialist parties were each unable to 
sustain political momentum into the 1940s. In contrast, the Nationalist Party lost electoral 
viability during its violent rise and rapid repression under the leadership of Pedro Albizu 
Campos, who foreswore electoral politics and called for armed resistance (including the 
assassination and attempted assassination of various U.S. and Puerto Rican officials) between 
1935 and 1937. Finally, the Liberal Party collapsed between 1936 and 1938 during the island-
wide debate about political violence and police repression, and due to its divided response to a 
surprise bill for complete independence proposed by conservative Democratic Senator Millard 
Tydings in Washington. 
 Even while this collapse of party politics was occurring, a third major political 
development was taking place as well: the emergence of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction 
Administration (PRRA) in 1935, which represented the island’s “Second” New Deal by 
replacing the relief-minded Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) that had 
existed during the “First” New Deal from 1933 to 1935. Referred to derisively by political 
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opponents in the Coalition and Nationalist Party as a “super government” or “colonial super 
government,” the PRRA was a locally-run New Deal agency that radically transformed Puerto 
Rican society through the construction of a federally financed public health infrastructure 
designed to secure the island from future hurricanes, increase life expectancy, and improve 
transportation and communication networks. Far from a “colonial” imposition, the PRRA was 
planned and run by a mostly Puerto Rican administrative and working staff. All projects, land 
acquisitions, infrastructural projects, and other capital investments were handed over in 
perpetuity to the “People of Puerto Rico” to be locally owned and administered—regardless of 
future political status. Put another way, these large transfers of properties and public works were 
not dependent on any future political or economic relationship with the United States, 
particularly significant given the uncertainty of island politics during the 1930s.  
 Social changes profoundly influenced Puerto Rican politics, and by the end of the 
Depression, when New Deal liberalism had replaced laissez faire individualism in Washington, 
local politics entered a period of transition toward the mass-based political coalition formed and 
maintained by the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) the 1940s. This new coalition—referred 
to at the time as a New Deal-type coalition—was, in part, held together by the pragmatic alliance 
between the PRRA and the Puerto Rican public that circumvented many of the corporate and 
partisan bulwarks against socioeconomic reform that had been cultivated during the previous 




Chapter 1: The Political Economy of Relief: 
The San Felipe and San Ciprián Hurricanes of 1928 and 1932 
 
 The San Felipe hurricane cut northwestward across Puerto Rico on September 13, 1928, 
striking the island with 150 mile per hour winds and torrential rain. Measured by the Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, in use by the National Hurricane Center since the 1970s, San 
Felipe was a Level Four major hurricane. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, which struck the Louisiana 
coast in 2005, the San Felipe was officially considered the deadliest natural disaster in U.S. 
history.
34
 The storm’s exact death toll in Puerto Rico is unknown; the official report was 300 
killed and between 500,000 and 700,000 homeless.
35
 Aside from the human toll, the storm’s 
sustained winds and intense rain—about 10 inches fell on the coast and more than 25 inches in 
the interior mountains—caused catastrophic infrastructural damage across the island: flooding 
Ponce and the southern coast of the island; demolishing wooden-framed houses; disorganizing 
radio, telephone, and telegraph systems within the island and to the outside world; interrupting 
railroad service; destroying 1,000 rural school houses and at least 20 larger schools; tearing the 
roof away from the tuberculosis clinic and destroying the leper colony quarters. In all, the storm 
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damaged at least 70% of the houses and 30% of the business structures in greater San Juan and 
caused between $40 million and $85 million in property damage island-wide, or between $547 
million and $1.2 billion today.
36
 In rural communities such as “Jauca,” the fictional home of Don 
Taso in Sidney Mintz’s Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History, residents received no 
advance warning of the approaching hurricane. In areas where the wooden houses and zinc roofs 
were no match for the storm, the destruction was nearly complete. As Taso recalled: 
After that I stopped outside the store, and from there I watched the hurricane as it 
unfolded. I saw the first-grade school tumble to the ground, and I watched the 
way the houses were going down . . . and by 9 P.M. many houses had fallen to the 
ground. From the steps of the Moras’ store there I watched our house. It was 
moving backward and then swayed forward again with the force of the wind. I 
waited from moment to moment for it to fall to the ground, and I could see from 





 In addition to the infrastructural damage, the storm disrupted the rural economy of the 
island, as all major agricultural industries were severely hurt—with sugar, coffee, tobacco, and 
citrus crops uprooted and/or completely destroyed. A recent study of the losses suffered by 
tobacco farmers paints a particularly grim picture, with 6,316 tobacco ranches destroyed and 
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over 25% of all tobacco seedbeds washed away in the uncompromising wind and rain.
38
 For 
tobacco, coffee, and citrus farmers, the 1928 storm amplified the existing financial strain and 
created severe restrictions to long-term recovery. In tobacco, San Felipe compounded the 
disastrous 1927 crop, when the price paid to tobacco farmers had decreased by 48% due, in part, 
to an increased amount of acreage planted in 1926 and 1927 that the market could not absorb. In 
coffee, the millions of dollars in losses incurred by planters were multiplied by the fact coffee 
bushes take 4 to 5 years to mature.
39
 Citrus farmers, who had exported over one million crates of 
fruit in 1927, lost at least 150,000 fruit-bearing trees in the 1928 storm—as 35,000 trees were 




 Recovery from San Felipe was far from complete when the San Ciprián hurricane moved 
horizontally across the northern length of Puerto Rico on September 26-27, 1932. The four years 
separating the two hurricanes had been especially difficult, as two major banks failed during the 
onset of the Great Depression and a large number of private commercial and industrial 
businesses on the island were forced into bankruptcy between 1929 and 1932.
41
 San Ciprián 
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killed hundreds, left at least 400,000 people homeless, and like the San Felipe caused extensive 
damage to the infrastructure and agriculture of the island.
42
 While San Ciprián destroyed over 
90,000 houses and 1.6 million farm buildings, it also killed nearly 500,000 livestock animals and 
inflicted staggering financial losses in all major agricultural industries: $11.5 million in sugar, 
$3.7 million in coffee, $1.9 million in citrus, $11.5 million in coconuts and palm trees, $750,000 
in tobacco.
43
 Touching nearly every community on the island, the twin hurricanes affected nearly 
all aspects of daily life in Puerto Rico during the Great Depression. The combined damage of the 
two storms was over $175 million—nearly $3 billion today.
44
 The daunting tasks of providing 
immediate assistance and long-term recovery were further hindered by a political economy of 
relief that sustained an older model of politics in Puerto Rico. 
 When the San Felipe hurricane struck the southern coast of Puerto Rico in September 
1928, federal politics was dominated by laissez faire individualism, the prevailing economic 
philosophy of the Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover administrations. For 
U.S. citizens—American and Puerto Rican-born alike—the social safety net was comprised of a 
variety of private community, charity, and corporate organizations. This safety net, stitched 
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together by churches, charities, unions, settlement houses, community organizations, immigrant 
societies, fraternal orders, agricultural associations, and “welfare capitalist” employers, worked 
in tandem with local, county, and state governments to provide for temporary assistance in times 
of environmental crisis. Before the New Deal, it was to these local and private institutions that 
public welfare was entrusted.
45
   
 When natural disasters struck, such as the Mississippi flood of 1927 or the San Felipe 
hurricane of 1928, the private safety net was usually expanded to include some federal 
coordination. As Secretary of Commerce from March 1921 to August 1928, Herbert Hoover had 
enlarged the role of the federal government as a kind of economic umpire, skillfully managing 
the relationship between corporations, local governments, and voters. In times of environmental 
crisis, this form of business “associationalism” relied heavily on the financial support of 
corporate philanthropy and the tireless work of the American Red Cross.  
 In Puerto Rico, this model of disaster relief echoed the type of hurricane relief that had 
existed in the Spanish colonial system during the nineteenth century. The key difference between 
the Spanish and federal relief model was that under Spanish rule, there were no private 
corporations as in the United States. Instead, royal concessions were given to local entrepreneurs 
who became “government contractors” and established “mercantile associations” that the Crown 
could seize in the event of military or other necessity.
46
 Despite this difference, the Spanish and 
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U.S. models were quite similar. Each relied on a mixture of philanthropic, religious, and private 
cooperation that strengthened the power of large landowners and failed to produce long-term 
interventions in public security or health.
47
 
 Before analyzing relief efforts following the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes of 
1928 and 1932, it will be helpful to examine previous relief efforts on the island. Hurricanes 
were not new to Puerto Rico, but rather an annual occurrence. The San Narciso hurricane, for 
example, came ashore near Fajardo on October 29, 1867. By that year, the Spanish royal 
government had extensive experience with hurricanes in the Caribbean, with storms of various 
sizes striking major Spanish Caribbean settlements in Santo Domingo, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 
Florida every year between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Puerto Rico, at least 25 
major hurricanes were recorded during this time, including San Narciso of 1867.
48
 As Stuart 
Schwartz has argued, relief efforts following San Narciso revealed both the Spanish colonial 
system’s negligent infrastructural program and its vulnerability to popular resistance. Despite 
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their long experience with hurricanes, Schwartz found that the Spanish spent only 3% of its 
colonial budget on building a basic infrastructure that could buffer the destructive fury of tropical 
storms.
49
 By distributing all royal relief funds through local estates and giving large landowners 
the power to make essential decisions regarding the distribution of these funds, nineteenth-
century relief efforts enhanced the influence and power of the landed elite. 
 Three decades later, when the San Ciriaco hurricane struck Puerto Rico on August 8, 
1899 with 100 mile per hour winds, the storm presented the same dilemmas and opportunities to 
the U.S. military government and large local landowners.
50
 The storm struck the southern third 
of the island in an almost straight horizontal line from Humacao to Mayagüez leaving nearly 
250,000 people homeless and without food on top of an island-wide $20 million in estimated 
property damage.
51
 The coffee sector was hit hardest, totaling about half the damage; coffee 
exports in 1899 were only 10% of their average in the five years from 1894 to 1898.
52
 Brigadier 
General George W. Davis, who had served in the Cuban-Spanish-American War and was the last 
military governor of Puerto Rico, oversaw relief efforts that were modeled on the Spanish 
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colonial system and combined philanthropic, humanitarian, and political motives.
53
 General 
Davis, who later served as chairman of the Central Committee of the Red Cross from 1906 to 
1914, pressed President William McKinley and Secretary of State Elihu Root for food supplies. 
In addition, Root led a campaign to promote charitable relief directed at the U.S. public to be 
coordinated through mayors of large U.S. cities.
54
 Relief aid from the U.S. was coordinated on 
the island by the Board of Charities, which was established in San Juan by Davis and John Van 
Rennselaer Hoff, a Major and surgeon in the U.S. Army.  
 Like the nineteenth-century Spanish colonial system, U.S. military hurricane relief efforts 
in 1899 strengthened the position of large local landowners—as Davis and Hoff sought alliances 
with local elites to maintain order while coping with the disaster and rebuilding the island’s 
economy.
55
 These alliances were solely between the Board of Charities and the planter class, 
which handled all applications for relief on behalf of their tenants and workers.
56
 In fairness, 
there were not many alternative options, as the basic infrastructure of the island had not been 
constructed to facilitate direct relationships between tenants and the government—much less 
developed for public ownership. In the aftermath of the hurricane, which flooded rivers and left 
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muddy, impassable roads, Hoff requested extra pack mules, wagon trains, and schooners to 
deliver relief supplies to the interior mountains and coastal areas.
57
 Other U.S. officials, such as 
Lieutenant Colonel Camillo Cassatti Cadmus Carr, who commanded the west coast military 
district of the island centered in Mayagüez, complained that hurricane relief work was 
complicated by the long “years of misgovernment, unequal taxation, and official neglect” during 
the nineteenth century.
58
 In addition, the hurricane exacerbated partisan tensions on the island, as 




 In the days and weeks following the San Felipe hurricane of 1928, it was clear that 
relatively little had changed regarding disaster relief from the Spanish colonial or U.S. military 
strategy. After the “Great Mississippi Flood” of April 1927, President Coolidge had actually 
decreased federal involvement in coordinating disaster relief. That spring, the Mississippi River 
and much of its vast tributary system overflowed its banks and levees from Cairo, Illinois to New 
Orleans, flooding an area 500 miles long by 50 miles wide, killing hundreds, and forcing the 
evacuation of millions of people in nine states, including Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, 
Kentucky, Texas, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
60
 Initially, as the nation listened to 
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radio reports and watched newsreel footage of the devastation, Coolidge refused to intervene in 
relief and rescue efforts. A week later, finally relenting to the pleas of state governors, Coolidge 
appointed Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover to liaison with the Red Cross and coordinate a 
federal plan for relief among five cabinet departments and the Army and Navy.
61
 
 Politically, the flood allowed Hoover to distinguish himself from the president, and 
position himself once again as both the “Great Engineer” and the “Great Humanitarian” of the 
WWI years, when he had successfully organized food relief for 10 million Belgians, guided the 
Food Administration’s “Food Will Win the War” campaign, and coordinated famine relief in 
postwar Russia. He used the national spotlight to launch his successful presidential campaign the 
following year.
62
 Hoover’s plan for flood relief was twofold. On one hand, he attempted to turn 
refugee camps into sites of economic rehabilitation that included education in agriculture, 
personal health and hygiene, and home economics. On the other hand, Hoover sought to rebuild 
the flooded region through credit provided by a series of private nonprofit corporations that 
could loan money to indebted cotton planters and sugar growers on easier terms than private 
local or regional banks.  
 Throughout May of 1927, Hoover’s greatest contribution to flood relief efforts was in 
fundraising for the private relief loan corporations. In perhaps the finest example of how he 
viewed the role of the federal government in the face of disaster, Hoover raised over $13 million 
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for his relief loan program by personally appealing to senior executives at major corporations 
such as General Electric, Standard Oil, Ford, General Motors, Dodge, Sears, Marshall Field, 
Proctor & Gamble, Allied Chemical, U.S. Steel, the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, and the 
Pennsylvania and Illinois Central railroads. This loan money would supplement the $17 million 
in direct relief provided by the Red Cross. 
63
 Envisioning a type of business-charity-government 
partnership, Hoover “blended the [American Red Cross] and government relief . . . and sought to 
make the [American Red Cross] an unofficial extension of the federal government after he took 
office as president” in 1929.
64
 
 When the San Felipe hurricane struck Puerto Rico in 1928, Calvin Coolidge was still in 
office. The coordination of government and charity functions started by Hoover during the 
Mississippi flood had already begun, and the Red Cross led all immediate relief efforts in Puerto 
Rico. Here, however, rather than work directly with the federal government, the Red Cross 
coordinated relief efforts with the locally elected legislature, which had chosen civil engineer 
Guillermo Esteves Volckers to head the relief campaign. For Esteves, who was Commissioner of 
the Interior at the time, relief efforts reflected the legacy of the Spanish colonial, U.S. military, 
and welfare capitalist models, and were clearly focused on providing charitable relief. Influenced 
by a progressive era willingness to both victimize and blame the disaster-struck population by 
implicitly questioning their moral and political aptitude, Esteves, like previous relief 
administrators, established a hierarchical system of disaster relief following the 1928 storm. 
Instead of the large landowning class, however, that had been propped up in the Spanish and 
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U.S. military models, Esteves insisted that the colono class of small family farmers was of the 
highest moral character and could be trusted with the distribution of relief loans and supplies.
65
 
The tenant farmer and urban poor were contracted by the local government to labor on 




 Born in Aguadilla, and educated as an engineer at Tufts University in Massachusetts, 
Guillermo Esteves is an important figure in this story beyond his coordination of relief after the 
1928 hurricane. As one of the most central figures in Puerto Rican civil engineering, Esteves 
served in a variety of government positions, including the Head Engineer of Puerto Rican 
Municipal Works, Superintendent of Puerto Rican Public Works, and Commissioner of the 
Interior of Puerto Rico. In the decade following the San Felipe hurricane, Esteves served as the 
Regional and then Assistant Administrator of the PRRA. During the New Deal, Esteves helped 
reorient hurricane relief efforts toward programs for permanent reconstruction through the 
construction of cement-based houses, schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure.  
 As for the 1928 hurricane, we do not know if the relief system implemented by Hoover, 
Esteves, and the Red Cross was satisfactory to President Coolidge, because he remained rather 
silent on the issue. For Coolidge, Puerto Rico existed as both a symbol of what was right about 
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U.S. territorial policy and as a potential stepping stone to closer diplomatic relations with Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Unconcerned with the plight of the depressed agricultural economy 
or the lag in basic utility services as compared to urban areas of the U.S., Coolidge had 
celebrated the goodwill flight of Charles Lindbergh to Latin American earlier in 1928 as a 
peaceful attempt to blunt growing criticism of U.S. foreign policy in the region. Landing in 
Puerto Rico on February 3, 1928, Lindbergh was enthusiastically greeted by Horace Mann 
Towner, the 72-year-old governor of Puerto Rico who had served under both Warren G. Harding 
and Calvin Coolidge. Even as the Puerto Rican legislature used Lindbergh’s arrival as an 
opportunity to express dissatisfaction with federal policy, Towner called Lindbergh the “prophet 
of a . . . better day.”
67
 This message contrasted with that of José Tous Soto, the Speaker of the 
House, who ambiguously requested that Lindbergh convey the message of “Liberty or Death!” to 
the American public while, at the same time, asking for the “right to a place in the sun of this 
land of ours, brightened by the stars of your glorious flag.”
68
 
 To Arnold G. Dana, a retired statistician who published Speaker Tous Soto’s message in 
the U.S. in 1928, it was not a request for independence but rather one of many “impassioned 
appeal[s] for consideration and assistance” in the face of extreme economic hardship that had 
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been “often reiterated in vain in recent years.”
69
 In 1931, three years after the San Felipe 
hurricane struck the island, Luis Muñoz Marín celebrated the expansion of the relief efforts 
coordinated by Hoover, Esteves, and the Red Cross, writing that Governor Theodore Roosevelt, 
Jr. deserved credit for obtaining increased federal aid to Puerto Rico. That year, Roosevelt, Jr. 
secured over $18 million in hurricane relief aid for food and basic supplies, relief loans to small 
farmers, and education programs to combat disease and malnutrition. Despite the increased 
amount of federal aid, hurricane relief under Hoover and Roosevelt, Jr. still reflected the 
individualist economic policy of the 1920s. Dismissing the idea of other types of federal 
intervention, Hoover declared, “we cannot exorcise a Caribbean hurricane with statutory law.”
70
 
The increased aid, which Muñoz Marín applauded as a “palliative, based on philanthropy,” was 
only part of the relief equation.
71
  
 In addition to direct aid, hurricane relief also included federally supported loans, mostly 
directed to small farmers and cooperative associations. These loans were made possible by the 
creation of the Porto Rico Hurricane Relief Commission (PRHRC), which was established three 
months after the hurricane, on December 21, 1928, and dissolved into the PRRA in 1935. 
Composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture, War, and Treasury, the PRHRC was administered 
on the island by a collection of local offices, including the Collector of Customs at San Juan, the 
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Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
72
 Just over one 
year after the PRHRC was created, as the U.S. sunk further into the Great Depression, President 
Hoover urged Congress to make an additional $3 million available to the hurricane relief loan 
fund, writing that Puerto Ricans were “still suffering from the effects of the disastrous hurricane 
of September 13, 1928. There exists a real and immediate need for appropriating these funds in 
order to alleviate the distress due to unemployment on the Island and to enable the Commission 
to continue its farm rehabilitation program.”
73 
Although the resolution became law in January 
1930, the appropriation was defeated in the House of Representatives.   
Funding issues aside, the PRHRC was deeply influenced by Puerto Rican farmers who 
closely followed federal relief activities. In nearly all agricultural industries, various ligas 
agrícolas (agricultural leagues) had been established to represent farmers’ interests in the local 
legislature. Many of these organizations participated in the Asociación de Agricultores 
Puertorriqueños (AAP), an island-wide association founded in 1924 that published information 
in El agricultor puertorriqueño,(the official publication of the AAP) and lobbied for agricultural 
interests in several industries.
74
 In 1931, for example, AAP representatives traveled to 
Washington to lobby for additional relief funds. Their efforts swayed federal policy, and they 
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returned home to Puerto Rico with over $8 million in relief loans—$6 million for agriculture, $2 
million for infrastructure (schools and roads), and $100,000 for the purchase and distribution of 
seed—as well as temporary tax reductions for farmers still affected by the destruction of San 
Felipe.
75
 The successful participation and growing influence of the AAP suggested the increasing 
desire for greater participation in relief and recovery efforts from both the hurricanes and, after 
1929, the economic downturn of the Great Depression as well. As Teresita Levy has argued, 
these “examples suggest that farmers were not only involved at all levels of the island’s 
governmental structure, but had learned how to skillfully lobby and influence the policies of the 
U.S. government which directly affected their interests.”
76
     
 Of course, this was not unique to Puerto Rico, as the Great Depression was a global event 
that was experienced at the local level. As Lizabeth Cohen has written, the reduction of the Great 
Depression to a series of external and “impersonal events—the stock market crash, 
unemployment, mortgage foreclosures, bank failures—obscures the reality of these disasters as 
people experienced them.”
77
 While most people initially turned to private social and local 
political structures for help, there was a gradual and then rapid appeal to the federal government 
as the social safety net frayed and then tore away during the long summers and bitter winters 
between 1929 and 1932. In communities all across the country, Hooverism was put on trial as, in 
state after state, city after city, the network of private charity and local government organizations 
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proved unable to cope with the growing demands of the crisis. While U.S. citizens increasing 
looked toward the federal government as a potential ally in relieving the stress of the Depression, 
Hoover initially refused to intervene and continued to call on private charities and local 
governments to provide relief, as he maintained an ideological faith in the ability of private 
welfare and free markets to bring about the “New Era” of permanent prosperity and final triumph 
over poverty.
78
 As conditions worsened, however, the Hoover administration sought a more 
direct role in recovery efforts, particularly through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC). Created on January 22, 1932, the RFC was designed to provide aid and loans to both 
public and private institutions, including state, county, and municipal governments and private 
corporations such as banks, railroads, insurance companies, and home lending agencies.
79
  
 Following the San Ciprián hurricane of September 26-27, 1932, the RFC took a 
pronounced role in relief and recovery efforts in Puerto Rico. Because the RFC was essentially 
an expansion of the types of loans made available by the PRHRC, the ability of the RFC to loan 
money in Puerto Rico was complicated by the fact that the local government had nearly depleted 
its legal borrowing capacity during the first three years of the Great Depression.
80
 By that time, 
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the growing discrepancy between Hoover’s New Era of laissez faire capitalism and the American 
public’s increasing demand for direct federal intervention had all but assured the certain defeat of 
Herbert Hoover and the Republican Party in the 1932 elections.
81
 In his place, voters elected 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 50-year-old Democratic Governor of New York. Though his 
campaign was often vague on details, FDR had promised a “New Deal” for American citizens; in 
addition, voters could look to his gubernatorial record to see the outlines of several New Deal 
policies ranging from emergency relief to public works to hydroelectric power. Through a 
combination of policy and politics—through bold legislative experimentation and shrewd 
coalition building—the New Deal came to represent a clear break from previous federal policy.
82
 
In many ways, however, it was not an immediate break from past policy and much of FDR’s 
“First” New Deal policy built on the existing RFC and has been called, in retrospect, little more 
than “Hooverism in high gear.”
83
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 As for Puerto Rico, FDR did not stray very far from Hoover’s relief model, and the 
hurricane relief program of the First New Deal continued many of Coolidge and Hoover’s 
individualistic relief policies. Even though the creation of the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA) in May 1933 and the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration 
(PRERA) in August 1933 signaled a new course, relief was still shaped by the kind of 
philanthropic voluntarism that had marked earlier periods.
84
 Although relief spending was 
greatly increased from earlier eras, the PRERA was seen—even by its own administrators—as a 
“stopgap” measure that fell short of long-range economic development or the creation of truly 
public works on the island.
85
  
 Throughout the remainder of 1933 and 1934, as excitement over the New Deal and 
PRERA increased, the older model of charitable relief came under increased scrutiny on the 
island. For even as the PRHRC, PRERA, and American Red Cross continued the process of 
providing shelter, distributing food and clothing, and making emergency loans to farmers, it 
became increasingly clear to Puerto Rican engineers, doctors, academics, and workers from all 
class backgrounds that the scale of the current crisis was too large for the individualistic model 
of charitable relief. Not only did existing relief agencies fail to relieve the immediate calamity, 
they actually made the crisis worse in three ways. First, by relying on a model of charitable 
fundraising that had existed under the Spanish colonial and U.S. military rule, hurricane relief 
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efforts prior to the New Deal strengthened fundamental inequalities in Puerto Rican society by 
enhancing the power of large corporate landowners. During the Coolidge and Hoover 
administrations, large landowners, such as international sugar corporations, were essentially in 
charge of the allocation and distribution of relief supplies—just as they had been during the 
nineteenth century. These policies, however, should not be associated with the Republican Party 
alone, as the basic model of charitable relief was extended by FDR during the First New Deal. 
Second, philanthropic charity and relief loans were not enough to make the necessary 
interventions in constructing a permanent recovery through hurricane-proof public works. Third, 
and most crucial to Puerto Rican doctors and engineers, the political economy of relief after the 
San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes had actually increased the three deadliest public health 
crises confronting the island during the 1930s: malaria, hookworm, and malnutrition (which 
included dietary related gastro-intestinal disorders such as chronic diarrhea and enteritis).
86
 As 
we will see, these basic public works and public health interventions did not begin until the 
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Chapter 2: The Breakdown of Party Politics in Puerto Rico: The Fracturing of 
the Coalition, the Nationalists, and the Liberal Party, 1932-1940 
 
 The failure of the hurricane relief model played a part in the political chaos that unfolded 
in Puerto Rico after the onset of the Great Depression. During the 1930s, the inability of existing 
political structures—external or internal—to provide timely and lasting relief from the twin 
forces of hurricanes and economic depression had serious consequences for each of the four 
major political parties. These consequences shaped the limits and possibilities of local politics. 
This chapter will consider the electoral success of the pro-statehood Coalition in the 1932 and 
1936 elections; the rise and decline of a revolutionary wing of the Nationalist Party led by Pedro 
Albizu Campos; and the breakup of the Liberal Party during the debate that consumed island 
politics following the assassination of Police Commissioner Francis E. Riggs and the 
introduction of the Tydings Bill in 1936, and the Ponce Massacre in 1937. Taken together, the 
collapse of the Coalition, the Nationalist Party, and the Liberal Party during the 1930s paved the 
way for a puertorriqueño form of populist politics that emerged during and after World War II. 
By the time of the 1940 elections, the Republican, Socialist, Nationalist, and Liberal parties had 
each experienced too many internal fractures to stem the challenges to the old political order set 
in motion by the New Deal. Capitalizing on these fractures, a new form of mass-based politics 
was led by Luis Muñoz Marín and the Partido Popular Democrático—or Popular Democratic 
Party—which not only won the 1940 elections, but also dominated Puerto Rican politics through 








 On November 8, 1932, the same day that Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president, 
the Coalition won control of the Puerto Rican legislature in a close election. Made up of an 
alliance between the Republican Party and the Socialist Party, the Coalition governed the Puerto 
Rican Senate and House of Representatives for the rest of the 1930s. Occurring just six weeks 
after the San Ciprián hurricane tore across the island, the election united the political party of 
large landowners with that of the organized labor movement, and created a legislative majority 
that captured 6 out of 7 seats in the Puerto Rican Senate, and 28 out of 35 seats in the House of 
Representatives. Individually, neither the Republican nor Socialist party had nearly the same 
popular support (as defined by number of votes) as the Puerto Rican Liberal Party; combined, 
however, the Coalition won 54.3% of the vote compared to 44.3% for the Liberal Party. The 
election made Socialista Santiago Iglesias Pantín and Republicano Rafael Martínez Nadal the 
two most influential politicians in Puerto Rico. As the Resident Commissioner in Washington 
and President of the Puerto Rican Senate, respectively, Iglesias and Martínez Nadal wielded 
considerable local power for the rest of the decade, from 1933 to 1941.
87
  
                                                 
 
87
 A variety of polling data has been compiled by El Archivo de las Elecciones en Puerto 
Rico. For Resident Commissioner, see “Escrutinio de las Elecciones Generales del 8 de 
noviembre de 1932: Resultados para Candidatos a Comisionado Residente,” accessed August 23, 
2013, http://eleccionespuertorico.org/archivo/1932.html; for Senate and House results, see 
Elecciones en Puerto Rico: Mapa Electoral – Elecciones Generales 1932: Distritos Legislativos,” 
accessed August 23, 2013, http://electionspuertorico.org/mapas/legislativos/1932.html. For two 
of the most comprehensive analyses of the party politics surrounding the 1932 elections, see 
Morales Carrión, ch. 11-12; and Ayala and Bernabe, ch. 4-7. For a sound but strictly class-based 
analysis of the era, see Pantojas-García, Development Strategies as Ideology, ch. 1-2. The 1932 




 Like their leaders Iglesias and Martínez Nadal, the Socialist and Republican parties were 
united in their support of statehood, and their Coalition mounted strong opposition to nearly all 
other political parties during the 1930s, including the independence movements of both the 
Liberal and Nationalist parties. Importantly, their Coalition was also the most formidable critic 
of the New Deal in Puerto Rico, and its rise to power the same year as the election of FDR had 
direct consequences for how the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) and the 
Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA) operated during the decade. The Coalition’s 
opposition to the New Deal emerged despite its early and vocal support for Roosevelt, which 
included organizing a parade of nearly 8,000 supporters in San Juan through streets lined with 
thousands more in October 1933. Carrying banners that pledged support to “Roosevelt y el 
Nuevo Trato!” and that declared to Roosevelt that “1,500,000 Puerto Ricans Support You!,” the 
parade ended at the governor’s mansion of La Fortaleza where Martínez Nadal read a “spirited 
speech” before turning to Governor Robert H. Gore and giving him “a typical Puerto Rican 
embrace.”
88
 Within a year, however, it was clear that rather than representing the New Deal in 




 Though far from united on every issue, Iglesias and Martínez Nadal formed a strong 
political partnership that pushed the agenda of statehood on behalf of the international and 
locally owned sugar companies, and the Federación Libre de Trabajadores (FLT)—the major 
labor organization in Puerto Rico at the time. The Coalition was not opposed to New Deal policy 
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on an ideological basis, the way that conservative Republicans were opposed to FDR in the 
United States. Rather, the Coalition’s opposition was driven primarily by local partisanship as 
Republican and Socialist leaders attempted to drive a wedge between liberal New Dealers in 
Washington and the Liberales, the political party which represented many of the small family 
farmers and coffee growers of the interior highlands. Ironically, even though the Liberals were 
against statehood—falling somewhere between partial independence and increased political 
autonomy within the territorial system—they shared many of the New Deal’s goals of social and 
economic reform and forged lasting alliances with the new actors and new agencies of the FDR 
years. The Coalition, which openly campaigned for statehood, repeatedly looked to thwart the 
implementation of New Deal reforms. The reason was clear: local partisan politics and the 
Coalition’s desire to control all federal funds and patronage.
90
  
 On the outside of this picture was the Partido Nacionalista, led by Julio Medina 
González and Pedro Albizu Campos. Receiving only 1.4% of the vote in the 1932 elections, 
many Nationalists transitioned away from the electoral politics of the elderly Medina González 
(first elected to public office in 1905) and gravitated toward the politics of non-participation and 
the call for direct action articulated by the younger Albizu Campos.
91
 As Albizu Campos moved 
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the Nationalists further away from electoral politics, the party became increasingly identified as 
an “anti-colonial” independence movement that employed violent tactics in its struggle with the 
federal government, particularly after 1936.
92
 Despite their anti-colonial ambitions, however, the 
emergence of Albizu Campos as the leader of the Nationalists must also be seen in the context of 
local politics—particularly as a reaction against the electoral success of the Republican and 
Socialist parties and the new push for statehood that the Coalition represented.
93
 
 Despite its success in the 1932 and 1936 elections, however, the Coalition was unable to 
sustain its base of support and did not outlive the Great Depression. Indeed, so strong were the 
crises of hurricane and Depression that, by the end of the decade, no political party had survived 
the 1930s intact. There were at least four internal factors that contributed to this decline of the 
party system during the Depression, beginning with a generational shift in leadership in the 
parties—underscored by the death of Liberal leader Antonio Barceló in 1938, Socialist Iglesias 
in 1939, and Republican Martínez Nadal in 1940.
94
 Second, there was an unprecedented wave of 
strikes and labor mobilization during the decade that, as in other parts of Latin America, 
galvanized new bases of popular support. Third, there was a series of spectacular confrontations 
between a small number of nationalist protesters and the local police, as Albizu Campos and his 
nationalist cadets began a campaign of political violence directed at U.S. and Puerto Rican 
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administrators. This campaign was met with an unsympathetic response from officials in the U.S. 
and on the island. Fourth, and perhaps least appreciated in the political historiography of Puerto 
Rico, was the emergence of the New Deal. As the PRRA replaced the PRERA in 1935, it became 
clear that FDR’s New Deal was now committed to attacking a wide range of public health issues 
in Puerto Rico, constructing a new public works infrastructure in all parts of the island, and 
developing a new political alliance centered on New Deal liberalism—which helped foster the 
transition from a paradigm of relief to one of reconstruction.  
 As the Depression worsened, a growing number of Puerto Ricans from across class 
backgrounds and party loyalties questioned the hurricane relief system and began to make new 
demands on a variety of local social and political organizations. While some asked new 
questions about the external colonial structure, many, like people elsewhere, directed their 
demands at local political structures. Tested by the fury of the hurricanes, however, local politics 
in Puerto Rico broke apart in the second half of the 1930s and all four of the major political 
parties fractured amid a series of compromises, bargains, and alliances, each discredited as 
unable to provide lasting recovery and security from the devastating storms of 1928 and 1932.   
 In 1932, however, it was the Coalition that carried the day during what Arturo Morales 
Carrión has called the “kaleidoscopic era” of Puerto Rican politics.
95
 Neither component of the 
Coalition was a new party. Both the Republican and Socialist parties were products of an earlier 
generation of Puerto Rican politics that emerged after 1898, when the Treaty of Paris officially 
ended the Cuban-Spanish-American War and Puerto Rico was ceded from Spanish to U.S. 
jurisdiction.
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 Following a brief period of military rule, Puerto Rico was transferred to U.S. 
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civilian control by the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900. Though not—by itself—the object of 
imperialist desire, Puerto Rico became an economically desirable territory as a major sugar 
producer during the first 30 years of U.S. rule—as the Foraker Act liberalized economic relations 
between the island and mainland by allowing for free, untaxed trade. The primary four export 
industries after 1900were sugar, tobacco, coffee, and needlework. Until the New Deal, most 
infrastructural developments such as major roads and electric power were built primarily to 
benefit these large export industries. Sugar cultivation, the largest of all, was led by a mix of both 
local and international corporations and became the “decisive” sector of the Puerto Rican 
economy, with cane grown in the lowlands that form a ring around the entire island, totaling 
about 1/3 of the island’s cultivated land. In all, sugar production for export markets in the U.S 
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 Despite being just one of several important economic sectors, sugar came to have a large 
bearing on both colonial and local politics after 1900. This influence reached its zenith when the 
Coalition won control of the Senate in 1932, and placed Republican Martínez Nadal in the 
presidency. Sugar’s influence on local politics was a development of the island’s legal status as 
an “unincorporated” territory of the United States. From the turn of the twentieth century to the 
end of World War II, all Puerto Rican governors, top cabinet officials (such as Attorney General, 
Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Education), and members of the Supreme Court were 
appointed by the U.S. President without popular consent. All other executive government 
positions, however, were appointed by the Governor on the advice and consent of the local 
Senate. Because most governors knew very little about Puerto Rican politics and society, they 
came to rely on the Senate for both personnel recommendations and public support. The 




 By this time, the connection between corporate landowners and the Republican Party was 
long established. Because there was no strong pro-independence movement during the nineteenth 
century, the formation of political parties after 1900 occurred within the context of the new 
political and economic relationship with the U.S., as outlined by the Foraker Act, and the 
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massive expansion of corporate power in the U.S. between the 1880s and the 1920s.
99
 From its 
inception in 1899, the Republican Party positioned itself as the leading pro-statehood party on 
the island. For Republicans, statehood was viewed as a pragmatic choice. As Edgardo Meléndez 
has argued, this position was not the result of a cynical “opportunism” or evidence of an 
“assimilationist” cultural mentality, but was rather a reaction to the lack of social and economic 
mobility during Spanish era and the expression of new goals for the “transformation of Puerto 
Rican society through the absorption of American social, economic, political, and cultural 
institutions,” particularly modern corporate strategies, democracy, and progressive politics.
100
 
During this period, as U.S. policy in Puerto Rico centered on a program of “Americanization” 
through the implementation of English in all Puerto Rican schools, the early Republicans came 
to be seen at the time as an “auxiliary of the American government in Puerto Rico.”
101
 As Pedro 
Cabán has argued, these early Republicans “expressed a fervent devotion to the colonizing 
mission of the United States” and hoped to prepare Puerto Rico for eventual statehood.
102
 
Building on the annexation movement of the late-nineteenth century, the Republican Party was 
originally comprised of Spanish-educated businessmen and professionals living in small urban 
areas. Casting their economic platform on a closer relationship to the U.S., these businessmen 
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and professionals took advantage of increased educational opportunities in U.S. prep schools and 
colleges available to the sons of the privileged classes.
103
   
 Over time, Republican politics became closely identified with the expanding sugar sector, 
which was made up of a collection of local and international agricultural corporations that sought 
to strengthen the economic ties between Puerto Rico and the U.S., and believed that a cultural 
Americanization project would help lead the island to eventual statehood. By 1924, however, as 
it became clear that the U.S. Congress was not actively considering Puerto Rican statehood, the 
Republican Party began to fracture—with one wing supporting José Tous Soto and seeking an 
alliance with the liberal Unión Puertorriqueña, and another wing rallying behind Rafael 
Martínez Nadal and seeking an alliance with the Socialists. For the Tous Soto wing, the desire to 
align with the Union Party and its leader Antonio Rafael Barceló meant a wavering on the 
statehood issue, as Barceló and the Unionists had led the struggle against the expansion of 
international corporate interests in Puerto Rico and the cultural Americanization program 
associated with the Republicans. Founded in 1904 by Luis Muñoz Rivera and Antonio Barceló, 
the Unión Puertorriqueña walked the line between cultural independence and political 
autonomy, and drew its largest support from small landowners and younger professionals in 
medicine, law, engineering, and academia.
104
 In 1924, the Tous Soto wing of the Republican 
Party formally merged with the Union Party, and their newly formed Alianza won the elections 
of 1924 and 1928. 
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 It was, however, an uneasy alliance that disintegrated when Barceló withdrew his support 
from the Alianza and formed the Partido Liberal just before the 1932 elections. Frustrated with 
the limitations of partisan politics within the existing “colonial” structure, Barceló and younger 
members of the Liberal Party such as Luis Muñoz Marín increasingly campaigned for political 
independence. This stance, which Barceló and Muñoz Marín had both publicly and privately 
articulated by the Spring of 1932, was too strong for their pro-statehood Republican partners in 
the Alliance. On March 13, 1932 the Liberal Party released its official political platform, 
publicly declaring that “its purpose is to demand the immediate recognition of the sovereignty of 
Puerto Rico and make it effective by the most rapid, most practical, and most direct methods, 
thus establishing the absolute independence of Puerto Rico.” That December, a month after 
losing the 1932 elections to the Coalition, Muñoz Marín privately wrote to Ruby Black in 
Washington that the Liberal Party was “for independence” and retains a “special tenderness for 
the Democratic party in spite of its having statehood in its platform.”
 105
 
 For the Martínez Nadal wing of the Republican Party, the split with Tous Soto in 1924 
resulted in an alliance with the Partido Socialista, the political arm of the Federación Libre de 
Trabajadores (FLT)—the oldest labor union in Puerto Rico that was founded during the first 
years of U.S. rule and remained closely connected to the “bread and butter unionism” of Samuel 
Gompers and the American Federation of Labor (AFL).
106
 Led by Santiago Iglesias Pantín, a 
Spanish born journalist and labor organizer, the FLT had been originally composed of Puerto 
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Rican artisans and craftspeople (men and women employed in a variety of professions, including 
as painters, carpenters, cigar makers, and dock workers) who participated in a wide array of 
political societies, agricultural societies, and cooperative associations.
107
 For these workers, the 
transfer of political organization from Spain to the U.S. offered a multitude of new possibilities, 
as the U.S. intervention in Puerto Rico was infused with a progressive era focus on expanding 
literacy, education, and the embrace of applied scientific techniques while, at the same time, 
including Puerto Rican industries into the U.S. system of tariff protections.
108
 Though never 
totaling more than 7% of the overall population of the island, this artisan “class” of Puerto Rican 
workers saw the post-1900 Puerto Rican political economy not as a “colonial” takeover, but as 
the basic common ground of a strong working alliance.
109
 Not surprisingly, these workers 
viewed the hope of eventual statehood as the best possible avenues for extending Constitutional 
protections to Puerto Rico, and formed a lasting affiliation with the AFL to serve as a platform to 
campaign for increased labor rights and progressive reforms.  
 For Gompers, the FLT was a chance to expand its influence across international waters 
and into U.S. territorial policy, particularly important in the age of the “New Freedom” in which 
President Woodrow Wilson rearticulated Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe 
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Doctrine to state that the U.S. had a moral imperative to make the world “safe for democracy.”
110
 
At a time of increasing hostility towards radical labor groups such as the Industrial Workers of 
the World (IWW), Gompers sought to portray the AFL as a patriotic and loyal American 
organization. Part of this loyalty and patriotism included the spread of democracy and capitalism 
to U.S. territorial possessions. As Gompers testified before the Senate Committee on Pacific 
Islands and Porto Rico in 1916, there was “no factor” more valuable to “Americanizing the 
people of Porto Rico as the American labor movement,” which, as he reminded Congress, was 
by 1916 synonymous with the AFL.
111
 Labor leaders in Puerto Rico agreed, and Iglesias Pantín 
wrote to Gompers that “if the people of Porto Rico should really become Americans, the AF of L 
would be the only institution to be held responsible for it.”
112
 
 Like the early Republicans, Gompers and Iglesias Pantín both promoted cultural 
assimilation, and each felt that the FLT was central to the process of Americanization. Following 
a series of strikes organized by the FLT (and supported by the AFL) in the tobacco processing, 
sugar, truck driving, railroad, baking, dock working, carpentry, printing, and other industries, the 
FLT broke ties with the Unión Puertorriqueña and began searching for new political allies, 
resulting in the formation of the Socialist Party in 1915. Though the FLT and Socialists were 
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technically separate, they were in fact run by the same leaders.
113
 From this time until the 1932 
election, the FLT and Socialist Party had consistently criticized the dominance of corporate 
agriculture in Puerto Rico and pushed for “bread and butter” economic reform aimed at 
improving workers’ lives. As the Liberal Party campaign for independence grew in the late 
1920s, however, the Socialists increasingly looked to the Republicans; although they previously 
agreed on statehood and assimilation, the political glue that now bound them together was a new 
“unified opposition to the independence movement.”
114
 In 1932, as the Socialists and 
Republicans formally united on the issue of statehood, their Coalition had to overcome extreme 
class tensions between the sugar and corporate elite and the organized workers. Put another way, 
the Coalition’s electoral success hinged on the ability of the “Republican bourgeoisie [to] accept 
the political alliance with the working class,” which was made easier by the non-radical 
approach promoted by Gompers and the AFL in the U.S. and Iglesias Pantín and the FLT in 
Puerto Rico.
115
 Their alliance would last as long as a) they could convince the mass of voters that 
cultural Americanization was the best pathway to fuller inclusion into U.S. politics and eventual 
statehood, and b) they were able to deliver permanent reconstruction from the devastating 
economic and environmental catastrophes of the Great Depression. 
 The Coalition, however, could not accomplish either, as its unwavering position on 
statehood forced it to oppose two major new political developments of the 1930s: the rise of the 
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Nationalist movement and the coming of the New Deal. The Nationalists and the New Deal each 
presented a more radical vision of social reform than the Coalition could tolerate—with Albizu 
Campos and the Nationalists increasingly seeking full political independence, while Puerto Rican 
New Dealers pushed for social and economic reform via the PRERA from 1933 to 1935 and the 
PRRA from 1935 to 1955. Representing the large sugar interests, the Coalition was the only 
sector in Puerto Rico to move against the PRRA.
116
 While it was effective in curtailing its full 
implementation, the Coalition’s opposition to New Deal reform undermined its popular basis of 
support at the polls. Although it defeated the Liberals in the 1936 election by a 54.1% to 45.9% 
margin, the Coalition’s inability to lead the recovery from the San Felipe and San Ciprián 
hurricanes combined with their increased obstruction to Nationalist and New Deal reform 




 The political vacuum created by the collapse of the Coalition, combined with the fracture 
of the Liberal Party in response to the Nationalist uprisings, established the conditions for the 
success of the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) in the 1940 elections. This new popular-
based political party, led by former Liberal Senator Luis Muñoz Marín, introduced a form of 
Puerto Rican populism that oversaw the transfer of New Deal public works—and eventually the 




 Ayala and Bernabe, 103. While the Coalition had initially supported the PRERA, 
which operated through the local legislature, it moved determinedly against the PRRA which 
attempted to operate independent of local partisan politics. Córdova has disagreed, and argued 
that the Coalition’s reaction to the PRRA was positive, but that the program was not run 




 Meléndez, 57, 63. For 1936 election returns, see “Escrutinio de las Elecciones 
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colonial government itself—to Puerto Rican control in the 1950s. Although the PPD campaign 
featured a simplistic slogan of “Pan, Tierra, y Libertad” (“Bread, Land, and Liberty”), Muñoz 
Marín worked to establish close ties to the PRRA and WPA during his first few months in office. 
Seeking to continue a wide range of PRRA programs under the banner of the PPD, Muñoz 
Marín’s government introduced a series of legislative proposals including the Land Authority 
Bill that would, among other provisions: a) continue the low-cost hurricane-proof home 
construction programs of the PRRA; b) continue and expand the PRRA parcelas program of 
distributing land seized from large agricultural corporations to agricultural workers and 
farmhands now living in slums; c) focus on PRRA projects of land rehabilitation and road 
construction; d) build new sanitary facilities in these areas; e) construct sports and recreation 
facilities; f) continue PRRA construction of medical buildings in rural and municipal areas; g) 
experiment in high-protein fisheries (now possible due to the construction of man-made lakes as 
part of the PRRA’s rural electrification program); h) fund adult literacy education; and i) support 
civics and democracy classes.
118
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 While the 1932 election elevated the Coalition to local political power, it also signified 
the inability of the Nationalist Party to generate enough votes to win elections or even influence 
electoral politics. That year, after Julio Medina González received just 5,257 votes for Resident 
Commissioner and Pedro Albizu Campos received 13,000 votes in a losing Senatorial bid, many 
Nationalists followed Albizu Campos’ subsequent call for direct action and the politics of non-
participation.
119
 Born in 1891, Albizu Campos came of age in the era of U.S. rule in Puerto Rico. 
Graduating from high school in Ponce, Albizu Campos attended the University of Vermont 
before transferring to Harvard, from which he received his law degree in 1921.
120
 Like others of 
his generation, he benefitted from new educational opportunities in the U.S. and used them in the 
struggle to improve the island’s living conditions and economic prospects. These educational 
opportunities were largely limited to the wealthy sons of Puerto Rico, as enrollment in elite 
universities in the United States (as elsewhere) was overwhelmingly comprised of wealthy, male 
students. In the case of Puerto Rico, this group of students has been referred to as the “reformist 
elite” of the island—a young, educated professional class that became public servants or ran for 
political office.  
                                                                                                                                                             
low-cost construction of medical buildings; distribution of small farms to be paid for over long 
period of years; municipal hospital construction; experiment in fisheries; adult literacy 
education; civics and democracy classes. See also Meléndez, 59. These and other programs will 
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 Interestingly, however, there seems to be no direct correlation for this generational 
“class” of Puerto Ricans between education in the U.S. and political ideology. Certainly, there 
were members of this generation on all sides of the status question and other political issues.
121
 
Among the other elite sons of this generation who took advantage of the new educational 
opportunities in the U.S. were Antonio Lucchetti, born in Ponce, Puerto Rico in 1888 and 
graduated from Cornell University with a degree in electrical engineering in 1910; Guillermo 
Esteves, born in Aguadilla in 1890, educated at Tufts University in Massachusetts; and Luis 
Muñoz Marín, born in San Juan in 1898, educated at Georgetown University Law Center (unlike 
the others, Muñoz Marín never completed his degree).  
 This generation—some of whom, like Albizu Campos, served in the U.S. Army during 
World War I—rose to political prominence during the 1930s. The emergence of a younger 
generation of supporters gravitating around Albizu Campos was not unique to the Nationalist 
Party, as inter-generational political tensions occurred within the other major parties during the 
decade as well. By the end of the decade, in fact, the leaders of the Republican, Socialist, and 
Liberal parties were replaced by a younger generation of politicians. In these other cases, the 
death of the party head was a key cause of this shift: Barceló died in 1938, Iglesias in 1939, 
Martínez Nadal in 1940.
122
 While these parties struggled to find dynamic new leaders, the 
emergence of a new generation of political leaders had moved the Nationalist movement away 
from electoral politics. At the center of this change was Albizu Campos. Eloquently described by 
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 A.W. Maldonado has referred to the 1930s as an era of a “generational sea change” 




Ronald Fernández as una rafaga, or a violent gust of wind, Albizu Campos self-consciously 
blended cultural nationalism and political independence.
123
 Fernández argues that Albizu 
Campos’ experience with Jim Crow segregation during the war (like other enlisted men in the 
Puerto Rican Expeditionary Forces, Albizu Campos served in a segregated regiment and was 
stationed in the Panama Canal Zone to protect the canal from German submarine attacks) 




 Albizu Campos’s idea of Puerto Rican nationalism was also largely based on the 
glorification of Spanish rule during the nineteenth century, and on a conception of Spanish 
Catholicism that was largely influenced by the intersection of Irish nationalism and Irish 
Catholicism during the 1920s.
125
 The era of Spanish colonialism was glorified because in the 
August 1897, desperate to retain control of Cuba and Puerto Rico (its two remaining colonies  
after nearly 400 years of colonial control), the Spanish Crown had offered an Autonomic Charter 
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to Puerto Rico that extended local self-rule and provided limited representation in the Spanish 
Parliament.
126
 Disrupted by the U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico the following year, Puerto Rican 
autonomy never came to be. Three decades later, following the election of 1932, Albizu Campos 
and the Nationalists argued that the Treaty of Paris, which had ended the Cuban-Spanish-
American War in 1898, was null and void because the newly autonomous Puerto Rico was not 
included in the negotiations and, therefore, the U.S. had illegitimately replaced Spanish colonial 
rule at the turn of the twentieth century.
127
  
 Another aspect of the glorification of Spanish rule in the nineteenth century was the 
embrace of Spanish Catholicism, which offered the Nationalist Party followers a cultural 
platform after their withdrawal from electoral politics. Couched in an idealization of Hispanic 
culture, the Nationalists articulated a modern vision for Puerto Rican society based on the 
conservative and traditional views of the Catholic Church, including those about women’s roles 
in the family, in politics, and in education.
128
 This conservative vision was at odds with gender 
politics of the 1930s, particularly at a time of increased agitation for universal women’s suffrage 
by the Liga Social Sufragista—which was supported by the Socialist Party and the Coalition—
and the call for limited suffrage by the Asociación Puertorriqueña Sufragistas—supported by the 
Unión, Alianza, and Liberal parties.
129
 Nonetheless, the Nationalist Party infused its idea of 
                                                 
 
126












 Ayala and Bernabe, 68-39; Cabán, 210-216. For an analysis of the connection between 
women workers in the cigar industry (particularly leaf-strippers) and the Socialist Party, see 
Quintero-Rivera, 24-26. The women’s suffrage movement had been a part of the Socialist 




nationalism with a male-oriented, Hispanic Catholicism based on “courage, culture, chivalry, and 
Catholic civilization” and the exaltation of paternalism and personal honor in the face of the 
rampant individualism associated with capitalist, Protestant society.
130
 Although not all members 
of the party shared his views on Hispanic Catholic nationalism, by the 1930s Albizu Campos’ 
name was almost synonymous with the nationalist movement for independence. Eventually, after 
a failed attempt to raise $200,000 in bonds on the U.S. stock market in 1931 and the miserable 
showing at the polls in 1932, the Nationalists began to call for the armed defense of “true liberty” 
at the “price of blood.”
131
 Calling all elections in Puerto Rico “colonial,” Albizu Campos 
implored his followers to abstain from voting. In December 1932, the Nationalist Party met in 
Humacao, Puerto Rico to write a new constitution and form the Army of Liberation, whose 
members adopted the black shirt uniform associated with both European and South American 
fascism at the time.
132
 While no historical consensus exists on the exact role of fascist ideology 
on Albizu Campos’ understanding of Puerto Rican nationalism, it is clear that the symbols of 








 Ribes Tovar, 15. For the Nationalist Party’s (presumably) fraudulent sale of bonds in 
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nationalism and fascism in Mussolini’s Italy and Franco’s Spain highly influenced the 
Nationalist Party in Puerto Rico.
133
 
 The same underlying problems that doomed the Nationalist Party’s ability to win political 
elections still plagued the party during its turn toward political assassination and armed 
revolution: the inability to cultivate and win mass popular support for its cause. While public 
interest in the independence movement grew, the Nationalists consistently failed to attract 
serious interest from important public sectors, including students, workers, women, parents, or 
college educated professionals such as doctors, nurses, teachers, and engineers. While Ribes 
Tovar asserted that the Nationalist Party attracted “vast crowds of people” to its speeches in the 
mid-1930s, and was especially effective and mobilizing Puerto Rican youth through radio and 
the press, Ayala and Bernabe have described the party’s limited organizational structure and 
warn that it is nearly impossible to quantify how many supporters the party actually had during 
the 1930s.
134
 As for the connection between Albizu Campos’ nationalist movement and working 
class Puerto Ricans, there appears to be very little.
135
  Despite a near ubiquitous reference to 
Albizu Campos’ support for several strikes that overtook the island in the early 1930s, there was 
very little organizational connection between the Nationalist Party and the major strikes of the 
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  Whereas the connection between Albizu Campos and the labor movement was 
ambiguous, the role of Nationalists in the decade’s greatest political crisis is clear. Between 1934 
and 1936, Albizu Campos’ rhetoric turned increasingly violent as he began to position himself 
and his loyal soldiers as martyrs to the cause of Puerto Rican independence. As local and federal 
police agencies began monitoring Nationalist speeches and demonstrations, Albizu Campos 
advocated armed struggle through a war of vengeance against both the local and U.S. 
governments. Although many on the island viewed his rhetoric as a “sideshow” to the real 
political debates between the Coalition and Liberal Party, the reality of Albizu Campos’ words 
became increasingly clear in July and August 1935 when a series of bombs exploded in San 
Juan.
137
 At first, the targets were “U.S.” government buildings: on July 4, 1935, the headquarters 
of the PRRA was dynamited; a few weeks later, the U.S. Court Building in Puerta de Tierra; in 
August, a local police station in Barrio Obreo.
138
 While no one was hurt in these explosions, a 
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gun battle between Nationalists and police resulted in the death of four Nationalists and one 
bystander in October 1935. The confrontation, which began when Nationalists attempted to 
disrupt an anti-Nationalist Party rally by students at the University of Puerto Rico (UPR), 
marked the beginning of two years of violence, confusion, and bloodshed.  
 Four months later, in February 1936, the Police Commissioner of Puerto Rico Colonel 
Francis E. Riggs was shot and killed by Hiram Rosado and Elías Beauchamp—young followers 
of Albizu Campos who were themselves killed while detained in police custody.
 139
 Like 
Governor Blanton Winship, who was appointed by Franklin Roosevelt in 1934, Riggs was a 
military man, and Albizu Campos interpreted his appointment as the return of military rule in 
Puerto Rico.
140
 Placing armed guards at his house in Aguas Buenas, Albizu Campos argued that 
Puerto Rico was now governed by tyrants who were “only interested in crushing the nationalism 
of the invaded country” and that insular police power represented a “government by murder.”
141
 
Speaking at the funeral of Rosado and Beauchamp, Albizu Campos sought to inspire the crowd 
of young nationalist soldiers. By mixing Catholic fatalism with militant discourse, he declared 
that there was “only one gateway to immortality: the gateway of valor, which leads to sacrifice 
for a sacred cause. We must sacrifice ourselves for the independence of our country.”
142
 Arguing 
that the “Yankees seek to intimidate us with murder,” Albizu Campos declared that for every 
Nationalist killed, an American (or Puerto Rican working for the U.S. government) would be 
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targeted. Transforming himself into a symbol and martyr, Albizu Campos told the crowd that 
“they can kill Albizu Campos. They can kill 10,000 Nationalists [but] a million Puerto Ricans 
will rise up” to avenge their deaths and defend the honor of the Puerto Rican fatherland.
143
 
Response to the quickly growing crisis came from many sides at once. Operating on 
orders from Governor Winship, who placed a temporary ban on all public demonstrations, local 
police began a swift repression of the Nationalists by raiding the party’s headquarters and the 
homes of several leaders. Simultaneously, the FBI built a case against Albizu Campos—
eventually charging him with conspiring to overthrow the U.S. government. After a jury 
composed of seven Puerto Ricans and five Americans failed to reach a verdict, Albizu Campos 
was convicted by a separate jury made up of two Puerto Ricans and ten Americans and sentenced 
to ten years in federal prison.
144
 When a federal appeals court in Boston upheld the verdict in 
February 1937, political violence against U.S. and Puerto Rican officials escalated, and Governor 
Winship, Puerto Rico District Court Judge Robert Archer Cooper, and Socialist Party leader (and 
Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico) Santiago Iglesias all survived assassination attempts. In 
June 1937, Albizu Campos was transferred to Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. 
 Meanwhile, a bill for immediate Puerto Rican independence was being discussed in 
Washington throughout 1936. Written by Millard E. Tydings, a Democrat from Maryland and 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, and Ernest Gruening, the 
Director of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the Department of the Interior 
and head of the PRRA, the Tydings Bill was introduced in the Senate two months after the Riggs 
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assassination. It was both punitive and vindictive.  Referred to as a political ambush by El 
Mundo, the bill was written in response to the political chaos that followed the Riggs 
assassination and would have destroyed the Puerto Rican economy by abruptly ending all relief 
assistance and tariff protections.
145
 Rightly seen as a seminal event in Puerto Rico during the 
1930s that has had long-lasting political implications, the bill has received considerable attention 
in the historiography of U.S.-Puerto Rican relations and has come to be understood as part of a 
personal vendetta by Tydings against the rebellious nationalist movement of the decade. 
Historians have focused on Tydings’ friendship with Riggs and his claim the “American system 
was not functioning adequately in Puerto Rico.”
 146
   
Several aspects of this argument are convincing, particularly considering that the 
Philippine Independence Act, which Tydings co-sponsored with Alabama Democratic 
Representative John McDuffie in 1934, was a “gradual” independence act designed to ease the 
economic burdens of independence. Nevertheless, the personal dimensions of the Tydings Bill 
have been overstated in the historical literature, as they ignore the larger context of Tydings’ 
opposition to the New Deal in both the U.S. and in Puerto Rico. Like nearly all other aspects of 
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Puerto Rican political history, the Tydings Bill has been viewed too narrowly through the lens of 
U.S. “colonialism.”  
 This view has obscured the fact that the animosity between Tydings and Roosevelt (as 
well as between Tydings and Harold Ickes) was so strong that FDR once threatened to punch 
Tydings in the nose.
147
  On taking the battle against Tydings directly to the public, Ickes wrote 
that if he “seems bent on smearing us all he can, we ought to fight back day by day through the 
newspapers, which is the only means available to us to meet the vague charges that are being 
produced” by Tydings’ complaints.
148
 While these incidents were not about policy in Puerto 
Rico, they illustrate the need to put Tydings’ relationship with Ickes and FDR into broader 
perspective. A closer analysis of Tydings reveals that the conservative Southern Democrat was 
not only the most “uncompromising” and “troublesome” Democratic critic of the New Deal in 
the U.S., but also the most strident critic of the New Deal in Puerto Rico. As Jo Ann Argersinger 
has written, FDR denounced Tydings as a “betrayer of the New Deal.”
149
 Not only did Tydings 
oppose the NIRA, AAA, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), National Labor Relations Act 
(Wagner Act), and Social Security Act (SSA), but he also moved against the PRERA and PRRA 
and criticized the escalating federal expenditure in Puerto Rico. The 1936 bill, written during the 
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context of the Riggs assassination, was a move to eliminate the increasing federal spending on 
the island by way of offering Puerto Rico complete and immediate independence. It was an 
attack on Ickes and the New Deal as much as it was an attack on Albizu Campos or Puerto Rican 
nationalism. 
 By the end of 1937, the Nationalist movement began to lose viability as a mass political 
movement. While it had already foresworn electoral politics following its convincing defeat in 
the 1932 elections, its turn toward violent resistance resulted in the swift repression of party 
leaders in the immediate aftermath of the political crisis caused by the assassination of Riggs and 
discussion of the Tydings Bill. In addition, as the movement of armed resistance became more 
narrowly focused on Albizu Campos and his young, armed, possibly fascist-influenced 
“soldiers,” the movement drew further and further away from the aims and aspirations of many 
important sectors of Puerto Rican society, including students, women’s rights advocates, 
professionals, and organized labor—who each looked to local politics to bring economy recovery 
from the Depression and hurricanes. Although the Tydings Bill was not adopted by Congress, it 
had opened up new and serious debate over the merits and of abrupt political independence 
without a period of economic transition. With Pedro Albizu Campos imprisoned in the Atlanta 
Federal Penitentiary, the Nationalists ceased to be a force for political change on the island for 
the rest of the Great Depression. 
  
The Liberal Party 
 Just as the intense debate over the Tydings Bill undermined the Nationalist position on 
immediate independence, it also drove a wedge into the previously unified Liberal Party. By the 
midterm elections of 1938, the party was in disarray due to a political fracture between Luis 
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Muñoz Marín and Antonio Rafael Barceló that resulted in over half of the party’s base of support 
following Muñoz Marín out of the party. Born 30 years before the U.S. occupation of Puerto 
Rico during the Spanish American War, Barceló was a contemporary of Luis Muñoz Rivera—
the father of Muñoz Marín. Together, they had led the Unión Puertorriqueña during the early 
years of the twentieth century with a platform that revolved around the concepts of cultural 
independence and political autonomy. Following an uneasy alliance with the Republican Party in 
the 1920s, Barceló refashioned the Union Party as the Partido Liberal in time for the 1932 
elections around a platform of cultural and political independence.
150
 For example, on March 13, 
1932 the party declared in its official platform that its purpose was to “demand the immediate 
recognition of the sovereignty of Puerto Rico and make it effective by the most rapid, most 
practical, and most direct methods, thus establishing the absolute independence of Puerto 
Rico.”
151
 In private correspondence, party leaders echoed this official platform. That December, 
a month after losing the 1932 elections to the Coalición, Muñoz Marín wrote to Ruby Black that 
the Liberal Party was “for independence” and retains a “special tenderness for the Democratic 
party in spite of its having statehood in its platform.”
152
 
 Even though they had lost the 1932 elections, the Liberal Party had received the most 
total votes of any single party in the election, and the one Senate seat awarded to the Liberals in 
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1932 was won by Muñoz Marín.
153
 Viewed by supporters and opponents as the “New Deal’s 
golden boy,” Muñoz Marín’s spent much of his time in the Senate working on the social and 
economic reforms of the New Deal agencies that were opposed by the Coalition. Using his 
bilingual and bicultural skills to his party’s advantage, Muñoz Marín turned the personal 
friendships cultivated during his time in Washington and New York into strong political 
alliances and relationships.
154
 Declaring his support for the New Deal, Muñoz Marín wrote to 
President Roosevelt in January 1934 that he was a Puerto Rican New Dealer, committed to 
working within the local legislature to assure that the “economic implications of the New Deal” 
were fully implemented on the island.
155
 Although Muñoz Marín and the Liberal Party were 
essential to the early successes of both the PRERA and the PRRA between 1934 and 1937, the 
close relationship between Muñoz Marín and New Deal officials (in both Washington and San 
Juan) broke apart during the political crisis caused by the Riggs assassination and Tydings Bill of 
1936. These events not only distanced Muñoz Marín from allies in Washington, but marked the 
beginning of the end of the Liberal Party as well.
 156
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While the Riggs assassination and Tydings Bill frayed the Liberal consensus, the Ponce 
Massacre of 1937 permanently ended the Liberal Party’s ability to win elections or exert 
substantial political influence over local Puerto Rican politics. On Sunday March 21, 1937, 
Puerto Rican police shot into a crowd of unarmed Nationalist demonstrators and terrified 
bystanders in Ponce, the Southern “capital” of the Nationalist movement. Police actions killed 19 
people (17 citizens and 2 police officers) and wounded hundreds.
157
 The confrontation was 
precipitated by Enrique de Orbeta, the Puerto Rican Chief of Police, who had revoked a permit to 
demonstrate that had been previously given to the Nationalists by the city of Ponce.
158
 Even in 
the context of the escalating tensions between Nationalists and the local government, the 
shooting of unarmed men and women (and one child) in Ponce was a shock that reverberated 
throughout the island and further disrupted Puerto Rican politics. The Liberal Party, which 
immediately called for a “thorough investigation” of what had occurred in Ponce, quickly 
divided over what position to take in the aftermath of the massacre. Like the debate over the 
Tydings Bill the year before, this divide crystallized around the two towering figures of Liberal 
Party politics, Barceló and Muñoz Marín. While Barceló tempered his anger over the police 
murders in Ponce while investigations were underway, Muñoz Marín took a much more direct 
approach in his criticism of Governor Winship, Ernest Gruening, and other U.S. officials.
159
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Seizing the chance to regain control of the Liberal Party, Barceló blamed Muñoz Marín 
for the deterioration of the Liberales’ relationship with key U.S. figures such as Gruening, Ickes, 
and Roosevelt.
160
 In the first few days after the Ponce Massacre, Barceló reaffirmed the Liberal 
Party’s faith in the original tenets of the Union Party—which he had founded with Muñoz 
Rivera. By highlighting the Liberal Party’s origins as the party of cultural independence and 
political autonomy, Barceló contrasted his younger political rival with Muñoz Marín’s own 
father.
161
  In May 1937, less than two months after the Ponce Massacre, Barceló’s looked to 
permanently undercut Muñoz Marín’s standing in the Liberal Party by associating him with 
Albizu Campos and the Nationalists in the minds of liberal voters, and by the end of the month, 
Muñoz Marín and his followers were officially expelled from the Liberal Party.
 162
 
 Barceló could not have played his hand any worse. Over the next few months, as Muñoz 
Marín attempted to establish a new political party—experiments ranged from the Acción Social 
Independentista (ASI) to the Partido Liberal Neto, Auténtico y Completo (or New, Authentic, 
and Complete Liberal Party)—Barceló’s control of the Liberal Party was enhanced (until his 
death in October 1938) but the overall strength of the party was decimated by the loss of Muñoz 
Marín. With the formation of the Partido Popular Democratico (PPD) in 1938, Muñoz Marín 
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rekindled his vision for a mass-based or popular alliance of Barceló’s reform minded “middle 
class” followers with Santiago Iglesias’ “working class” followers.
163
 Combined with the 
collapse of the Coalition and withdrawal of the Nationalist Party from electoral politics, the 
fracturing of the Liberal Party between 1936 and 1938 signaled a new era in Puerto Rican 
politics. Over the course of the next decade, this new era was dominated by the PPD, whose new 
platform merged a populist call for “Pan, Tierra, y Libertad” (Bread, Land, and Liberty) with 
support for the emerging paradigm of permanent reconstruction embodied in the large-scale 
public works projects of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration that aimed at providing 
long-term economic recovery from the Great Depression and hurricanes of 1928 and 1932. 
 Short of financial assets and burdened with the bureaucratic difficulties of starting a new 
political party, the PPD nonetheless had some powerful resources in its favor, including control 
of the liberal newspaper La Democracia the support of several key Liberals who worked for the 
PRRA such as Benigno Fernández García, Guillermo Esteves, and Antonio Lucchetti. Hoping to 
attract a broad popular base of Socialists, Liberals, workers, unionists, small farmers, civil 
employees, and reform-minded professionals, the PPD published a small newspaper called El 
Batey and a series of pamphlets outlining its platform for the upcoming 1940 elections.
164
 When 
the PPD won a surprise victory in the election, Muñoz Marín was elevated to President of 
Senate—a position held by Republican Rafael Martínez Nadal since 1933. Noting the 
importance of this transition from the Coalition to PPD-led control of the local government, 
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Muñoz Marín declared that he led a New Deal-style party that would seek to make permanent the 
many social and economic gains of the PRRA reconstruction projects, particularly on the issues 
of land reform and public ownership of natural resources.
165
 Skillfully positioning himself as a 
critic of U.S. policy and leadership in the aftermath of the Ponce massacre, and yet heir to the 
New Deal, Muñoz Marín consolidated his leadership of the PPD and the Puerto Rican Senate 
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Chapter 3: From Relief to Reconstruction: 
The New Deal in Puerto Rico from La PRERA to La PRRA 
 
 The third major political development of the 1930s was the emergence of the Puerto Rico 
Reconstruction Administration (PRRA) in 1935, which was made possible by the election of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. The PRRA brought new and unprecedented changes to U.S. and 
Puerto Rican political life. Unlike the collapse of the private relief model invoked in the wake of 
the 1928 and 1932 hurricanes and the breakdown of partisan politics during the second half of 
the decade, the success of the PRRA was contingent on the close collaboration of Puerto Rican 
and U.S. New Deal officials and the popular support of the residents of the island—the workers, 
farmers, and professionals who actively designed, labored on, contested, and benefitted from 
PRRA programs. The PRRA—despite a general consensus in the historical literature that has 
argued otherwise—should be seen as a remarkable success in combatting the worst aspects of the 




 Like the New Deal in the U.S., the PRRA had many shortcomings. It was underfunded; it 
went through several administrative changes; it did not accomplish all of its goals; it had many 
failures; it was susceptible to corruption; it was used as political fodder; it was short sighted; and 
it overreached. As this and the following chapters will demonstrate, however, the public works 
programs of the PRRA radically transformed Puerto Rican society through the construction of a 
federally-financed and publicly-owned infrastructure that made the most serious intervention in 
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public health in the island’s history. Far from a “colonial” imposition, the PRRA was planned 
and run by a mostly Puerto Rican administrative and working staff and supported by an 
increasingly devoted popular base of Puerto Rican citizens. Legal title to all projects, land 
acquisitions, infrastructure, and other capital investments were transferred in perpetuity to the 
people of Puerto Rico to be locally owned and administered. The New Deal in Puerto Rico was 
divided into two clear eras: that of the PRERA from 1933 to 1935, and that of the PRRA from 
1935 to 1955. 
 
The Puerto Rico Emergency Relief  Administration, 1933-1935 
 The Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA), which was created in 
August 1933, coordinated emergency relief from the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes from 
1933 to 1935.
 167
 During this time, which can be considered the “First” New Deal in Puerto Rico, 
the PRERA was run by James Bourne, who, along with his wife Dorothy, was a close friend of 
Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt.
168
 The PRERA’s operational budget was funded through the 
Federal Emergency Relief Agency (FERA), which had been established during the First Hundred 
Days and run by Harry Hopkins (who later directed the Works Progress Administration and 
negotiated the Lend-Lease Act of 1940). 
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 The PRERA was regarded as a temporary measure designed to provide both food and 
clothing to hurricane victims and work relief through limited infrastructural building projects.
169
 
As Manuel Rodríguez has warned, however, a narrow focus on the PRERA’s relief work has 
obscured the transformative ways in which the PRERA “reached all sectors of the island and had 
a considerable impact on Puerto Rican society.”
170
 The numbers seem to back up this claim, and 
by the end of 1933 the PRERA had received an initial grant of $770,000 from the FERA to 
combat the most pressing effects of the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes.
171
 Although 
Puerto Rico was originally required to provide $300,000 to supplement the money from FERA, 
this stipulation was later withdrawn when the Coalition-led legislature refused to allocate any 
local funds to match the federal dollars.
172
 During the entire 25-month period of its existence 
from August 1933 to September 1935, the PRERA spent nearly $20 million (about $260 million 
today) allocated from FERA plus an additional $190,000 supplied by Puerto Rican municipal 
governments. An additional $1.6 million was transferred from FERA to the Federal Surplus 
Relief Corporation (FSRG) in exchange for $4 million of surplus non-perishable food supplies, 
which was distributed by PRERA.
173
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 While these funds represented a serious improvement to the inadequate model of relief 
during the Coolidge and Hoover administrations, the overall focus on emergency services 
continued to confine the relationship between Puerto Ricans and the PRERA into a progressive 
era paradigm of relief that precluded direct public participation in building a lasting recovery and 
continued longstanding traditions of waiting on aid from above. Puerto Rican participation under 
the PRERA was limited to waiting in line for emergency supplies. Between August 1933 and 
September 1935, the PRERA received 339,125 applications for aid. Operating in each of the 
island’s seventy-six municipalities, PRERA distributed 120,000 pounds of surplus pork and 
spent over $3 million in federal funds on milk distribution.
174
 To move around the opposition of 
the Coalition, and in response to new ideas about Puerto Rico emerging from the island, the 
PRRA was formed to replace the PRERA in 1935. 
  
 The Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, 1935-1955 
 Signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Executive Order #7057 on May 
28, 1935, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration reoriented the New Deal in Puerto Rico 
away from the paradigm of relief towards one of permanent reconstruction by constructing a new 
public health and public works infrastructure on the island. For the next twenty years, the PRRA 
dedicated itself to the construction of public drinking water and sewer systems, rural 
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electrification, agricultural rehabilitation, and the building of affordable hurricane-proof houses. 
In bringing the “Second” New Deal to Puerto Rico, the PRRA replaced all other New Deal 
activity on the island. It was the first effort on the part of any U.S. administration to directly 
confront the social and economic policies that had led to increasing poverty, landlessness, 
unemployment, and ill health in Puerto Rico.
175
 
 Operating within the Department of the Interior, which was led by Harold Ickes, the 
PRRA was organized in accordance with the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of April 8, 
1935, and funded through a series of additional Emergency Appropriation Acts between 1935 
and 1938. From its inception, the PRRA’s primary focus was on the construction of capital-
intensive construction projects in both rural and urban Puerto Rico that would alleviate the 
Depression’s most severe effects while providing for long-term social and economic growth. 
While the PRRA made important forays into rural rehabilitation by establishing agricultural 
cooperatives and beginning extensive programs in agricultural resettlement and forestry 
management, its most significant and lasting contributions came out of the Engineering division, 
which oversaw the construction of the Cataño cement plant, the slum clearance and hurricane-
proof housing program, and the rural electrification of the island. Initially headquartered in 
Washington, the PRRA was a Puerto Rican designed, run, and staffed New Deal program. It was 
not the handmaiden of the U.S. professional class nor of the U.S.-educated “colonial” 
professional class on the island. Indeed, as we have already seen, the younger generation of 
Puerto Rican leaders that emerged in the 1930s came from all different sides of the political 
spectrum. In fact, it is impossible to fully appreciate the ways in which the PRRA was a local 
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 Highlighting the failures of the previous hurricane relief model, Roosevelt remarked that 
the change from the PRERA to the PRRA represented a new focus towards public security from 
hurricanes and diseases caused by an inadequately built physical environment. Arguing that the 
PRRA intended “not merely immediate relief but permanent reconstruction for the Island,” FDR 
outlined a bold vision that combined agricultural and rural rehabilitation with “cheap and 
available electric power, good roads, reforestation, and adequate housing.”
177
 These goals, which 
reflected a major break from the goals of all previous administrations, were dependent on three 
things: substantial capital outlays from the federal government, effective local administration, 
and widespread popular support.  
 As for capital, the PRRA spent over $82 million between 1935 and February 15, 1955, 
when the New Deal agency was formally liquidated. The bulk of this money, which equates to 
over $1.36 billion today, was spent between 1935 and 1943.
178
 As a locally-run New Deal 
agency, over half of this figure was spent on labor and personnel; direct employment by the 
PRRA reached a peak of 58,238 in November 1936 and was sustained through July 1937. As of 
October 31, 1938, the PRRA had furnished approximately 108,658,865 man-hours of work. Like 
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many New Deal programs, the PRRA was officially designed as a job creator tasked with 
attacking what FDR saw as the most pressing problem of the Great Depression: the 




 Puerto Rican men and women overwhelmingly performed this work in positions ranging 
from unskilled laborers to engineers, architects, and administrators for projects largely 
conceived, designed, and supervised by Puerto Ricans. Between 1935 and 1943, for example, at 
least 90% of all administrative, supervisory, and clerical personnel and 99.9% of all other 
workers were native-born Puerto Ricans. In all, roughly 98% of the entire PRRA payroll was 
Puerto Rican. Without overemphasizing this point, it is necessary to remark on the uniqueness of 
this federal agency that operated out of San Juan with an essentially Puerto Rican staff.
180
 
 After payroll, which accounted for between 50-57% of the PPRA’s total budget, the vast 
majority of the $82 million was spent on large-scale capital projects constructed by the 
Engineering division. As part of a larger New Deal strategy to displace corporate monopolies in 
electric power and water utilities and remove the control of public works from local partisan 
interference, PRRA public works were transferred out of federal control and administered by 
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publicly-owned authorities and corporations after completion.
181
 These capital investments, 
which included land acquisitions as well as capital-intensive projects in infrastructure, utilities, 
roads, sewers, and buildings, accounted for $32.6 million or approximately 40% of the PRRA’s 
total budget, which equates to over $543 million today.
182
 These projects—which ranged from 
soil conservation and cattle tick elimination to rural electricity and the construction of the second 
cement plant ever built in the Caribbean—made lasting contributions to personal and collective 
well-being in Puerto Rico. Like the many large-scale public works built by the Public Works 
Administration (PWA) and Works Progress Administration (WPA) in the U.S., these federal 
interventions were not “colonial” projects designed to tie local economies to the “imperial state,” 
but were rather linked to some of the basic goals and accomplishments of the New Deal in terms 
of reforming and expanding the role of the federal government in the lives of citizens.
183
 
  The extension of massive public works projects to the territories has been little explored 
in the historiography of the New Deal, but the $543 million (in 2014 dollars) spent on capital 
investments in Puerto Rico seems to warrant examination. Between 1935 and 1955, the federal 
government allocated, spent, and transferred ownership to Puerto Rico projects that totaled (in 
2013 dollars): $153.2 million on rural electrification; $56.5 million on reforestation; $39.3 
million on roads, streets, and highways; $32.1 million school construction; $31.3 million on 
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health care facility construction; $29 million on eliminating the cattle tick that had plagued and 
depleted Puerto Rican livestock for decades; $28.9 million on infrastructural malaria control, 
such as swamp drainage and fill; $27.8 million on soil conservation; $23.9 million on the 




 Although the New Deal as a whole was inconceivable without the election of FDR in 
1932, the origins and energy behind the shift from relief to reconstruction were conceived and 
developed in Puerto Rico. By 1933, at a time when few in the U.S. general public or Washington 
knew or cared about the social and economic damages wrought by the hurricanes and Depression 
in Puerto Rico (particularly in the context of the expanding social, economic, and environmental 
crisis in the U.S.), Puerto Rican intellectuals, agronomists, and public officials began formulating 
ideas and strategies for the mounting agricultural and urban crises. This group included Carlos 
Chardón, the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) with a background in 
mycology; Rafael Menéndez Ramos, an agronomist at UPR and the Agricultural Experiment 
Station (AES); and Rafael Fernández García, the Commissioner of Agriculture and also 
associated with the AES. Their work originally focused on the agricultural damage of the 
hurricanes, and sought to find solutions to the seemingly impossible task of resurrecting the 
coffee, tobacco, and citrus industries most severely impacted by the storms of 1928 and 1932. 
Clustered around the half-built campus of the UPR, this group (sometimes referred to as the 
Chardón group) also directed their attention toward reforming the sugar industry. Though not 
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explicitly political, the Chardón group was mostly comprised of members of the Liberal Party 
who stood at odds with the new Coalition government that was elected in 1932 to, in part, uphold 
the violation of a decades-old law that had been designed to limit corporate and absentee 
landholding on the island.  
 This law, which was known as the “500-Acre” law, was the single most important 
political issue facing the Coalition after the statehood issue. In some ways, the law was as 
important than statehood—particularly to the Republican Party, as the party’s platform called for 
statehood in order to protect and enhance the political and economic position of its constituency 
which included the owners and overseers of large corporate-owned plantations. The 500-Acre 
law, which had been adopted as part of the Foraker Act of 1900, was added to the Foraker Act by 
Representative William Atkinson Jones of Virginia, a Democrat whose career in Washington 
spanned from the era of Populism to that of Progressivism during the World War I years. 
Expressing his fear that “syndicates” in corporate agriculture were “being organized to buy up 
practically all the rich sugar, coffee, and tobacco lands,” Jones sought to add the 500-Acre 
amendment to the Foraker bill.
185
 Seen today as a symbol of Puerto Rican nationalism, the law 
                                                 
 
185
 Truman R. Clark, Puerto Rico and the United States, 1917-1933 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), 110. The 500-Acre amendment had many critics, including 
Charles Harcourt (C.H) Forbes-Lindsay, who argued that the law “entirely nullified” the purpose 
of the Foraker Act—which as it saw it was to “facilitate the introduction of American capital into 
Puerto Rico.” C.H. Forbes-Lindsay, America’s Insular Possessions, Vol. 1 (Philadelphia: J.C. 
Winston, 1906), 159-160, quoted in Clark, 110. The original can be found at 
http://archive.org/stream/americasinsular00forbgoog#page/n12/mode/2up. 
 
 William Jones was later the co-author of the Jones Act of 1917, the law that extended 
U.S. citizenship to all Puerto Ricans and expanded Puerto Rican participation in the local 
government through the creation of a bicameral legislature composed of a House of 
Representatives and Senate. The Jones Act, which was written by Jones and Senator John 
Shafroth of Colorado and signed by President Woodrow Wilson on March 2, 1917, was seen as 




was actually introduced by progressive U.S. politicians concerned about the rapid pace of 
vertical integration and spread of monopolies during the early years of the 1900s.
186
 The law, 
however, was never enforced. 
 The need for land reform was magnified by the environmental and economic crises of the 
Depression years, and the Chardón-led group focused much of their discussion to the 
enforcement of the existing 500-Acre law. In 1934, Eleanor Roosevelt, Undersecretary of 
Agriculture Rexford G. Tugwell, and James A. Dickey of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA) made personal tours of Puerto Rico and provided detailed reports on the 
socioeconomic conditions to President Roosevelt. Following these reports, the Roosevelt 
administration established the Puerto Rico Policy Committee to merge with and expand the work 
already being done by the Chardón group. Composed of both U.S. and Puerto Rican intellectuals 
and policy makers, the committee included Carlos Chardón, Rafael Menéndez Ramos, Rafael 
Fernández García, Rex Tugwell, Oscar Chapman (Assistant Secretary of the Interior), Jacob 
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Baker (FERA), and William I. Meyers (Farm Credit Administration).
187
 In June 1934, the 
Chardón group—officially called the Inter-Departmental Committee for the Economic 
Rehabilitation of Puerto Rico—released its much anticipated report, which was soon labeled as 
the “Plan Chardón” in the press.  
 The primary goal of the Chardón Plan was to break up large, corporate-owned sugar 
plantations through enforcement of the 500-Acre law. Acknowledging that there were a “myriad 
of interlocking problems which together with natural disasters, formed a background for the 
Island’s dilemma,” however, there were 20 other major subjects covered by the Chardón Plan 
outside of the “sugar question.”  These were: coffee rehabilitation; citrus fruit rehabilitation; 
tobacco rehabilitation; creation of subsistence farms; development of the coconut industry; 
forestry; agricultural credit; development of sea-island cotton; industrial development; 
transportation; tourism; tax reduction and public debt reduction; canning industry; fresh water 
fish industry; eradication of bovine tuberculosis and cattle tick; soil erosion; hurricane research; 
cooperative hurricane insurance; slum clearance; crop, price, and statistical reporting.
 188
   
 Enforcement of the 500-Acre Law was difficult, as the court system and local legislature 
each supported the existing landholding arrangements. Not surprisingly, due to the large 
presence of Liberals and Democrats on the Policy Commission, Rafael Martínez Nadal of the 
Republican Party quickly emerged as the strongest critic of the Chardón Plan by the end of 1934. 
In order circumvent local resistance from the Coalition government, and to move faster than the 
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legal system would allow, FDR created the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration by 
Executive Order in May 1935. The flexing of executive power—seen by some as one of the 
Roosevelt administration’s great political strengths—was met with a tepid response from the 
plan’s own creators, including Chardón, who originally wanted more direct influence within the 
local government. As Coalition opposition to the Chardón Plan mounted, however, Chardón and 
other Puerto Rican officials pragmatically decided to align with Roosevelt; Chardón served as 
the PRRA’s first Assistant Administrator from May 1935 to November 1936.  
The first task of the PRRA was to replace the relief-minded PRERA, as the New Deal as 
a whole shifted away from the policy of relief during its “Second” stage. As in the U.S., the 
Second New Deal in Puerto Rico was less concerned with immediate job relief and more focused 
on long-term legal reform and economic reconstruction. Concluding that the “primary need for 
Puerto Ricans is not a direct dole-like service from the Federal Government, but a carefully 
developed economy,” Roosevelt changed course in Puerto Rico from the First New Deal to build 
lasting public works “upon which in years to come the people can erect a stable trade and draw 
therefrom a measure of self-sufficiency.”
189
   
 This shift from relief to reconstruction was both discursive and physical, and the long-
term effect of large-scale public works construction was closely followed in the Puerto Rican 
press. In 1935, for example, El Día: El peri dico de Ponce called for direct action to address the 
public health crisis in Ponce, where residents of the newly constructed slums in the Mameyes 
swamp near the Ponce Aqueduct had relocated following the 1928 and 1932 hurricanes. Seeking 
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access to the new federal resources, the newspaper argued for the PRRA to hire a team of 
competent engineers and allocate $500,000 to the rehabilitation of Ponce through the 
construction of new housing and sanitation infrastructure.
190
  
 The executive maneuver around the local government was crucial to the reform and 
reconstruction projects of the PRRA, as the Coalition attempted to control all new federal 
activities on the island—proposing that the PRRA be led by local political forces, including the 
Governor, several cabinet members, and two “at large” citizens. As these were the very groups 
that were already in charge—and had some control over the PRERA—these Coalition attempts 
to control the PRRA were seen by the Roosevelt administration as a means to halt any movement 
on the 500-Acre issue and to personally harness federal dollars into local political patronage to 
enhance Coalition power. Much to the Coalition’s dismay, however, FDR and his advisors saw 
through its attempt to coopt the New Deal. The PRRA—which needed to negotiate political 
opposition in both Washington and San Juan—would require a careful combination of local and 
federal administrators that could insure both its loyalty to the larger reform program and its 
independence from opposition politics.  
 With this political reality in mind, FDR appointed Ernest Gruening as Administrator, 
Carlos Chardón as Assistant Administrator, and Benigno Fernández García as Regional 
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Administrator. The PRRA was designed to be a locally-run New Deal agency, and its leadership 
structure was intentionally decentralized to handle both the scope of its program (it would 
consolidate all other New Deal functions in Puerto Rico—a task no other local jurisdiction in the 
U.S. faced), and the many logistical and political complexities involved. As Administrator, 
Gruening was ostensibly in charge, but nearly all daily functions were to be handled by the 
Assistant and Regional administrators, who were to coordinate and keep in touch with every 
aspect of the organization, and to “originate plans or policies that affect the organization as a 
whole. . . and execute his authority in keeping the various parts adjusted, and in regulating their 
efficiency and rapid operation.”
 191
   
However, Gruening and Chardón never really agreed on the purpose and direction of the 
PRRA’s actual work. While the link between the Chardón Plan and the PRRA has been 
extensively noted in the historical literature, the fact that Gruening and Chardón’s tenure lasted 
less than two years has not been fully recognized, and the administrative in-fighting between 
local and federal officials during these two years have colored historical analysis of the PRRA as 
a whole.
192
 Whereas Chardón and Fernández García were deeply committed to using the PRRA 
as a weapon against the violators of the 500-Acre law, Gruening—a diplomat and journalist with 
long ties to Latin America—envisioned the PRRA as a sort of ambassadorial tool in 
implementing Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy across the rest of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Chardón and Benigno Fernández García—who was the brother of the Chardón Plan’s 
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 Jorge Rodríguez Beruff is one of the few to comment on the importance of this 




co-author Rafael Fernández García—were primarily focused on enforcing the 500-Acre law, 
which they interpreted as the key to solving Puerto Rico’s economic problems. In January 1936, 
Benigno Fernández García was appointed by Roosevelt as the Attorney General of Puerto Rico 




 In contrast to Chardón and Fernández García, Gruening’s interest in Puerto Rico 
stemmed from his role as one of the earliest and strongest critics of U.S. foreign policy in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. A progressive liberal and Democrat, Gruening combined a critique 
of imperialism with a career-long focus on utilities regulation. He brought both of these causes to 
his leadership of the PRRA, he saw as a both a “bold . . . alternative to the political and economic 
nationalism adopted by many other Latin American states during the depression” and the key to 
a revised and revamped Good Neighbor policy.
 194
 As with other New Deal appointments, 
Roosevelt hoped Gruening could fulfill multiple objectives at once—transforming it into both a 
formidable economic reform project and a notable showcase for illustrating a new direction of 
U.S. foreign policy. Under Gruening, however, the PRRA was often stalled by its inability to 
move in these two separate directions at the same time. 
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 Aligning himself with young Liberals such as Chardón and Luis Muñoz Marín, Gruening 
faced entrenched opposition from Governor Winship, Santiago Iglesias, and Rafael Martínez 
Nadal—who launched a campaign against Gruening’s “despotic” and “arbitrary” leadership in 
the Puerto Rican press.
195
 Although Gruening shared some of their goals, he differed in both 
style and strategy from the Liberals, and his time in the PRRA was plagued by three factors: his 
international focus that distracted his attention from the nuances and details of the PRRA’s actual 
work in Puerto Rico; his strained relationship with Harold Ickes, his direct supervisor in the 
Department of the Interior (and who, as director of the PWA envisioned a broader public works 
program for Puerto Rico); and his inability to handle the political fallout from the Riggs 
assassination and Ponce massacre, which tore apart his relationship with Muñoz Marín and, by 
the middle of 1936, forced Gruening into a new working alliance with Governor Winship and 
Martínez Nadal. 
 By summer 1936, Ickes, Chardón, and Fernández García were disillusioned with 
Gruening, whose move towards Winship and the Coalition threatened to undercut any effort at 
enforcing the 500-Acre law or sustaining the PRRA’s nascent public works program. That fall, 
Ickes moved against Gruening. While he could not convince FDR to fire him, Ickes was able to 
get the President to amend an executive order to give himself (Ickes) more control over the 
PRRA in November 1936.
196
 When Ickes learned that Gruening had accepted the resignations of 
Chardón and Fernández García without informing him, he interpreted the move as not only 
personal insubordination but as a direct attack to the PRRA. Fed up, he reached an agreement for 
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Gruening’s resignation in January 1937, although it was not made official until months of delay 
as Gruening seems to have clung to the job in the aftermath of the Ponce massacre that March.
197
 
Though Ickes had no personal stake in Puerto Rican politics, he recognized that the Ponce 
massacre “was a cold-blooded shooting by the Ponce police and that those who were killed were 
shot by policemen themselves. Of course, Governor Winship and Gruening have been on the 
other side.”  
 In June 1937, the PRRA officially entered a new phase with Harold Ickes as 
Administrator. Under his administration, the PRRA was transformed almost entirely into a public 
works agency. Although the engineering projects had been part of the PRRA’s emphasis since 
1935, it was between 1937 and 1943 that the most active and energetic work of the PRRA was 
constructed in the areas that most directly impacted the daily lives of Puerto Rican citizens and 
most directly relied on their participation. During these years, the PRRA built new public works 
in cement construction, hurricane-proof housing and sanitation systems, and publicly-owned 
rural electricity and water supplies. These were the areas that most impressed Ickes during his 
own tour of the island in 1936. According to Ickes, the island contained the: 
worst slums that I have ever seen. The dwellings looked as if a breath would blow 
them over . . . Open sewage runs through the streets and around the buildings and 
there are no sanitation facilities at all. The children play in this sewage, which in 
many cases is covered with a thick, green scum. The houses appear to be dirty and 
unkempt. The cooking is done on little charcoal stoves, and the furniture is of the 
simplest and scantiest.  . . . Such slums are a reflection not only upon the [Puerto 
Rican] Government but upon that of the United States. It is unbelievable that 
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 The massive construction projects—which will be discussed in the following chapters—
directly paralleled the extensive program of public works that was underway in the United 
States. The Engineering division of the PRRA, which directly addressed the conditions described 
above, is best thought of as a combination of the “prime the pump” public works of the PWA 
(run by Ickes) and the direct hiring public works of the WPA (run by Harry Hopkins). Together, 
the PWA and WPA transformed the built infrastructure of the U.S. and put millions of people 
back to work during the Great Depression. As Jason Scott Smith has argued, the large-scale 
public works projects of the PWA and WPA were also  “the New Deal’s central enterprise” and 
have proven to be “extraordinarily successful method[s] of state-sponsored economic 
development,” and should be regarded as one of the most significant and long-term reforms of 
the New Deal era.
199
 
 The most important thing Ickes did for Puerto Rico was to move the offices of the PRRA 
from Washington to San Juan—a move that transformed the PRRA into a locally-run federal 
program shielded from political tensions in Washington and obstruction from the local 
government. Immediately following Gruening’s (delayed) resignation, Ickes promoted Miles H. 
Fairbank as Assistant Administrator and Guillermo Esteves Volkers as Regional Administrator 
to manage the administration’s daily operations and coordinate its long-term plans. Ickes primary 
concern was to get the PRRA moving with as little interference from Washington as possible. 
Busy with the PWA and other business with the Department of the Interior, Ickes—despite his 
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reputation as a hands-on administrator—delegated the work of the PRRA to his subordinates. 
This suited Puerto Rican New Dealers fine. Indeed, the unlikely team of Fairbank, a mid-level 
farm bank administrator from Baltimore who had stumbled into the New Deal by accident, and 
Esteves, one of the most respected civil engineers in Puerto Rico, accepted their positions only 
on the condition that the Washington headquarters of the PRRA be closed and moved to Puerto 
Rico.  
In terms of large-scale infrastructural building, the promotion of Esteves proved to be 
significant—as Esteves helped reorient the PRRA to meet Puerto Rican public works and public 
health needs in areas outside of the “sugar question.” Together, Fairbank and Esteves helped 
numerous Puerto Rican engineers, teachers, doctors, nurses, and parents make a substantial 
difference in the public health of the island, which had a positive effect in people's daily lives for 
years to come.  
 Calling for greater cooperation between various parts of the federal and local 
governments, Fairbank held a series of conferences in August 1938 to coordinate intra-
governmental relations. In October 1938, the PRRA established the Program of Coordinated 
Activity, which included the Puerto Rican Commissioner of Agriculture and Commerce, the 
Director of the Puerto Rican Agricultural Extension Service, the Director of the Agricultural 
Experimental Station, Dean of the College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, Vocational 
Director of the Puerto Rican Department of Education, Director of the Puerto Rico Tobacco 
Institute, and the Director of the Puerto Rico Experiment Station of the United States Department 
of Agriculture. Notably, these were mostly positions out of the control of the Coalition. Out of 
this increased cooperation, the PRRA was able to assist in the expansion of a variety of already-
existing local projects, ranging from 4-H Clubs to soil conservation, commercial and subsistence 
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crop development, livestock and poultry farming, and farm management education and 
organization programs.
200
    
 At the same time, the PRRA was a distinctly political agency. Similar to public works 
programs in the U.S., the PRRA helped construct a new mass-based coalition of Puerto Ricans 
frustrated with the limits of local partisan politics and the relief-based economy. While the 
PRRA built a substantially new public infrastructure and assisted in the creation of public 
authorities and corporations, which assured lasting security from future storms and local control 
of natural resources, it also commanded a patronage program that dwarfed the budget of the local 
government, contributed to the breakdown of party politics during the late 1930s, and paved the 
way for a particularly Puerto Rican form of populist politics during and after WWII. This, too, 
paralleled developments in the United States. As New Deal historian Morton Keller argued, the 
New Deal was both a practical and political machine that attenuated the formation of the New 
Deal political coalition even as it concentrated on the more celebrated relief, reform, and 
recovery. According to Keller, the New Deal “established the precedent of continuous 
governmental responsibility for the wellbeing of the economy; it instituted broad social welfare 
programs; and it worked major shifts in national political allegiances.”
201
  
 On the island, it was not national political allegiances that were at stake but rather Puerto 
Rican ones. As Emilio Pantojas-García has argued, the public works program of the PRRA 
“went beyond their immediate effect in terms of aid to the population. In the long run, they 
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would constitute the basis for the mobilization of the political forces that could provide a 
solution to the crisis while preserving the interests of the United States.”
202
 This mass political 
mobilization, led by Puerto Rican Liberals like Guillermo Esteves and Antonio Lucchetti, 
depended on ties to “elements within the U.S. government connected to the executive branch” 
(such as Ickes) “who were aware of the need for structural reforms,” and “provided . . . the 
material basis to organize a [new] political machine based on a system of patronage.”
203
 Coming 
into power in the 1940 elections, Muñoz Marín was able to maintain and manipulate the new 
patronage machine of the PRRA through the political program of the PPD, which “was patterned 
along the lines of the Chardón Plan” and threatened the immediate interests of the sugar sector 
through implementation of the 500-Acre law and other programs initiated by the PRRA between 
1935 and the early 1940s.
204
 The PPD not only elaborated on New Deal programs in land reform, 
public works, hurricane-proof housing construction, and control of natural resources, but it was 




 Although they faced substantial obstacles at implementing the 500-Acre law, including  
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legal restrictions and political opposition from the Coalition, the PRRA attacked the issue from a 
variety of angles—from helping to secure the appointment of PRRA Regional Administrator 
Benigno Fernández García to Attorney General of Puerto Rico to arguing (and winning) 500-
Acre law cases before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in 1938 and the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1942. In addition, the PRRA “developed the first strategies of community organizing among 
landless working families” and through its action forced new initiatives from the resistant local 
legislature.
206
   
 The 1940 election played a significant role in the transition from the PRRA to the PPD, 
as it occurred precisely as the FDR administration was beginning to brace for war in Europe. 
Facing a highly isolationist Congress—which passed official and binding Neutrality Acts in 
1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939—Roosevelt began two separate processes designed to coordinate 
and facilitate U.S. intervention against Nazi Germany. On one hand, the two massive public 
works agencies, the PWA and WPA, were consolidated into the Federal Works Agency (FWA) 
by the Reorganization Act of 1939.
207
 This move not only freed up personnel that FDR wanted to 
utilize in other areas (Harry Hopkins, for example, became one of FDR’s closest military 
advisors after 1940), but also coordinated public works with necessary military construction and 
reduced the overall budget for domestic public works.
208
 The transition from a peace to war 
                                                 
 
206




 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on the Reorganization Act,” April 25, 
1939, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, University of 





 Hopkins was FDR’s primary liaison between Churchill and Stalin, and has been 
credited with helping to “create and preserve” the alliance between Great Britain, the U.S., and 




economy, which began two years before Pearl Harbor, would have most likely resulted in the 
complete end of New Deal activity in Puerto Rico without the election of the PPD in 1940, 
which took over and carried out many the PRRA projects and public authorities.  
 On the other hand, Roosevelt began maneuvering around Congress to supply aid to the 
Allies without technically breaking the Neutrality acts, which usually featured “cash and carry” 
provisions, passed by the isolationist Congress. The Destroyers for Bases Agreement of 1940 
and Lend-Lease Act of 1941, for example, shifted public works construction (and the capital, 
resources, and labor) toward the construction of new military bases, landing fields, and naval 
docks the British Caribbean, Newfoundland, and (though not directly connected to the 
agreements with Great Britain) to Puerto Rico as well. Engineering projects such as the Cataño 
cement plant and the construction of hydroelectric facilities in the rural interior of the island 
came to play a central role in the “militarization” of Puerto Rican public works and in the 
broader defense of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, Panama Canal, and coastlines of North and 
South America against Nazi U-boat attacks, which escalated rapidly after U.S. entry into the war 
in December 1941. 
Although the work of the PRRA was beginning to be replaced by 1940—first by military 
spending and second by the election of the PPD—it continued to operate on the island until 
1955. During these remaining fifteen years, the PRRA was run by Guillermo Esteves who 
replaced Miles Fairbank as Assistant Administrator in 1941 and oversaw the New Deal agency to 
its end. Working closely with the local government during the 1940s and 1950s, Esteves oversaw 
the completion of every single PRRA engineering project underway. By the time of its final 
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liquidation, the PRRA had invested over $1.36 billion (in 2013 dollars) and directly transferred 
at least $543 million of this figure to Puerto Rico in the form of completed public works projects. 
It also left with a balanced budget.
209
 As we will see in the following chapters, the PRRA’s most 
far-reaching accomplishments were the construction of hurricane-proof houses, schools, 
hospitals, roads, and sanitation systems and the completion of the capital-intensive rural hydro-
electrification projects.  
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Part 2: Engineering a New Deal: The Cataño Cement Plant, Hurricane-Proof Public 
Works, and the Rural Electrification of  Puerto Rico, 1935-1943 
 
 Between 1935 and 1943, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration constructed a 
large number of hurricane-proof public works in urban and rural areas of Puerto Rico. These 
public works differed from previous infrastructural projects built during the Spanish colonial 
(1508-1898), U.S. military (1898-1900), or U.S. “insular” (1900-1933) periods in that they were 
island’s first truly public works—state-built construction projects administered by publicly-
owned agencies or authorities. Part of a local response to the devastating hurricanes of 1928 and 
1932, these public works were designed to both secure the island from future storms and protect 
its natural resources from private corporate control. These projects fostered a new long-term 
relationship with the United States—one based on the emerging political economy of the New 
Deal which, by the time of the PRRA’s creation in 1935, was transitioning from the “First” New 
Deal’s emphasis on emergency relief and regulation to the “Second” New Deal’s commitment to 
structural reform and long-term economic development. 
 The new relationship that formed between 1935 and 1943 was based on mass popular 
support for the PRRA’s public works projects—support that temporarily existed outside the 
partisan lines of the statehood versus independence dilemma. By operating independently of the 
local legislature, the PRRA fostered entrenched political opposition from within local 
government—from both the Coalition majority of the legislature and from Governor Blanton 
Winship, each of whom sought to control the massive budget and job-creating potential of the 
PRRA engineering programs. By moving its headquarters to San Juan in 1937, however, the 
PRRA’s top administrators had greater access to local civic engineers and agronomists and 
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closer ties to the Puerto Rican public unmediated by the local political leaders, which provided a 
bulwark against direct attacks from the Coalition and Governor Winship. 
 The San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes played such a large role in the popular 
imagination of the 1930s that recovery from the storms came to be one of the most central 
political issues of the decade.
210
 The failure to provide long-lasting recovery from the fury of 
nature contributed to the loss of electoral support of all existing political parties during the Great 
Depression. Although this idea has been marginalized in the historical imagination, which has 
focused much more on Puerto Rico’s “colonial” status and the violent uprising and strong-armed 
repression of Pedro Albizu Campos and the Nationalist movement, the twin hurricanes were far 
more disruptive and had more far-reaching economic implications than the uprising or repression 
of Puerto Rican Nationalists.  
 Part of the problem for local political leaders in addressing the infrastructural, 
agricultural, and public health crises of the hurricanes was that the scale of the problems was 
unknown and un-quantified. Upon its formation in 1935, the PRRA collected a series of 
important data including the “Special” mid-decade population and housing census of 1935, the 
first census of school-aged children, the first door-to-door survey of the island’s semi-urban and 
urban slums, the first aerial map of the island’s topography, a countless collection of forest and 
non-forest geographic and infrastructural surveys, various investigations of rural working and 
living conditions, hurricane and oceanographic research, and a wide range of environmental and 
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health data collected in collaboration with the University of Puerto Rico and the School of 
Tropical Medicine.
 211
 These surveys helped the PRRA focus its reconstruction efforts more 
directly on the structural economic problems exposed by the hurricanes than other government or 
private agencies and departments. 
Thanks in part to these surveys, the island’s civil engineers who worked for the PRRA 
had a better understanding of the public demand for permanent security from the violence of the 
annual storms. Massive changes within the federal government after FDR’s election made 
possible a shift from the kind of temporary relief provided by the Red Cross and the PRERA 
towards the more enduring infrastructural and agricultural reconstruction of the PRRA. Some 
Puerto Rican engineers, like Guillermo Esteves and Antonio Lucchetti, had been working in 
public service for decades by the time of the PRRA’s formation. Others, such as the large staff of 
junior engineers, architects, white collar workers, clerical staff, farmers, teachers, nurses, 
doctors, drivers, skilled construction workers, and unskilled laborers, gained invaluable 
professional skills and hands-on work experience (not to mention weekly income during the 
depths of the Great Depression) through their employment in the PRRA. In terms of both the 
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physical infrastructure built during the New Deal and the skills and experience gained by its 
workers, the public works projects constructed during the late 1930s and early 1940s assured that 
the net effects of the PRRA reverberated across generations of Puerto Rican family life. The 
following three chapters will discuss some of the large and small engineering projects of the 
New Deal in Puerto Rico—from opening of the Cataño cement plant in 1938 to the construction 
of hurricane-proof public works to the rural electrification of the island between 1935 and 1943. 
Puerto Rican civil engineers envisioned the construction of a lasting “hurricane-proof” 
infrastructure, and labored to build houses, schools, roads, hospitals, sanitation and water 
delivery systems, and rural electricity facilities that were engineered para permanencia—for 
permanence. Central to their efforts to build a permanent hurricane-proof infrastructure was the 
construction of Puerto Rico’s first cement plant, which transformed local natural resources into 
new forms of security, stability, and physical mobility for local residents. Built by PRRA 
engineers between 1936 and 1938, ownership of the Cataño cement plant was transferred to the 
local government, which had created the independently run Puerto Rico Cement Corporation 
(PRCC) to operate the plant.
212
 The locally produced cement was vital to the slum clearance and 
hurricane-proof public works projects of the PRRA.  
The opening of the cement plant was one of the most important milestones in the island’s 
recovery from the Great Depression, and should be regarded among the most significant 
contributions to political change in 1940s. Although it is rarely mentioned in political histories of 
Puerto Rico, the Cataño cement plant contributed to key advances in public health that had a 
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considerable effect on local politics at the end of the 1930s and the emergence of a mass-based 
“popular” coalition during the 1940s. Not only was the plant filling a demand for cement 
products, but it was creating new markets for them as well by helping to revive a moribund 
construction industry on the island. As a direct and indirect job creator, the cement plant was a 
model of New Deal efforts to combat unemployment by utilizing both the direct employment 
strategy of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the indirect employment strategy of 
the Public Works Administration (PWA) in the United States. Officially headed by PWA chief 
Harold Ickes after 1937, the PRRA should be regarded as a local version of both the WPA and 
PWA on the island.  
The Cataño cement plant was not just a link between Puerto Rico and the United States. 
It also helped create stronger ties between Puerto Rico and other parts of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and its construction was watched with considerable interest by regional neighbors 
who inquired about purchasing Puerto Rican cement during the early 1940s. Not only did these 
neighbors view Caribbean-produced cement as a cost efficient means to building their own 
infrastructural projects, but Puerto Rican cement also proved extremely valuable to securing the 
region’s defenses during the lethal Nazi U-boat campaign in the area between 1941 and 1943.  
While the cement plant project was underway, PRRA electrical engineers were also 
working on a capital and labor intensive project to bring electricity, refrigeration, indoor 
plumbing, and clean drinking water to the rural interior of the island. Between 1935 and 1943, 
the PRRA constructed seven major hydroelectric projects in the Cordillera Central to generate 
inexpensive electric power while also providing adequate flood relief, year-round irrigation for 
the dry southern coast, and abundant reserves of clean drinking water. As with other PRRA 
projects, all property, constructions, and lands of the rural electrification program were 
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transferred in perpetuity to the local government, which established the Puerto Rico Water 
Resources Authority (WRA) to administer the water and electric resources of the island. 
Modeled on the New York Power Authority and Tennessee Valley Authority, this public 
corporation helped Puerto Rico recover from 1928 and 1932 hurricanes, improved long-term 
public health, and broke the power of private utility companies that had controlled water and 
electric resources for decades. Shaped by an alliance between local actors and new federal 
agencies that upended the corporate monopoly on utilities, these social and economic changes 




















Chapter 4: “Para Permanencia” -- The Cataño Cement Plant and the  
Puerto Rico Cement Corporation 
 
 The first cement plant in Puerto Rico began operations on the humid morning of August 
22, 1938, crushing magnesium-rich Puerto Rican limestone and mixing it into high-quality 
“Portland” cement. Locally-produced cement was a symbol for Puerto Rico and other Latin 
American and Caribbean countries that pointed to unknown future possibilities of national and 
regional development. As we know today, for many in the region these possibilities included 
state-led development programs during the 1940s and 1950s. Puerto Rico was no exception, and 
the island’s postwar industrialization program, known as “Operation Bootstrap,” continues to 
receive deserving attention in the historical literature.
213
 The Cataño cement plant, however, was 
not designed for its symbolic value nor built to address future unknown possibilities. Rather, it 
was built as a pragmatic response to the growing public health crisis facing the island during the 
Great Depression, and was a central development in the effort to build an all-weather 
infrastructure for parts of the island that had been devastated by the San Felipe and San Ciprián 
hurricanes of 1928 and 1932. 
 Built by the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, the Cataño cement plant was 
located between the low hills and marshy bay shore of Guaynabo, about ten miles south of San 
Juan. Funded through the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act in a series of federal allocations 
between 1936 and 1938, the total cost of the cement plant was $1.44 million in Depression-era 
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dollars, or about $24 million today.
214
 The Cataño plant was a central component of all PRRA 
goals and projects. Hurricane-proof public works construction relied heavily on the locally- 
produced cement, fostered new private investment in hurricane-proof construction, and matched 
new federal actors and capital on the island with Puerto Rican engineers, farmers, workers, 
doctors, and administrators who sought an increased role in the island’s reconstruction during the 
Second New Deal.  
Built during the crisis years of the Riggs assassination, Tydings bill, and Ponce massacre, 
the Cataño cement plant was one of the first major projects completed under the new leadership 
of Miles Fairbank and Guillermo Esteves. Designed by Manuel Font Jiménez, who had 
graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1913 and served as Assistant Chief 
Engineer of the Puerto Rico Irrigation Service before being named the head of the PRRA 
Engineering division, the construction of the plant was overseen by head foreman Arturo 
Cordova Infante.
215
 At 12:01am on January 16, 1939, five months after its opening, full 
ownership and operations of the Cataño plant were turned over to the Puerto Rican Cement 
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Corporation (PRCC), a newly-created, non-partisan, and publicly-owned corporation 
administered by the local government.
216
    
Though the Cataño plant has been noted as one of several small-scale industrialization 
projects built or planned by the PRRA, less attention has been given to the public health context 
of cement construction in the Caribbean.
217
 While the cement plant did make future 
industrialization possible, it was far more than a precursor to “Operation Bootstrap.” Local 
cement production aided Puerto Rican efforts to create greater stability and security by attacking 
the most pressing infrastructural and public health issues of the day. By examining the cement 
plant’s public health context, we see that public works in Puerto Rico paralleled the New Deal’s 
emphasis on building a more secure and lasting public health infrastructure while, at the same 
time, expanding a new vision of economic democracy for all citizens. In its concern for disease 
control, nutrition, constructing new water and sanitation systems, nurse and physician training 
programs, and extensive hospital building, the New Deal did not have a singular health program. 
Instead, it used the combined resources of many federal agencies working in cooperation with 
local and state governments to radically improve the nation’s long-term health.
218
 Public works 
construction was central to all New Deal public health initiatives, just as public health concerns 
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were central to all public works construction, whether built by the PWA and WPA in the U.S. or 
the PRRA in Puerto Rico. The publicly-owned Cataño cement plant was part of a strategy to 
improve long-term health through the construction of clean drinking water and sanitation 
systems.
219
 In addition to a modern cement-based public health infrastructure, the PRRA 
provided direct medical care as well. In a series of 23,180 medical and dental clinics held 
between 1935 and 1938, Puerto Rican and U.S. doctors and nurses working for the PRRA saw 
541,435 patients (about 30% of the entire population of the island in 1938).
220
 
At the same time, the production of local cement proved extremely valuable to Puerto 
Ricans in the following decades, both in securing the island’s defenses during World War II and 
in a variety of postwar industrialization programs. During the war, as José Bolívar has argued, 
the Puerto Rican economy would have completely collapsed without federal intervention.
221
 This 
intervention, centered on military construction, was largely carried out by a combination of 
federal agencies, including the Federal Works Agency (FWA) and the PRRA. During the first 
two years of U.S. involvement in the war, federal spending in Puerto Rico expanded over 275%, 
from $40.2 million to $110 million.
222
 As in the U.S., this increase in federal war spending was 
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offset by a decrease in the domestic public works budget, and the PRRA underwent considerable 
retraction after 1938.
223
 While much has been made of the PRRA’s chronic “underfunding” 
problem, beginning with the reduction of its original budget in 1935, wartime public works on 
the island were a continuation of PRRA programs despite the change in political rationale from 
work relief to economic reconstruction to hemispheric defense.
224
 Though the pace slowed, 
PRRA funding did not end completely, and grew from $57,953,189 million in December 1938 to 
$82,063,703 million in 1955.
225
 
During WWII, however, the primary reason for the increase in federal spending in Puerto 
Rico between 1941 and 1943 was the building of military defenses to protect the Caribbean, the 
Panama Canal, the Mexican and U.S. coastlines, Mexican and U.S. oil interests in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the Central and South American coastlines from the lethal effectiveness of Nazi 
submarine warfare in the Caribbean theater. As Gaylord Kelshall has argued, the defense of the 
Caribbean was not a peripheral event in the history of WWII, but was rather central to control of 
the entire Atlantic. Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was vital to the defeat of the Nazis, 
made the D-Day landings possible, and was the survival link for both Britain and the United 
States in terms of the shipment of food, arms, and medical supplies from North America. The 




 “Facts About the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration,” accessed June 24, 




 For examples of the focus on PRRA underfunding, see Dietz, 155; Mathews, 233. As 
in the U.S., part of the shift from a depression to war economy included a discursive 
rationalization for federal appropriations—whereas a rhetorical focus on jobs was necessary to 
extract money from Congress during the Depression, a rhetorical focus on war defense was 
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Caribbean Sea Frontier, which was divided into three headquarters in Panama, Trinidad, and 
Puerto Rico, was one of the largest anti-submarine commands in the world, ranging over 500,000 
sq. miles and protecting thousands of miles of coastline. It was not only the “outer defense ring 




During these years, Nazi U-boats struck U.S. and Latin American cargo ships in the 
Caribbean with little restriction, as the U.S. sank just one Nazi submarine for every 23.5 U.S. 
cargo ships sunk by the Germans. These losses accounted for 80% of all Caribbean casualties 
during the war and 36% of all global shipping losses during the entire war.
227
 Recognizing the 
Caribbean basin as a soft target, as radar was not installed in the Caribbean or Western Atlantic 
region until 1943, German U-boats increased the number of attacks and relocated their focus to 
the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, the Florida straits, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean 
Sea, and the northeastern coast of South America stretching from Venezuela to Brazil.
228
 Many 
Caribbean islands, each allied with the Allied nations against the Axis Powers, faced direct 
attacks from Nazi and Italian submarines and were covertly used as refueling stations or safe 
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 Although there is little evidence that German strategy included dividing the U.S. from 
Latin America or gaining control of the Panama Canal, Franklin Roosevelt directly warned the 
U.S. public in a fireside chat that the “Nazi attempt to seize control of the oceans is but a 
counterpart of all of the Nazi plots now being carried on throughout the Western Hemisphere,” 
including intrigues in Uruguay, plots in Argentina, sabotage in Bolivia, and machinations in 




While the main priorities of the U-boat campaign prior to December 1941 were to starve 
the British and halt U.S. entry into the war, the Nazi focus on the Caribbean had dire 
consequences for Puerto Rico. By sinking 181 cargo ships in the Caribbean and 175 more on the 
Atlantic coast of the U.S., the German submarine campaign reduced total imports in Puerto Rico 
by 55% from December 1940 to December 1943 and shrunk per capita food imports by 25%. 
That food imports declined at a lower rate than total imports tells us that all non-food items, such 
as building supplies, were given a lower priority during the submarine campaign. But, while 
imported building supplies were sharply restricted, local cement production at the Cataño plant 
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increased over 300% from 374,910 barrels in 1940 to 1,169,719 barrels in 1945. This increase 
was due to purchases by federal sources, such as the FWA, PRRA, and War Department, which 
continued with New Deal reconstruction projects in housing construction and rural hydro-
electrification while constructing a vast new defense infrastructure on the island of military 
bases, docks, and airfields.
231
 In addition, the PRRA contributed much more than cement to the 
war effort—facing the serious food and shipping crisis, the PRRA increased local food 
production by sowing over 15,000 acres of food crops in 1943 and 20,000 acres in 1944 to help 
make up for the decrease in food imports during the submarine crisis.
232
 
Although the possibility of U.S. entry into a future war was certainly real in 1938 and 
1939, and known to historical actors living at the time, the extent of future Nazi warfare in the 
Caribbean was far from the minds of Guillermo Esteves and Manuel Font as they oversaw the 
Cataño plant’s opening in August 1938. For civil engineers like Esteves and Font, the plant was a 
longstanding goal that had not been imposed by future demands of the U.S. military. Rather, 
local cement production was a crucial weapon against epidemic disease and protection against 
devastating hurricanes. As the original Chardón Plan argued, any other construction material 
would need to be replaced and prove to be a bad investment of limited relief finances, as “under 
our exacting climatic conditions, concrete is the only durable and hence socially economical 
construction material.”
233
  The PRRA benefitted from local studies of the geological availability 
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of raw materials and economic viability of markets and transportation.
234
 Its construction, 
however, had been nearly impossible before the influx of new federal financing for public works 
during the New Deal. Taking advantage of the administrative change that brought public works 
champion Harold Ickes to control of the PRRA in 1937, Puerto Rican engineers completed 
projects that had been practically unimaginable prior to FDR’s election in 1932 and the coming 
of the New Deal to Puerto Rico. 
One prohibitive factor had been cost. The total cost of the plant was $1.44 million, or 
about $24 million today, a figure that was financially impossible for the Puerto Rican legislature 
to supply and politically difficult for FDR to get from an increasingly resistant Congress. During 
1935 and 1936, the future of the New Deal was in doubt despite its widespread popular approval. 
As the Supreme Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), two seminal pieces of the legislation from the “First 
Hundred Days,” New Deal funding came under increased scrutiny from Congressional 
Democrats and Republicans alike.
235
 While much of the historical literature on Puerto Rico has 
noted the PRRA’s fiscal limitations, most analysis has viewed the problem in isolation and 
concluded that the limited funding was the product of “colonial” neglect.
236
 Instead, examination 
of the PRRA’s budget should be placed in context with the widespread impatience about and 
resistance to the entire New Deal after 1935.  
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It is impossible to fully evaluate the New Deal in Puerto Rico without acknowledging 
how politically complex New Deal financing actually was, especially after 1935, the year the 
PRRA was created. As with nearly all New Deal programs in the U.S., funding for PRRA public 
works such as the Cataño plant had to be politically framed around their role in providing relief 
work—even as the PRRA refocused New Deal energies toward reconstruction. Highlighting its 
appeal as both a direct job creator through the cement plant’s 150 permanent jobs and $20,000 
monthly payroll, and indirect job creator through the expansion of the local construction 
industry, PRRA administrators lobbied for and obtained $850,000 for the cement plant from the 
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of December 1935, and received four more allotments 
totaling $616,500 from 1936 through 1938. Job creation was the only reasoning that worked, 
even though the cement plant’s long-term value was substantially more important than the 150 
full-time jobs it created.
 237
  
While the costs were high, Puerto Rican engineers knew that the price of importing 
cement was even higher, as it fluctuated according to volatile global and local economic 
conditions. Prior to the cement plant’s completion, PRRA engineers made numerous internal 
complaints about the changing price of imported cement and the lack of stable transportation 
costs. These changing costs had rippling effects across a range of construction activities on the 
island and put added pressure on already strained budgets. In 1936, Carlos Chardón complained 
that while prices for materials such as lumber and cement had remained steady in U.S. markets, 
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Like Second New Deal programs elsewhere, the PRRA navigated sharp political 
divisions between federal and local control by transferring ownership of large-scale construction 
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projects to public corporations.
239
 In 1939, the legal transfer of the Cataño plant from the PRRA 
(a federal agency) to the PRCC (local control) marked a turning point towards the construction 
of truly public works in Puerto Rico.
240
 The cement plant offered public control of Puerto Rican 
natural resources, independence from the fluctuating global price of cement or international 
shipping, and the ability to construct all-weather public works in all areas of the island.
241
  
That the Cataño plant was an immediate success surprised and impressed regional 
neighbors also struggling to respond to the crisis of the Great Depression. Soon after the plant’s 
opening in 1938, the PRRA, local government, and U.S. State Department began receiving 
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letters from Latin American and Caribbean neighbors inquiring about purchasing Puerto Rico’s 
high-quality cement. Letters and telegrams came from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, 
the Virgin Islands, Jamaica, Curaçao, and (even) Norway.
242
 Part of the excitement about the 
opening of the Cataño plant was that it was also part of a jobs program that provided limited 
economic stimulus through both direct and indirect hiring. The Cataño plant brought benefits to 
Puerto Rican workers who were hired directly by the PRCC or through many private contractors 
in multiple ways. As in the U.S., New Deal-related hiring, even when limited, led to improved 
working and living conditions at a time of unprecedented unemployment. In addition, PRCC jobs 
were celebrated in the local press for providing benefits completely new to island workers. In a 
banner headline, El Mundo announced an agreement signed between the CIO-affiliated CGT and 
the PRCC that provided Puerto Rican workers with paid leave, sick pay, Christmas bonuses, 
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retirement pay, and increased salaries.
243
 Sitting on opposite sides of the table, the PRCC and 
CGT were both products of the changing relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico during 
the New Deal. It should not be construed that only working-class men benefitted from these 




 The Cataño plant was not only filling demand for cement products, but it was creating 
new markets for them as well. After just one year of operations, demand had risen so fast that 
Cataño was shipping over 2,000 barrels of cement per day, twice the plant’s original capacity. 
While engineers had originally estimated that the federal government would not see a return on 
its investment for 30 years, the plant had paid for itself by 1943. In these five years, the PRCC 
was producing over a thousand tons of concrete per year that was sold to 59 Puerto Rican owned 
small businesses, along with larger government and corporate customers as well.
245
 In all, the 
Cataño plant was doing over $168,000 per month business with private and government 
contractors, and held deposits in U.S. and Puerto Rican Banks, including the Chase National 
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Bank, the Banco de Ponce, Banco Crédito y Ahorro Ponceño, and the Banco Popular de Puerto 
Rico. This was exactly the type of “prime the pump” federal spending that Ickes and Hopkins 
used through the PWA and WPA to spur local spending and investment in the United States. In 
Puerto Rico, the response by local contractors was so strong that the PRRA had to scale back its 
advertising to once per week in just one newspaper in San Juan and Ponce. Originally, not 
knowing the response or availability of qualified contractors, the PRRA had originally advertised 
in daily, weekly, monthly and irregularly published newspapers.
246
    
In addition to increasing demand for its own cement, the PRCC also encouraged private 
Puerto Rican investment in other parts of the island. In 1939, José Ferré began an exchange of 
letters with the PRCC board of directors asking for authorization and technical assistance in 
opening a new cement plant in Ponce. Ferré calculated that the newly-created Ponce Cement 
Corporation would aim to produce 1,000 barrels of cement per day for southern contractors, to 
compliment the PRCC’s 2,000 per day output from Guaynabo. The PRCC responded with 
enthusiasm to Ferré, expressing that the PRRA encouraged investment from the island’s private 
capital, and that Puerto Rican demand for cement could easily handle another thousand barrels 
per day, particularly on the southern and western coasts.
 247
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For Puerto Ricans, the Cataño plant was measured by this combination of economic 
opportunity, advances in workers’ benefits, and the island’s newfound ability to construct 
hurricane-proof houses, schools, hospitals, roads, waterworks, sewers, storm drains, and other 
public works out of local limestone and clay. Cement construction proved to be the most 
effective at tackling the multiple vectors of disease and poverty that were increasing on the 
island during the Depression. Not only were hundreds of thousands of Puerto Rican men and 
women made homeless by the 1928 and 1932 hurricanes, but strategies for recovery before the 
New Deal had actually increased the three deadliest public health crises confronting the island in 
the 1930s: malaria, hookworm, and malnutrition—which included dietary related gastro-
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Chapter 5: Concrete Changes: Hurricane-Proof Public Works  
 
The increase in these deadly health threats was primarily caused by the spread of 
swampland “slum” houses built on wooden stilts, void of indoor plumbing, electricity, sanitation, 
or garbage disposal, prone to flooding and fire, and rife with infectious disease.
249
 During the 
early years of the Depression, this disease-vulnerable form of housing expanded a public health 
crisis that municipal governments and the local legislature, already stretched to fiscal limits with 
relief loans, were powerless to curtail.
250
 In both urban and rural areas of Puerto Rico, the PRRA 
relied upon Cataño cement to build affordable, hurricane-proof homes. In urban areas, New Deal 
public housing policy was centered on slum clearance—which combined swamp-draining, 
malaria control, and cement housing construction. In rural areas, New Deal public housing policy 
combined cement, brick, and packed-earth housing construction with several other rural 
rehabilitation programs, including forestry, soil conservation, agricultural diversification, road 
building, support for family farming cooperatives, and rural electrification. In all, the PRRA 
spent over $12.5 million (about $207.5 million today) on urban and rural hurricane-proof 
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housing projects between 1935 and 1943, an unprecedented investment in the permanent stability 





One of the first customers for PRCC cement was the PRRA’s Slum Clearance division, 
which was essential to all other New Deal housing programs in Puerto Rico. Although “slums” 
had existed in Puerto Rico during both the Spanish colonial era and U.S. insular one, the decade 
following the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes saw the rapid escalation of improvised slum 
houses. Their spread during the Great Depression was a direct result of the reliance on older 
models of relief efforts. During the 1930s, slum houses had been constructed in all low-lying 
urban areas of Puerto Rico. While global economic conditions quickened the pace of 
urbanization on the island in cities that did not have the jobs, houses, or resources available to 
migrants, the proliferation of slum houses built on rickety wooden stilts above polluted, swampy 
land exacerbated a local public health crisis that municipal governments and the local legislature 
were powerless to curtail. 
To fully understand the increase in these swampland slums, it is necessary to consider the 
combined environmental and political contexts of the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes. 
Prior to the New Deal, local and federal relief efforts relied upon an inherited paradigm of relief 
that enhanced the power of large landowners, precluded local participation, and failed to make 
long-term capital investments in Puerto Rico’s public infrastructure. During the New Deal, 
Puerto Ricans abandoned this paradigm of relief for one of reconstruction, and one of the clearest 
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examples of what this paradigm shift looked like can be seen in housing construction. Effective 
long-term strategies for the construction of hurricane-proof housing began with the creation of 
the PRRA in 1935. Essential to its success, the PRRA operated independent of the local 
legislature and forged alliances with Puerto Ricans farmers, workers, professionals, educators, 
and political actors in the study, planning, and construction of a public infrastructure in both 
urban and rural areas of the island. Urban hurricane-proof construction was part of a larger 
strategy that involved slum clearance, swamp-draining, and malaria control and relied upon great 
quantities of locally-produced concrete and cement. While U.S. and Puerto Rican New Dealers 
shared some of the assumptions of earlier relief efforts as to the moral and political aptitude of 
the corporate landowners, colono class of small farmers, and landless tenant farmers, the PRRA 
reconstruction projects differed from previous relief models by turning over infrastructural works 
to public agencies that served the public good. Building affordable, hurricane-proof houses that 
delivered clean drinking water, sanitation, electricity, and other public services to the island’s 
most vulnerable residents were among the PRRA’s primary objectives. 
 Improvised houses had multiplied in the wake of the hurricanes. Most were constructed 
on wooden stilts, balanced over brackish swamp water made unbearable due to food scraps, 
household trash, and human waste, and lacked all basic necessities such as clean water, 
sanitation, and electricity.
252
 Even as the slums proliferated, the extent of the problem was 
unknown as the local legislature lacked either the ability or desire to investigate the housing 
conditions of slum residents. In 1936, the PRRA conducted the first door-to-door surveys of 
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slums in Puerto Rico, and concluded that slum areas were now built on flooded swampland 
outside of all 76 municipalities on the island, housing over 9,000 families. Three years later, the 
totals had increased by 25% to nearly 11,500 families.
253
 Not confined to the large San Juan-
Santurce region, the worst slums were multiplying on semi-urban marshlands across the island, 
with slums in Arecibo, Ponce, and Mayagüez singled out as particularly deadly.  
 Across the island, post-hurricane slum residents faced a severe public health crisis. What 
set the PRRA slum clearance program apart from previous relief efforts was its emphasis on 
permanent reconstruction via capital-intensive projects, including swamp drainage, reinforced 
cement housing construction, and new public health amenities such as indoor plumbing, clean 
water, and sanitation services—a multi-pronged approach that Puerto Rican municipal and 
legislative bodies could not afford and had never attempted. Without these projects, hurricane 
relief efforts along the coastal regions were guaranteed to fail by exacerbating Puerto Rican 
efforts to combat proliferating diseases such as malaria, hookworm, and tuberculosis.
254
   
Before the PRRA, hurricane relief strategies created new slums. Without a 
comprehensive strategy for long-term economic development that included the construction of a 
local cement plant, hurricane housing relief built by the American Red Cross, PRERA, and local 
government was often an inadequate short-term solution to a problem that was guaranteed to 
repeat itself, given the geological and meteorological conditions of the Caribbean. In fact, many 
of the wood-framed relief houses and tormenteras (thatched-palm hurricane relief shelters) built 
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after the 1928 and 1932 storms were already in disrepair. As the PRRA explicitly argued, most 
of the local government’s relief projects built between 1928 and 1936 “can hardly be justified, 
since without question the new settlement will become another slum area within a few years” or 
get blown away in another storm. The immediate dangers of the wooden houses were disease, 
flooding, mold, termites, dry-rot, and fire.  
Even more serious was the PRRA claim that the local government had effectively 
“legalized” these new slums by condoning, sanctioning, and at times funding construction 
projects that did not even meet its own sanitary health codes and regulations.
255
 Rather than 
attack the problem of the slums, previous policy made it more permanent. Slum dwellings were 
built on land acquired in two ways: either the resident “ground-rented” land from a private 
landowner in a semi-official arrangement, or the resident squatted on public land. Under Puerto 
Rican law, residents owned their improvised houses regardless of whether they owned the land 
where the house stood. This applied equally to land owned by private citizens, municipal 
governments, or the local legislature. PRRA surveys of Ponce slums conducted by resident 
engineer Adolfo Nones illustrate the different locations on which slum residents acquired 
sanctioned slum land. The seven officially-sanctioned slums in Ponce were the: Mameyes-St. 
Thomas built alongside the irrigation reservoir but without sanitary plumbing or fresh drinking 
water; Machuelito on the eastern shore of the flood-prone Río Portugués, where slum houses had 
been washed away and rebuilt by surviving residents; Berlin–Peligro–Loma del Viento on the 
western shore of the Río Portugués (also prone to flooding); Salitral—Tablazo, on the beach 
shore of Ponce Playa also near the Portugués; the Hoya del Castillo, a small downtown slum, 
                                                 
255
 “Problems in Connection with Slum Clearance in Puerto Rico: With Special 
Reference to the San Juan Area,” 7, 1939, Box 1, “Slums” folder, Records of the Engineering 
Division, RG 323, NARA-NYC.   
 
 138 
facing the District Court, Castillo School, and Athletic Park; the Brooklyn, a small slum located 
just outside of the city alongside Road No. 1; and the Cuartro Calles, a slum entirely within the 
boundaries of the Fernando Toro estate. The PRRA located nine parcels of land available to 
purchase in Ponce, and two in Ponce Playa, and began construction on 4,290 concrete houses in 
Ponce and Ponce Playa. Built to house over 21,000 people, the PRRA also constructed an nearby 
incinerating plant, concrete storm sewers, new water supply system, and temporary 





Swamp-Land Slums and Public Health 
 Slums like these—whether newly created by the short-term relief policies of the 1920s or 
simply made worse by the storms—were cross-sections of malnutrition and disease. Lacking 
adequate food, electricity, and indoor plumbing, malnutrition was rife in swamp-land slums—
whose residents literally lived in a condition of “slow starvation.” The PRRA Slum Report 
concluded that the island’s daily per capita intake of meat and milk could only be measured by 
“ounces and spoonfuls.” The effects of this acute malnutrition were magnified by increasing 
levels of infectious disease. Death from malaria, tuberculosis, and gastro-intestinal diseases 
comprised over 40% of all deaths in Puerto Rico during the Depression. In 1936, nearly 90% of 
the rural population and 40% of the urban population “harbored the hookworm in their 
intestines” and between 25% and 50% of the coastal residents carried the malaria parasite in their 
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 These evaluations were compiled from reports by the Puerto Rico School of Tropical 
Medicine, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Insular Department of Health, as well as PRRA 
surveys. The PRRA noted that while the local Department of Health had good plans and laws in 
place to address these health crises, they lacked funding and support from the local legislature.   
Similarly, deaths from malaria following the hurricanes had increased 40% during the 
first five years of the Depression. At the time of the PRRA’s formation in 1935, deaths from 
malaria averaged nearly 2,800 per year, an increase largely attributed to the severe flooding of 
the hurricanes and the construction of slums on flooded land.
258
 The PRRA forged alliances with 
local doctors who were already working to ameliorate the effects of these diseases, but lacked the 
necessary capital, equipment, infrastructure, or staff to adequately do so. While the 1928 and 
1932 hurricanes brought local anti-hookworm “operations to a standstill” by destroying 50% of 
the sanitary latrines previously built to fight the spread of hookworm, Puerto Rican doctors such 
as Eduardo Garrido Morales and José Rodriguez Pastor led the campaign against tuberculosis 
and advised the PRRA on its construction of major tuberculosis hospitals in Ponce, Guayama, 
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Garrido Morales, who worked for the local government as director of Epidemiology and 
served as Commissioner of Health for nine years, later co-founded the Puerto Rico Public Health 
Association in September 1941. He is an interesting figure. Although he consulted with the 
PRRA, Garrido Morales was one of the leading opponents of the New Deal. A staunch member 
of the Republican Party and supporter of the Coalition, Garrido Morales felt that PRRA public 
health policy was a threat to his own Insular Department of Health and claimed that the PRRA 




 As for malaria, Guillermo Esteves, Manuel Font, and other engineers argued that 
permanent control of the disease was conceivable only through swamp-draining, mosquito 
eradication, and cement-based housing construction. By June 1939, the PRRA had completed or 
was working on 39 separate swamp drainage projects around coastal regions of the island. 
Funded by $1.75 million in federal funds, or about $29.8 million today, the swamp-draining 
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projects included four primary methods: hydraulic fill, dry fill, canalization, and tile drainage. 
The mosquito-breeding area eradication program that complemented the projects was co-
sponsored by UPR and the PRRA.
261
 Some of the swamp-draining projects were slowed by 
partisan politics in the Puerto Rican legislature. In 1938, for example, Miles Fairbank 
complained that Rafael Martínez Nadal interfered with swamp drainage projects because Felix 
Benitez Rexach, one of the leading experts, supported the Liberal Party and was an advocate of 
complete independence. Benitez Rexach, who had recently dredged the port of Ciudad Trujillo, 
owned his own diesel-electric dredging equipment and had inquired with the local legislature and 
PRRA for work. Despite this local opposition, the innovative combination of swamp-draining, 
mosquito eradication, and concrete construction attracted the attention of neighboring Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, which sent students, teachers, and health professionals to 
Puerto Rico to exchange ideas and information about these programs.
262
  
This exchange of information helped establish permanent intellectual relationships 
between Puerto Rico and other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. In December 1940, for 
example, the UPR School of Tropical Medicine hosted the first Inter-American Institute for 
Hospital Administrators. This two-week conference provided both intellectual and physical 
space for international and local hospital organizations to meet with representatives from across 
the region. Led by Félix Lámela, the conference had 183 registered attendees that “represented a 
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sizable cross section of hospital service personnel, principally from the Caribbean area, 27 of 
whom were from outside Puerto Rico.” Extensive expansion of the university’s library, research 




The PRRA expanded the public health infrastructure of Puerto Rico by building 
hurricane-proof hospitals and health centers in rural and urban areas. By the end of 1937, the 
PRRA had completed 64 of its 107 rural health centers in the interior of the island, 19 health 
units in semi-urban towns, and a major hospital at Lafayette.
264
 By 1944, the PRRA had spent 
$1.89 million on a variety of hospital and rural health dispensaries, including a two-story 
sanitarium in Río Piedras; new tuberculosis hospitals in Ponce, Guayama, Mayagüez and Cayey; 
four new district hospitals at Bayamón, Fajardo, Arecibo and Aguadilla; a new concrete school 
for the blind in Santurce; and major repairs to the leper asylum in Trujillo Alto, which had been 
damaged in the San Felipe hurricane.
265
 In addition, rural medical centers were built for the first 
time in many areas, including in neighborhoods of Aguada, Arecibo, Barceloneta, Isabella, Juana 
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Díaz, Las Marías, Loiza, Manatí, Moca, Morovia, Sabana Grande, San Germán, San Sebastian, 
Utuado, Villalba, and Yabucoa.
266
 
Though rural and urban health services focused on malaria, hookworm, and malnutrition, 
the PRRA health service also treated rural patients for typhoid fever, smallpox, and dental health 
conditions. By the summer of 1938, when the PRRA health service was transferred to local 
government control, the PRRA had directly treated 510,435 patients at 23,180 medical clinics 
held in all parts of the island. Puerto Rican and U.S. doctors and nurses conducted an 
extraordinary amount of medical examinations between 1935 and 1938, and treated a wide 
variety of health and dental conditions, conducting 22,060 physical exams; 27,792 malaria 
treatments; 91,550 intestinal parasite treatments (hookworm and other); 97,411 typhoid fever 
treatments; 26,021 smallpox vaccinations; 212,622 laboratory examinations; 48,499 dental 
exams; 169,330 extractions; 10,513 preventative cleanings; and 3,627 miscellaneous dental 
treatments.
267
   
 
Urban Cement-Based Housing 
 Another stage of the slum clearance program was the construction of cement-based 
houses that would provide a permanent bulwark against both hurricanes and the spread of 
disease. According to J.C. Hitchman, head of the Engineering division, the PRRA’s primary aim 
was to “provide a hurricane-proof house, and for that reason our construction work has gone 
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largely to the building of concrete houses.”
268
 Hitchman also argued that the cost of durable 
concrete construction would be less than wood when considered over a thirty-year period. By 
1938, Puerto Rican architects and engineers were building thousands of concrete houses with 
electricity and indoor plumbing in urban areas that were either on top of or adjacent to former 
swamp land slums.
269
 Included among these was El Falansterio in Puerta de Tierra, a three-story 
group of nine Art Deco buildings comprising 216 apartments of reinforced concrete built to 
withstand hurricanes, earthquakes, and fires. Completed in 1937, the Falansterio replaced the 
“Miranda” slum and rented single-family apartments for $2.00 to $4.25 per week that included 
two bedrooms, indoor bathroom (including shower), indoor kitchen, clean drinking water, as 
well as access to an interior patio, community building, kindergarten, a small library, with 
maintenance and janitorial services.
270
 The PRRA also built storm sewers, curbed sidewalks, and 
an improved water supply system in the surrounding neighborhood.  
Still occupied today, the Falansterio was built by Manuel Egozcue, head of the Slum 
Clearance division, and designed by lead architect Jorge Ramírez de Arellano. It was later 
integrated into a cooperative that allowed tenants to purchase their homes in the 1940s.
271
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Despite stylistic complaints from some residents who complained of a “beehive” noise in the 
courtyard, the Falansterio benefitted Puerto Rican workers in terms of rent, design, and 
geographic location and clearly represented PRRA goals of providing a newfound security from 
the destructive force of storms and the promise of improved health for Puerto Ricans, who 
“would otherwise be living in the deplorable conditions of the slums.” Falansterio tenants 
included a cross-section of Puerto Rican workers, including secretaries, office workers, nurses, 
plumbers, teachers, conductors, policemen, and small business owners.
272
 
 Between 1937 and 1942, the PRRA completed slum clearance projects known as the 
Eleanor Roosevelt development in Hato Rey, the Mirapalmeras development in Barrio Obrero, 
Santurce, and the Morell Campos development at Barrio Cañas, Ponce. Apartments in these 
reinforced-concrete structures each had two or three bedrooms, indoor plumbing, electricity, 
indoor kitchens, and were bordered by paved streets, cement sidewalks, sanitary and storm drain 
sewers, public water systems, schools, and local police stations.
 273
 Rents in these projects ranged 
from $8 to $18 per month at El Falansterio, $6 to $12 per month at the Eleanor Roosevelt, and $5 
to $9 per month at the Morell Campos. Compared to the wooden relief structures built by the 
local government and the increasing construction of slum housing rampant on the island, the 
slum clearance projects of the PRRA opened worlds of opportunities for Puerto Ricans across the 
class spectrum that were unforeseen just years before. 
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Rural Cement-Based Housing 
Hurricane-proof houses were also built in rural areas of the island, as part of the PRRA’s 
Rural Rehabilitation program. As of December 1937, at least 1,268 rural concrete houses were 
built as part of the PRRA rural rehabilitation and land tenure program, run by chief engineer José 
Benitez Gautier. By 1944, this program had spent $26.5 million supplying thousands of small 
coffee, tobacco, and fruit farms with seed, fertilizers, and experienced agricultural workers to 
“rehabilitate their farms, which had been seriously devastated by the cyclones of 1928 and 1932, 
and which [still] suffered seriously from the results of the economic depression that followed the 
First World War.”
274
 Locally produced cement was central to rural rehabilitation, as the PRRA 
sought to build rural houses that were, in the words of engineer Manuel Font, “earthquake-proof, 
hurricane-proof, insect [and] pest-proof, fire-proof, cool, and sanitary, that will require very little 
maintenance, if any.”
275
 The PRRA solicited and accepted eleven designs, which included wood, 
brick, and concrete. When Gruening and others in Washington enquired about brick, Puerto 
Rican engineers argued that concrete was more assuredly earthquake and hurricane-proof and a 
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 Manuel Font to Miles Fairbank and Guillermo Esteves, January 19, 1937, Box 2, 
Farmers Houses-General Memoranda folder, Records Relating to Construction Projects Directed 






 To help keep costs down, the PRRA redesigned rural houses to 
eliminate provisions that were specific for the urban houses. For example, the PRRA concluded 
that foundations in rural areas did not need to be two feet underground, as was the case in urban 
areas to protect against rats and possible outbreak of Bubonic plague. In rural areas, PRRA 
engineers advised, rats find shelter in trees, not under buildings.
277
  
These houses were only part of a larger plan of rural rehabilitation. Between 1936 and 
1944 the PRRA transformed over 40,000 acres into small farms on previously uncultivated lands 
acquired from large or absentee landowners.
278
 For migrant workers and homesteaders displaced 
by the environmental damage of the hurricanes, the PRRA created two or three acre parcelas in 
the fruit, tobacco, and citrus regions, located work on neighboring farms, and built “hurricane-
proof concrete, brick, or rammed-earth houses, thus creating subsistence farms where 
agricultural laborers have been installed as resettlers” and made available for rent or purchase.
279
  
As of April 1944, the PRRA moved 6,111 farmers onto parcelas with houses and 3,871 farmers 
onto parcelas without houses. The average rent was $2.50 per month for land with houses, and 
0.50 cents per month for land without houses. The price to buy these houses were within reach 
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for many—but not all—Puerto Rican workers, as the PRRA sold land with houses to 3,101 
settlers at a rate of $1.75 per month for 25 years, and land without houses to 520 settlers at a rate 
of 0.35 cents per month for 10 years.
280
    
 The rural rehabilitation program took over the construction of flood relief houses that was 
started by the FERA and PRERA in 1933. By January 1937, the PRRA was constructing flood-
relief houses in the southwestern towns of Humacao, Juncos, Gurabo, San Lorenzo, and 
Yabucoa. The PRRA expanded this flood-relief program into a much more comprehensive 
reconstruction plan that addressed community concerns such as repairing school buildings (with 
shared funding from the Puerto Rican legislature), and constructing entirely new rural 
schoolrooms, roads, waterworks, electricity, and sewers.
281
 The rural rehabilitation program also 
included the formation of farmer-owned cooperatives that provided shared access to seeds, stock 
animals, mechanical equipment, technical support, education, canning, and crop marketing 
services, in addition to over $6.25 million in low interest loans to small farmers. These 
agricultural cooperatives were a central component of PRRA rehabilitation programs covering 
the sugar cane, coffee, tobacco, citrus fruit, coconut, plantain, vanilla, pig, chicken, fresh water 
fish, Sea Island cotton, and other sectors.
282
 Like their counterparts in the U.S., Puerto Rican 
New Dealers in the PRRA experimented with new ideas. Some did not work. Among the 
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pastoral failures was the introduction of forty Nubian-Toggenburg goats for breeding. As Miles 
Fairbank wrote years later, these “splendid little animals made quite an impression on the 
countryside, but they soon fell prey to tropical parasites.”
283
 
 As in the U.S., rural rehabilitation also involved agricultural pest eradication, 
reforestation, and soil erosion projects. Two of the most harmful pests in Puerto Rico were the 
cattle tick and the rhinoceros beetle (also called the coconut beetle). Cattle ticks had spread 
bovine babesiosis, called “Texas fever” or cattle tick fever at the time, which is a highly fatal 
disease that attacks the red blood cells of infected animals.
284
 Cattle tick treatment and 
eradication were major concerns of the cattle industry of Texas and Mexico from the 1860s 
through 1940s. In Puerto Rico, the Rural Rehabilitation division constructed 991 “dipping tanks” 
throughout rural areas so that owners of cattle, horses, mules, and other livestock could get them 
dipped as part of an island-wide cattle tick elimination program. The number of animals treated 
was impressive: in the western third of the island, where 315 dipping tanks were built, the PRRA 
treated 115,863 cattle, 18,776 horses and mules, and 79,688 goats and sheep in the first year 
alone. In all, multiple hundreds of thousands of animals were treated, with all labor, chemicals, 
and other supplies paid for by the PRRA. As in Mexico and the United States, quarantine 
districts were set up in the island to control the movement of infected animals. During the 1940s, 
the island was certified tick-free.
285
 Similarly, the PRRA worked to eliminate the rhinoceros 
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beetle, which had been a major destructive factor in island coconut groves. Rhinoceros beetle 
elimination and coconut rehabilitation allowed coconuts to be exported to U.S. markets tariff-
free, and resulted in the PRRA hiring of thousands of Puerto Rican workers on coconut 
plantations, cleaning up debris on over 30,000 acres and more than 95,000 trees.
286
 Without these 
kinds of projects, which revitalized farms and created jobs, PRRA cement-based houses would 
have been useless in rural areas. 
 Rural rehabilitation engineers also coordinated (and funded) reforestation and soil erosion 
projects in connection with the Puerto Rico Forest Service, Federal Forest Service, Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC), and PWA in publicly protected lands such as the federally-run 
Caribbean National Forest (called the El Yunque National Rainforest today) and locally-run Toro 
Negro State Forest. Local cement production directly aided attempts to restore the environment 
of the central mountains, as the CCC and PRRA combined to build 100 miles of roads and trails 
in forestry regions, along with observation towers, picnic areas, campgrounds, bridges, 
swimming pools, parking areas, and water, sanitation, and recreational services. Aside from 
providing stable public access to sites of natural beauty and wonder, these roads allowed forest 
workers to plant millions of cedar, mahogany, and satinwood seedlings compiled from quick 
growing native and neighboring Caribbean trees. Between 1933 and 1942, the CCC employed 
2,400 Puerto Rican men to work on these environmental infrastructural and reforestation projects 
in El Yunque. Like their U.S. counterparts, the Puerto Rican Tres C’s published its own 
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newspaper, the Spanish language Ecos del Yunque.
287
 The work of the CCC, still a central 
symbol of Puerto Rican culture today, was achieved with help from the $3.4 million 





 In some areas of Puerto Rico, the construction of new public schools by the PRRA were 
the first ever built. By March 1938, the PRRA had constructed 285 schools or school rooms in 
189 towns or cities that were currently in use across the island, ranging from Aguas Buenas, 
Aguada, and Aibonito to Villalba, Yabucoa, and Yauco.
289
 Though these 285 rooms had 
exhausted the $500,000 budget allocated for rural school building projects, they were used as 
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arguments for increased funding; just as the PRRA made requests to Congress for more money, 
Puerto Rican administrators and parents made requests for more schools. In 1938, Jose Gallardo, 
the Puerto Rico Commissioner of Education wrote to Ickes to protest the $500,000 construction 
budget when $3 million had been originally planned. Similarly, Evangelista Rosario, the local 
school director in the small northern coast town of Barceloneta wrote to Fairbank requesting 
PRRA help in repairing the existing school infrastructure. In smaller towns such as Villalba, in 
the coffee region of the south, and Bajadero, a small barrio of Arecibo on the east bank of the 
Rio Grande de Arecibo Puerto Rican parents sought to help shape the PRRA’s school building 
program by directly contacting reconstruction officials to make requests for schools in their 
areas. Letters also came directly from parents—one of the most underrepresented groups in the 
historiography of Puerto Rico. Santos Vega of the Association de Padres y Maestros (PTA) in 
Villalba wrote to the PRRA asking for a new school; from Bajadero, the president of the local 
PTA Rufino Gómez wrote asking for a new vocational school in his area.
290
  
 Because no accurate census of school-aged children existed at the time, the PRRA 
conducted its own in 1935, and found that only 39% of the 638,728 school-aged children in 
Puerto Rico were in school.
291
 This educational crisis was more pronounced in the rural 
mountains of the interior, where there were over twice as many school-aged children as urban 
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areas, but nearly the same total amount that attended school.
292
  The PRRA estimated that Puerto 
Rico needed at least 1,714 more urban schoolrooms and teachers and 6,065 more rural 
schoolrooms and teachers. While funding for schools was limited, the PRRA school construction 
program was enhanced by its commitment to empowering local communities through 
transferring privately owned resources to public control. Purchasing land for school construction 
from private landowners, the PRRA transferred land directly to Puerto Rican municipalities 
wherever PRRA schools were built, including in the municipalities of Carolina (in the barrios of 
Barrazas, Cacao, Cangrejos, Canovanillas, Carruzos, Hoyo Mulas, Matin Gonzalez, Pueblo, 
Sabana Abajo, San Anton, Santa Cruz, and Trujillo Bajo), Cayey, Cidra, Ponce, Rincón, and Río 
Piedras.
293
 In addition, the PRRA hired and paid teachers in these areas during the first few years 
of the school to relieve some of the new financial “burdens” caused by providing free public 
schools to all children. During the 1936 and 1937 school years, the PRRA employed 1,403 
elementary teachers in urban areas at a salary of $900 per year and 2,022 teachers in rural areas 
at a salary of $700 per year.
294
 
 Cement school construction was not uniform, but rather varied by demographic size of 
the city. Whereas in Aguada, a small town just northeast of Rincón, the PRRA built two 
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classrooms, larger cities received many more, such as the 205 classrooms built in Ponce and 448 
built in San Juan. At a cost of $2,500 for hurricane and fire-proof concrete rooms, $1,800 for 
hurricane-proof rooms, and $1,200 for standard wood framed rooms, school construction also 
provided a temporary boost to the local economy. For example, the two Aguada classrooms cost 
nearly $6,000 and employed 20 men daily for three months. By contrast, the Ponce classrooms 
cost $615,000 and employed 2,050 men daily for 36 months and the San Juan classrooms cost 
$1.34 million, employing 4,480 men daily for 36 months.
295
  
While relief work was not the primary objective of the public school construction 
program, the PRRA often had to highlight the number of jobs created by school construction. As 
general council Henry Hirshberg explained, the PRRA did so not only as a strategy to secure 
financing but also out of legal obligation, since most PRRA funding was allocated from 
Congressional emergency relief funds. Nevertheless, Hirshberg continued, it was clear that 
school construction, like other PRRA programs in low-cost housing, swamp-draining and 
malaria control, rural electrification, rural rehabilitation, soil conservation, reforestation, cattle 
tick eradication, and the development of agricultural cooperatives differed from the work 
previous relief agencies in focusing on permanent reconstruction.
296
 It is an irony of the New 
Deal that the financing for many of its most far-reaching public works programs—the ones 
dealing with the physical and natural environment we live in—hinged solely upon how many 
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relief jobs they created. This framing has, in part, led to the conclusion that the New Deal did not 
“solve” the crisis of unemployment or “end” the Depression. But public works, like the 
construction of two classrooms in Aguada or 205 in Ponce, were never only about temporary 
relief employment.  
 The PRRA also enlarged the University of Puerto Rico. By 1938, the PRRA had 
completed eight new buildings for the UPR campus in Río Piedras as well as a medical research 
center in Mayagüez and hospital for the School of Tropical Medicine in Puerta de Tierra (now 
part of the UPR School of Medicine).
297
 The same year, the PRRA also allocated money and 
begun construction on the: university library; tower; biology laboratory for the Río Piedras 
Experiment Station; electrical installation in the administration building; electricity, seats, curtain 
in the auditorium; landscaping; reinforced concrete work on tennis and basketball courts; 
construction of a power plant and workshops for the engineering school; the normal school and 
teachers’ college; and an engineering building on the Mayagüez campus.
298
 By the end of 1943, 
the PRRA had invested $2.868 million in the physical enlargement of the university, which 
contributed directly to UPR’s consolidation and international accreditation later in the decade, 
and eventual expansion to include regional campuses in Aguadilla, Arecibo, Bayamón, Carolina, 
Cayey, Humacao, Ponce, and Utuado during the 1960s and 1970s.
299
 As with other schools, the 
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physical enlargement of UPR was not solely about how many jobs it created or how fast it 
“solved” the crisis of the Depression. It was designed to empower generations of Puerto Rican 
students to shape their own reconstruction—a notion at the very heart of public education in 
democratic societies. 
 
Roads, Waterworks, and Recreation 
 Puerto Rican engineers built thousands of miles of paved roads to connect rural areas 
with the main roads constructed during previous colonial periods. Between 1933 and 1938, the 
combined road building projects of the PRERA, FERA, and PRRA paved over 290,000 miles of 
Puerto Rican and municipal roads which connected Puerto Rican men and women to rural health 
centers, and rural health centers to city hospitals as never before.
300
 In place of flood-prone dirt 
roads, the PRRA spent $2.37 million—or $39.4 million today—placing block stone, Telford, and 
Macadam pavement over leveled and sub-graded roads, while they also removed landslides, 
graded and cleaned side ditches, extracted and crushed large rocks, and built reinforced concrete 
bridges in rural areas. Public roads were also built in Puerto Rican cities by asphalting streets, 
excavating side ditches, trimming road shoulders, building concrete sidewalks, curb and gutters, 
extracting and crushing stone, laying concrete foundations for bridges, and placing concrete 
forms and reinforcement steel for main sewer lines.
301
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 As with schools, public road construction drew close scrutiny from local residents, who 
filed their complaints and requests the PRRA engineers. While Eugenio Orsini, president of the 
Asociacion de Agricultores, Sección de Cafeteros, Comité de Mayagüez, and Germanico Belaval 
of Río Piedras each sought reimbursement for damage to their property caused by PRRA trucks, 
20 coffee farmers and marketers from Rio Príeto, Yauco (who also claimed to represent 300 
agricultural workers) petitioned Governor Leahy asking that the Río Prieto highway construction 
be continued, and not terminated as the farmers had heard. The hand-signed petition claimed that 
this road was essential to the entire coffee zone, which affected their livelihood and that of their 
workers. In addition, the farmers worried that if the work was not continued soon, it would be 
lost forever due to “las continuas lluvias de estos meses en esta zona” (the continuous rains in 
these months in this area).
302
  
 Puerto Ricans were equally pragmatic regarding the construction of concrete and cement 
drinking water systems, sewers, and storm drains. Letters from mayors across the interior of the 
island—from San Sebastian to Ceiba, Cidra—asked for help repairing or building new sewer 
systems for their communities.
303
 From Adjuntas to Utuado, the PRRA repaired, modernized, 
and constructed drinking water systems, sewer systems, and storm drains across the island. By 
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1938, the PRRA had: repaired 15 municipal waterworks; built new water systems and filter 
plants in Comerio, Isabela, Patillas, and San Lorenzo; built eight water systems for rural housing 
and eight for vocational schools; and one new health sewer including concrete curb and gutters 
in Mayagüez.
304
 New waterworks also assisted in the construction of a public swimming pool in 
Guajataca, Quebradillas, one of several new sports and recreation centers built by the PRRA. In 
addition to the 130 new sports fields and recreation centers built in both rural and urban areas of 





Comparison of PRRA Engineering Projects to Depression-Era Public Works Construction in 
Other Areas of the United States and Latin America 
 Efforts to build hurricane-proof infrastructure were integrated into a broader plan to 
improve life expectancy, economic opportunity, and physical mobility for island citizens. Taken 
together, the PPRA’s urban swamp-draining, slum clearance, cement-based housing 
construction, and rural rehabilitation housing programs aimed to halt the advance of several 
interrelated disease threats, buffer the island against the natural fury of tropical storms, and 
secure a lasting and permanent recovery from the Great Depression. Utilizing the supply of high-
quality local cement from the Cataño plant after 1938 and purchased directly from the publicly-
owned PRCC after 1939, the PRRA built permanent roads, schools, university system, hospitals, 
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rural health clinics, sports and recreation centers, agricultural experiment stations, municipal 
buildings, public drinking water systems, sewers, storm drains, and reservoirs.   
 The new paradigm of permanent reconstruction was not unique to Puerto Rico. Rather, it 
was similar to the new commitment to public works in the U.S. and other regions of Latin 
America and the Caribbean during the Great Depression. Not only were public works locally 
attractive as job creators, they were also bold and creative symbols of national pride in the face 
of widespread economic and psychological uncertainty. In the U.S., public works were 
constructed mainly through the PWA and WPA. Created as part of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act on June 16, 1933, the PWA funded and oversaw the construction of over 34,000 
large-scale projects in the U.S. between 1934 and 1943, including the construction of airports, 
bridges, hydroelectric dams, schools, hospitals, and road paving projects. Led by the “energetic, 
courageous, [and] incorruptible” Harold Ickes who in 1937 also became head administrator of 
the PRRA, the PWA built over 70% of all public schools, 65% of all courthouses, city halls, and 
municipal sewers, and 35% of all public hospitals and public health clinics in the United States 
between 1933 and 1939. Far more about long-term economic recovery than political patronage or 
mere unemployment relief, the PWA spent over $6 billion in contracting to private construction 
businesses in an attempt to stabilize the national economy and provide the basis for future 
growth. Though not engaged in direct hiring, PWA projects were built in all but three counties of 
the U.S. and had a rippling effect across entire economy. In the U.S., the PWA built large-scale 
infrastructural projects such as the Lincoln Tunnel and Tri-borough Bridge, and the Hetch-
Hetchy, Shasta, and Bonneville dams. In Puerto Rico, the PWA gave loans totaling $15 million 
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financed fifty-nine separate projects completed by the PRRA, and contracted large-scale work on 
non-federal projects with eleven Puerto Rican contractors.
306
  
  Although the WPA differed from the PWA in that it directly employed workers in the 
construction of public works, its commitment to stabilizing the infrastructure and economy of the 
United States was the same. Created by executive order in May 1935, the WPA was headed by 
Harry Hopkins and hired over 8 million men and women between 1935 and 1943 in the 
construction of highways, roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, libraries, post offices, airports, 
dams, sewers, theaters, observatories, public utilities, public parks, and a variety of other projects 
to enhance the quality of public life in the United States. In addition, the WPA supported 
thousands of unemployed writers and visual artists through its innovative art, theater, music, and 
writing programs.
307
 Federally employed artists painted 2,566 murals and 17,744 sculptures that 
continue to decorate public buildings today in every region of the country.
308
 As part of a 
program of state-sponsored economic development, the PWA and WPA accomplished far more 
than simply building bridges, buildings, and roads. They also prepared the U.S. for participation 
in World War II and made the economic growth of the postwar period possible by promoting “a 
series of striking innovations and technical changes in such fields as civil and structural 
engineering, transportation, distribution, machine production, electric-power generation, and 
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 In Puerto Rico, the PWA-type construction projects of the PRRA ensured that 
Puerto Rican engineers, architects, teachers, administrators, and health care professionals were 
not left behind the enormous changes in these fields during the U.S.-led economic boom 
following World War II. 
 During the Depression, the emphasis on permanent reconstruction in Puerto Rico 
paralleled large-scale infrastructural works projects in other regions of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In Mexico, for example, the enlargement of cement factories, hydroelectric plants, 
and roads during the Depression “accelerated the transition from the railroad age to that of motor 
vehicles.”
310
 In Mexico, public works were framed as the living legacy of the Mexican 
Revolution, and constructed by the state run party that was formed in 1929 and went through 
several name changes before being called the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in the 
1940s. As elsewhere in Latin America, Mexico was in the midst of a population explosion that 
saw its own population increase by seven times, from 13.61 million people in 1900 to 96.58 
million people in 2000. This demographic transformation was in part the result of new state 
interventions in public health, including the construction of a public works infrastructure 
designed to provide clean water, sanitation, and disease control.
311
 As in the U.S. and Puerto 
Rico, public works construction in Mexico was a locally-driven response to the crisis of the 
Great Depression that, at the same time, helped generate future and unknown changes in 
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banking, credit institutions, housing, public services, agriculture, industry, and tourism 
associated with the “Mexican Miracle” of the 1940s and 1950s.
312
 
  In the Dominican Republic, a Caribbean island five times the geographic size of Puerto 
Rico, the Rafael Trujillo regime (1930-1961) began constructing a broad array of infrastructural 
projects that were directly modeled on the hurricane-proof public works built in Puerto Rico. In 
1939, for example, Trujillo’s general council M.M. Morillo directly wrote to Miles Fairbank 
asking for copies of PRRA blueprints for construction on the University of Puerto Rico campus, 
as well as instructive pamphlets regarding the canning of fruit preserves.
313
 Trujillo attempted to 
buffer the Dominican Republic from hurricanes and tropical storms on the PRRA model of 
reconstruction after the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes; further, he purchased Puerto 
Rican cement throughout his dictatorship to do so—as the Dominican Republic did not open its 
first cement plant until 1964.
314
 Hurricanes were important to Trujillo’s consolidation of power, 
as he personally oversaw Dominican recovery from the destructive and deadly San Zenón 
hurricane of 1930, which bypassed Puerto Rico but leveled Santo Domingo and killed between 
3,000-6,000 people. Despite some similarities, the central difference between Puerto Rican and 
the Dominican reconstruction was the strikingly undemocratic terms on which these Trujillo 
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used “public” works to enhance his political and personal power over the Dominican 
Republic.
315
 For Trujillo, Dominican “reconstruction” did not include a transfer of public works 
and utilities to the people. As will be discussed below, it meant literally rebuilding the nation in 
his personal image and for his personal profit.
316
  In Puerto Rico, where infrastructural works 
were turned over to public control, public works did not enhance the power of a military dictator 
during the New Deal. Rather, the PRRA funded and constructed public works projects that 
touched nearly all aspects of Puerto Rican daily life. As with other New Deal programs, funding 
was not unlimited. Despite financial restrictions, however, the PRRA public works included the 
construction of urban and rural housing, the construction and/or repair of schools and hospitals 
with concrete buildings, electricity, clean drinking water, and island-wide waste disposal 
systems.   
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has stressed the importance of the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes in 
assessing Puerto Rican response to the Depression. The storms not only contributed to the 
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infrastructural devastation and rising public health crisis on the island in the 1930s, but defined 
new possibilities and limits of recovery as well. Faced with the limits of all previous relief-based 
efforts from the Spanish colonial era to the PRERA, Puerto Ricans from several backgrounds 
aligned with the PRRA as the only viable avenue to fighting infectious disease through 
hurricane-proof reconstruction, which included several capital-intensive public works projects. 
The publicly-owned Cataño cement plant was central to these projects.  
Local participation in these programs was understood as a pragmatic response to the 
infrastructural destruction of the hurricanes and growing public health crisis on the island during 
the Depression. If Puerto Rican-made cement was the answer to the destructive force of 
hurricanes, the construction of the Cataño cement plant should stand as one of the lasting 
achievements of the New Deal in Puerto Rico. This has not happened. Rather, large-scale public 
works have been marginalized in the historical literature on Puerto Rico as (at best) isolated 
bright spots in an overall dim picture of “disappointment” with the “failures” of the New Deal. 
This portrayal of disappointment conforms to a synthesis of the Second New Deal in the United 
States, in which historians have argued that the authentic reform impulse of the New Deal—to 
restructure capitalism—ended with the recession of 1937 and U.S. experience in World War II. It 
was here, between 1937 and 1945, that the “earlier and more dynamic period of activism and 
accomplishment” ended, and New Deal policy became “less diverse, and . . . less challenging” to 
the existing power structures that the New Deal had originally sought to reform.
317
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overlooking the transfer of the Cataño cement plant to the locally controlled PRCC, historians 
have missed an opportunity to imagine public works as the beginning of reform.  
Cement-based public works construction in Puerto Rico addressed several interrelated 
public health goals of Puerto Ricans, such as curtailing infectious and epidemic disease, 
protecting against future hurricanes, and providing direct and indirect employment to Puerto 
Rican men and women. Comparison with the New Deal in the U.S. mainland demonstrates that 
this multi-vectored approach to reconstruction was in line with the public works projects of the 
PWA and WPA that aimed to “raise, almost to a revolutionary extent, the standard of living in 
underprivileged homes.”
318
 As in the U.S., the New Deal’s large-scale public works projects 
should be regarded among most significant contributions to public health and physical mobility 
(through improved transportation and communication networks) in Puerto Rico.  
 Funding for the PRRA engineering program, which had come largely out of several 
emergency relief appropriation was sharply reduced with U.S. entry into World War II—though 
the PRRA continued until 1955 under Guillermo Esteves, who was promoted to Assistant 
Administrator at the start of the war and oversaw the completion of all projects that the PRRA 
had begun or planned.
319
 While defunding the PRRA ended its role in Puerto Rican recovery 
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from the Depression, it did not end the reconstruction paradigm that it helped bring to the island. 
Rather, by ceding control of Puerto Rican public works to locally owned public agencies and 
corporations such as the Puerto Rico Cement Corporation and Puerto Rico Water Resources 
Authority, the PRRA ensured that its work would continue regardless of future political events.  
 The end of the PRRA did not mean the reversion of colonial policy to the one of neglect 
that had dominated the Spanish colonial and U.S. insular colonial eras. Rather, the PRRA handed 
off many long-term projects to other New Deal agencies, such as the WPA and Farm Security 
Administration (FSA)—which continued to provide investment and support for rural 
rehabilitation and agricultural cooperatives in the mountainous farm regions of the island. In 
addition, recent analysis demonstrates that the wartime spending of $1.2 billion in Puerto Rico 
equated to nearly 4.6 times the amount per capita spent by the U.S. on Western Europe in the 
Marshall Plan.
320
 With the change to a war economy, federal agencies connected to war spending 
became the Cataño plant’s largest customers, and purchased 89% of the cement and concrete 
produced by the PRCC in 1942, and almost all of the Ponce Cement Corporation’s output as 
well.
321
 While the PRRA was not a direct link or precursor to these unknown future events, it 
should be remembered as a pivotal turning point from past colonial policy in Puerto Rico and a 
part of a broader change in U.S. domestic and foreign policy that begun during the New Deal. 
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Chapter 6: Public Power and Authority: The Rural Electrification of Puerto Rico and the 
United States in Comparative Perspective 
 
 
 Puerto Rico’s recovery from the Great Depression included substantial new federal 
investment in rural electrification. Headed by Puerto Rican engineer Antonio S. Lucchetti Otero, 
the PRRA’s Rural Electrification division was a central component of several interrelated public 
works and public health projects taking place on the island during the 1930s. As with other 
Second New Deal programs, the PRRA combined immediate concern for recovery with the long-
term goal of reconstruction by building a modern public infrastructure designed to: hurricane-
proof the small, mountainous island through cement-based construction; eradicate deadly 
diseases like malaria, tuberculosis, and hookworm by increasing access to public sanitation and 
clean drinking water for residential use; and provide cheap electricity to rural Puerto Ricans for 
the first time in the in the island’s history.  
 As in the U.S., bringing electricity to rural areas was both a goal and consequence of the 
New Deal, and there are many similarities in how the process of rural electrification took place 
on the island and mainland. Between 1935 and 1943, the PRRA constructed seven modern 
hydroelectric projects in the Cordillera Central of the island by damming or diverting small 
rivers to create a series of man-made lakes, generating inexpensive electric power while also 
providing adequate flood relief, year-round irrigation for the dry southern coast of the island, and 
abundant reserves of clean drinking water. These projects did not only improve public health by 
increasing public access to clean drinking water. They also expanded communication systems 
through a network of transmission and distribution lines that cut across the mountainous interior 
of the island, bringing radio to the high interior of rural Puerto Rico. Similar to other 
reconstruction projects—such as the construction of hurricane-proof houses, schools, hospitals, 
 
 168 
roads, sewers, and storm drains—the dams, tunnels, and reservoirs of the hydroelectric projects 
relied on locally produced cement purchased from the Cataño cement plant in Guaynabo that was 
built by the PRRA in 1938 and transferred to the local government in 1939.   
 As discussed above, analysis of the Great Depression in Puerto Rico must keep the 1928 
and 1932 hurricanes at the center. In assessing the infrastructural, environmental, and public 
health crises of the 1930s, it is impossible to separate the local effect of the hurricanes from the 
global economic contraction of the Depression. The PRRA helped provide permanent recovery 
from the storms and led directly to the creation of a publicly-owned corporation that supplanted 
the private monopolization of electric power on the island. Modeled on the New York Power 
Authority (NYPA) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Puerto Rico Water Resources 
Authority (WRA) democratized the public control of water and power resources in Puerto Rico, 
which had been an unrealized goal of many political parties during the preceding decades. 
 Public control of water and electric power had far-reaching implications for the island’s 
internal political structure and for its relationship to the United States. To fully appreciate these 
implications, it is necessary to place Puerto Rico in comparative perspective with the U.S. by 
examining other rural electrification projects of the New Deal. Despite the personal emphasis 
Franklin Roosevelt put on rural electrification programs and the remarkable success of these 
programs, this comparison has not been made in the vast historical literature of the New Deal. 
Nor has it been made in the historiography of the “colonial” relationship between Puerto Rico 
and the United States. As part of a larger question regarding the role of private and public 
development of natural resources, rural electrification in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. was 
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brought about by political solutions in administrative organization, law, and financing. While 
these policy changes began in the New Deal, they were not completed until after WWII.
322
 
As in the U.S., the arrival of electric power was delayed in rural Puerto Rico until the 
1940s, decades behind the urban areas of the island. There were many reasons for this lag, 
including the colonial relationship between island and mainland, natural and geological 
disadvantages, and entrenched electric power monopolies and the local political interests that 
supported them. Of these three, the colonial context seems to be the least significant, as rural 
electrification in Puerto Rico began to occur at nearly the exact same time as it did in the U.S., 
and in some cases years before.
323
 Not all of “rural” Puerto Rico was without electric power, 
however. Many large-scale agricultural enterprises—particularly in sugar and tobacco—had their 
own private electric generating stations providing light for the estate interiors and power for 
some of the mechanical components of production. However, for the majority of small family 
farmers, agricultural workers, sharecroppers, and subsistence farmers who lived in the 
mountainous interior, indoor plumbing and reliable electric service did not exist.  
The marginalization of the colonial question will strike some as unconventional, as 
Puerto Rican and U.S. historians have long blamed the island’s “problems” on the failures of the 
colonial relationship.
324
 The case of rural hydroelectricity, however, complicates this explanation 
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by demonstrating how alliances between Puerto Ricans of several backgrounds and new federal 
actors worked against local power monopolies and encouraged more direct participation in the 
island’s reconstruction.  
Looking beyond the colonial context, there were many internal reasons for the lag in rural 
electrification in Puerto Rico, such as extreme geological obstacles, the entrenched power of 
electric utility monopolies, and the local political interests that supported them. By making 
alliances with the PRRA, Puerto Rican electrical engineers, administrators, and workers began a 
process of bringing affordable and dependable public electricity to all areas of Puerto Rico. 
 Electric power is so important to modern life that, paradoxically, it is somewhat easy to 
overlook when examining the political history of a nation, region, or society. This oversight can 
trick us into believing that the spread of electric service during the twentieth century was a 
natural development unmoored to larger political and economic issues. The rural electrification 
of Puerto Rico suggests otherwise, demonstrating that the generation and delivery of public 
hydroelectric power in Puerto Rico was reflective of Second New Deal strategy. This strategy 
was welcomed by electrical engineers who had long been unable to circumvent or dismantle the 
water and power monopolies on the island, and their local political supporters, that directed 
public water and electric resources to the large sugar corporations who had flourished between 
1900 and the New Deal. It was also welcomed by Puerto Rican administrators, workers, and 
farmers who sought greater participation in the island’s recovery from the San Felipe and San 
Ciprián hurricanes. The pragmatic alliance between Puerto Rican men and women and the New 
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Deal was a local response to the global crisis of the Great Depression that resulted in substantial 
improvements to public health, transportation, and communication on the island. Rural 
electrification demonstrates that this locally supported shift was a break from the colonial past of 
the island toward a greater “democratization” of public services and local control of natural 
resources.  
 
Rural Life in the United States  
 At the beginning of the Depression, access to electric power was unevenly distributed in 
both Puerto Rico and the United States. Whereas 90% of urban residents in the U.S. had 
electricity by the 1930s, only 10% of rural residents had access to electric power.
325
 Combined 
with housing shortages, soil erosion, and massive unemployment, the lack of electric power in 
the countryside contributed to the poor health, malnutrition, and susceptibility to disease that 
rural residents faced. Although there were more urban than rural residents in the U.S. beginning 
with the 1920 census, during the Depression there were over 54 million rural residents and rural 
majorities in 26 of the 48 states (plus five more between 48-50%). In all, 43.9% of the U.S. 
population lived in rural areas.
326
 Of these, about 32.7 million people lived on farms (26.5% of 
the total population), the vast majority of whom lived without indoor plumbing or electric 
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 In Puerto Rico, the discrepancy between electric service in rural and urban areas was 
very similar, as nearly all of the rural population also lived entirely without electric power or 
indoor plumbing. The key difference between Puerto Rico and the U.S. was that rural residents 
comprised over 70% of the 1940 population of 1.87 million people.
328
  
 The lack of electricity in rural areas of the U.S. was the result of two factors. First, by 
geological disadvantages such as mountainous, marshy, or isolated terrain that increased the cost 
of building power generating stations and extending transmission and distribution lines to rural 
areas of the country. Second, by the political power of private utility companies that determined 
electric policy in the U.S. prior to the New Deal. Because electric service was considered to be 
an unavoidable “natural monopoly,” power companies were allowed to operate as unregulated 
regional monopolies, tied together through industrial association and complex financial holding 
companies—key parts of the business strategy of unregulated capitalism that dominated the 
presidencies of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover during the 1920s. Though 
rural electrification was explored, private power companies did not connect electricity to 
“unprofitable” areas of the country.
329
 By the start of the Depression, the combination of 
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geological and political factors meant that the U.S. had substantially lower rates of rural 
electrification per capita than several countries, including France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, and Tasmania.
330
 Though industrialized, each of 
these countries had large rural or isolated areas.  
When private companies did connect electric power to rural areas, it was generally to 
service the interests of large agribusiness rather than to support small family farmers, 
sharecroppers, tenant farmers, migrant workers, or other rural residents. The first successful 
private utility company to deliver electric power to farming regions was in California in 1898—
where electricity was used to pump irrigation water into the Sacramento Valley. In 1911, the 
National Electric Light Association recommended that the Department of Agriculture study of 
potential use of electric power on farms, but the prospects of federal intervention were put on 
hold during WWI and grew even more remote in the 1920s, as the Republican-dominated White 
House promoted a laissez faire “return to normalcy” that introduced the era of welfare capitalism 
and business associationalism.
331
   
 The refusal or inability of private power companies to provide electricity to rural areas 
indirectly contributed to the overall poor health and quality of life in rural areas of the United 
States. While extreme drought, poor soil management, and overproduction contributed to 
recurring crop failures, the lack of electricity added to the dismal living conditions of the rural 
poor. Throughout the Great Depression, Eleanor Roosevelt was a vocal advocate of rural 
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electrification as a means to help the millions of sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and small 
subsistence farmers who lived in chronic poverty—a disproportionate number of whom were 
African Americans living in the south. During the1930s, Eleanor Roosevelt provided both vocal 
support and direct assistance in many New Deal programs designed to reconstruct public health 
in rural areas, including the TVA, Rural Electrification Administration (REA), Appalachian 
Regional Commission, Farm Security Administration (FSA), and PRRA.
332
 
 The lack of electricity and indoor plumbing had a negative effect on both the very poor 
and better-off rural or farm residents in the U.S., who, during the 1920s and 1930s, usually lived 
on “vicious, ill-tempered soil with a not very good house, inadequate barns, makeshift 
machinery, happenstance stock, tired, over-worked men and women—and all the pests and 
bucolic plagues that nature has evolved.”
333
 Cut off from the news and culture of the day the lack 
of access to radio, rural Americans lived without running water, refrigeration, or basic sanitation 
services. While the poorest famers cooked with pots and pans placed over an outdoor fire, the 
majority of the better-off farmers cooked with wood or charcoal burning ovens in dim houses 
lighted by oil or kerosene lamps. Conditions for the industrial rural poor were just as bad, as 
many mill towns, mining centers, tenement houses, and African American neighborhoods were 
also without electric light, refrigeration, or indoor plumbing.  
These conditions were especially hazardous for poor rural women, whose backbreaking 
labor included retrieving water from streams or outdoor pump-wells, hand-scrubbing laundry, 
and cooking over open fires. During the 1930s, farmwives spent an average of 20 more days per 
year doing laundry than women in the city who owned or had access to electric washing 
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machines. Poor nutrition during pregnancy, in part due to the “sharecropper’s diet” of salted 
fatback, cornmeal, and molasses, also contributed to poor health in the countryside as spoilage 
and dysentery lurked in perishable foods kept in creeks and streams for lack of refrigeration or 
ice delivery. The combination of rural toil, hand labor, and lack of sanitation contributed to the 
ill-health, economic backwardness, and chronic disease that plagued rural areas. Conditions were 




 Life was particularly hard for rural children, who were the most susceptible to the waves 
of treatable and/or preventable diseases that haunted rural areas of the U.S., such as malaria, 
tuberculosis, pellagra, typhoid, syphilis, and hookworm. Among migrant workers, the 
combination of inadequate housing and sanitation services resulted in a chronic, almost 
inescapable malnourishment as anemia and vitamin deficiency plagued migrant camps and 
caused infant mortality rates to soar.
335
 While most urban residences had indoor plumbing, dirt 
floor outhouses remained the most common form of rural plumbing during the 1930s and were a 
leading cause of hookworm, an infectious disease spread by a parasite that thrives in damp soil 
and spreads through human waste. Highly preventable through improved sanitation, plumbing, 
and education, hookworm was a serious and persistent health threat in many rural areas of the 
U.S. that lacked indoor plumbing (and where children often went barefoot), such as the 
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Appalachian Mountains, the Pacific northwest, and the south.
336
 While rarely fatal, the parasitic 
disease produces listlessness, anemia, stunted growth, and contributes to long-term 
socioeconomic backwardness. By 1910, this “vampire of the south” had infected 40% of all 
school aged children in the South; their poor health was the leading reason that southern children 
were 20% less likely to attend school than their non-infected neighbors.
337
 Similarly, the FSA 
estimated that sickness and disease were the cause of 50% of all farm mortgage defaults in the 




Rural Life in Puerto Rico 
 Living conditions in Puerto Rico were very similar to those in the U.S., and the lack of 
electric power and clean drinking water contributed to the spread of preventable diseases such as 
malaria, tuberculosis, and hookworm; the overall poor health and nutrition of rural residents; and 
the quality of life in the mountainous countryside. Housing design and available building 
materials also impacted rural health. During the Depression, basic materials, design, and 
construction methods were virtually unchanged from the nineteenth century to the 1930s. While 
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most rural houses made of wood with either a thatched palm or corrugated tin roof, raised on 
stilts and protected from flooding by a small ditch dug out around the house, nearly all were 
without electricity, clean drinking water, or indoor plumbing. The kitchen, which was almost 
always outdoors, consisted of a few shelves attached to the side of the house with a nearby wood 
fire pit or a separate standing shed about 20 or 25 feet from the main house in which a 
homemade stove or fire pit was fueled by wood or charcoal.
339
  
As in the rural U.S., dirt floor outhouses were the most common means of sanitation. 
Marked by a variety of intersecting public health crises ranging from rampant malnutrition to 
malaria and tuberculosis, nearly 90% of the rural population of the island had hookworm during 
the 1930s.
340
 Hookworm exacerbated other health threats as the parasite sapped iron and protein 
in the host body, led to anemia, and contributed to the “slow starvation” of island residents, 
largely because 60% of Puerto Ricans did have access to refrigerated milk.
341
 The jibaro diet of 
salted cod, rice, and beans provided perhaps more protein than the sharecropper’s diet of the 
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rural U.S., but lacked the vitamins, iron, and nutrients (especially) essential during pregnancy 
and childhood.  
Factors limiting rural electricity in Puerto Rico were similar to those in the United States. 
The first was geological, as the island contains no oil or coal reserves and has a mountainous 
topography of many small rivers and no natural lakes. Puerto Rico receives abundant but uneven 
amounts of rainfall, widely varying from between 100 and 250 inches per year in the tropical 
rainforests of the central mountains to less than 30 inches per year along the dry southern and 
southwestern coasts.
342
 Just as the length of rivers in Puerto Rico varies from the 60 mile Rio de 
la Plata on the north coast to the 7 mile Rio Cañas on the south coast, so too does the net water 
flow of these rivers vary considerably. Although flow is perennial in the north, many rivers in the 
south run completely dry for long parts of the year.
343
 This means that while hydroelectric power 
made the most sense for the island as a whole, its practicality and cost varied greatly from region 
to region. While today, annual rainfall in the El Yunque National Forest alone can amount to 100 
billion gallons and provide clean drinking water to over 800,000 people, prior to the New Deal 
low lying urban areas such as San Juan-Santurce and Mayagüez supplied their own water via 
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gravity-based aqueducts and steam-generated power fueled by imported oil, and were 
unconcerned with the mountainous interior.
344
 
 The second factor was political. As in the U.S., private utility companies controlled water 
and electric power through regional monopolies. Local experimentation with electric power 
began during the last decade of Spanish rule, as royal decree established construction and 
installation standards for Puerto Rico and Cuba in 1890. Spanish concessions to local 
entrepreneurs did not grant private or corporate ownership of electric power, but rather 
established “mercantile associations” that the crown could seize control of in the event of 
military necessity—though it is not clear that this ever occurred, even during the Cuba-Spanish-
American war of 1898.
345
  
After the U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico in 1898, most of these mercantile associations 
sought to strengthen their local power by establishing legal corporate identities in the United 
States. Some, such as the Sociedad Anónima Luz Electrica of San Juan and the Compañía 
Anónima de la Luz Electrica de Ponce, horizontally integrated with smaller local companies and 
newly-formed holding corporations in the U.S. to form regional monopolies of electric power on 
the island by 1904.
346
 Following a decade of more mergers and consolidations, electric and water 
resources were increasingly controlled in the hands of a few regional monopolies—who were 
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linked more by their corporate style of organization than by any other aspect, including foreign 
or local ownership status. By 1910, the three largest regional monopolies were all publically 
traded in international markets. They were the Canadian-owned Porto Rico Railway, Light, and 
Power Company (RLPC), the U.S.-owned the Ponce Electric Company (PEC), and the Puerto 
Rican-owned Mayagüez Light, Ice, and Power Company (MLIPC). As in the U.S., these private 




 The RLPC, PEC, and MLIPC took their organizational shape during the first decade of 
U.S. rule. Although the colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. must be noted, 
we should take caution before crediting this relationship too much weight in the movement 
towards consolidation and monopoly. The global history of industrial capitalism between 1890 
and 1910 is one of widespread corporate merger via stock buyouts, takeovers, and 
consolidations, as new forms of corporate management steered the “visible hand” of the market 
toward greater vertical and horizontal integration.
348
 During the first decade of the twentieth 
century, which coincided with the first decade of U.S. rule in Puerto Rico, economic policy was 
articulated by Republican progressives who sought limited reform to this “mania” of mergers 
and consolidations by pursuing only the most egregious monopolies—typified by the forced 
breakup of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil in 1911. Exposed by progressive journalist Ida B. 
Tarbell in 1904 in the serial publication of History of the Standard Oil Company in McClure’s 
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Magazine, the Standard Oil Trust was pursued by Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft 
who invoked the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 against the oil monopoly.  
 Between 1890 and the New Deal, electric power in Puerto Rico was generated to benefit 
large agricultural estates. Originally, this was in the form of electric railways that connected 
urban centers to ports, such as the 4.7-mile long track owned by the by the Ponce Railway and 
Light Company (a subsidiary of the PEC) that began carrying freight between Ponce and Playa 
de Ponce in 1905. By 1907, Puerto Rico had about 17 miles of electric railway track, nearly all 
of it built to transport agricultural freight.
349
 Just as electric power serviced agriculture in 
transportation, water resources were also allocated toward irrigation for sugarcane farming. On 
the dry south side of the island, electric power was used to pump irrigation water to the sugar 
estates that greatly expanded during the first three decades of the twentieth century—largely due 
to new irrigation methods using electric pumps. Even though most of the major sugar estates and 
tobacco farms had their own privately generated supplies of electricity for lighting and industrial 
operations, public water and electric resources were continuously diverted to service corporate 
agriculture.
350
 For example, the Puerto Rico Irrigation Service—which was established in 1908 
by the local legislature—constructed four storage reservoirs and 98 miles of canals and 
distribution laterals to service the large sugar estates on the southern coast of the island. The 
development of limited hydroelectric power was strictly a secondary byproduct of agricultural 
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 In 1915, the insular government began building its own hydroelectric facilities, though 
the power generated was again geared more towards private irrigation projects than residential or 
rural customers. Even when the Irrigation Service began generating its own electricity, over 85% 
of its power was used to pump irrigation water to the sugarcane sector and only 15% was sold 
directly to local customers for lighting and domestic use.
352
 Reflecting a flexible corporate 
strategy, private power companies not only resisted insular efforts to establish hydroelectric 
systems, but also profited from increasing public competition after 1915 as well. In Ponce, for 
example, as the demand for expanded electric power and access to indoor lighting and 
refrigeration grew during the 1920s, the PEC declined to invest or expand their private power 
system. Instead, they purchased power from the limited public systems at wholesale rates, and 
resold it to their customers for a profit.
353
 For most of the 1920s and 1930s, Ponce was the only 
area in the south of the island with reliable electric power, and the PEC was the only supplier.  
 Greater access to electric power was desired by residents of Ponce, and became an island-
wide political issue throughout the decade—particularly so as Ponce was the home of Pedro 
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Albizu Campos, the leader of the Nationalist Party, and the newspaper El Nacionalista de Ponce. 
Formed in 1922, the Nationalist Party had split by the beginning of the Depression with the more 
militant wing consolidated around Baize Campos, whose rhetoric increasingly took aim not just 
at the colonial rule of the U.S.—but at specific targets such as the corporate power monopolies of 
the PEC and the RLPC. In 1930, Albizu Campos called for government control of electric power, 
including lighting, phone, railroad, and street trolleys, which he included as one of the seven 
primary points of the Nationalist Party’s official platform.
354
  
By the end of the decade, other groups had taken up a similar call for public ownership of 
natural resources and public access to basic utilities. In September 1939, the Unión Protectoral 
de Desempleados (UPD) or unemployed union planned a “hunger march” to mark the arrival of 
the new governor Admiral William D. Leahy. Supported by a broad coalition of unemployed 
workers and other groups such as the Communist Party and the Asociación de Choferes or taxi 
drivers union, the UPD called for the extension of New Deal slum clearance and hydroelectric 
development programs by asking that “running water and electric lights, first aid stations, 
schools and school lunch rooms be extended to [those] zones where most of our people live. We 
are against slums; we are for a program of building hygienic houses for the people.”
355
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 This call for public control of electric power was not unusual for the time, as similar 
developments in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico pointed to a rising economic 
nationalism in Latin America that specifically criticized foreign ownership of local resources 
such as electric power.
356
 It was also similar to the pressure for public ownership of water and 
electric power resources in the U.S. by progressive reformers in the 1920s, and New Dealers in 
the 1930s. The shared goal of publicly controlling water and electric resources in Puerto Rico 
was not realized until the Second New Deal, as Puerto Rican electrical engineers, working with 
the PRRA, were able to build the infrastructure, secure the financing, and develop new legal 
structures to transfer control of the island’s water and power resources into public hands. The 
PRRA bankrolled the buyout of the private power monopolies and helped form the publicly-




The New Deal and Rural Electricity 
 In both Puerto Rico and the U.S., the New Deal fought against the corporate control of 
water and electric resources and provided rural access to electric power through hydroelectric 
development. New Dealers in Puerto Rico and the U.S. understood water power to be a “free” 
gift of nature, though one that required a “large capital outlay” by the federal government.
358
 The 
development of hydroelectric power was both a major goal and accomplishment of the New 
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Deal—one that forever changed life in the rural countryside of both countries. It was, simply put, 
a central part of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s conception of the New Deal itself. Though long-term 
public works have been marginalized in academic discussions of the New Deal, Roosevelt’s 
focus on rural electrification during his presidency would not have surprised contemporary 
observers of his term as Governor of New York or of his presidential campaign, as it was one of 
the more clearly articulated goals he presented in stump speeches from coast to coast. As one of 
the few concrete proposals that voters could measure against his gubernatorial record, FDR’s 
commitment to rural electrification won him valuable support from both progressive intellectuals 
and rural voters.  
 To progressives, Roosevelt’s experience as Governor had already confirmed his 
commitment and ability to harness natural resources for the public good. During his first 
inaugural speech in Albany on January 1, 1929, FDR addressed the issue of developing 
hydroelectric power in New York by calling for an end to the “petty squabbles and partisan 
dispute” in Albany that had blocked previous attempts to break local power monopolies. 
Claiming that it was the government’s duty to “give back to the people the waterpower which is 
theirs,” Roosevelt vowed to “see that this power, which belongs to all the people, is transformed 
into usable electrical energy and distributed to them at the lowest possible cost.”
359
 This was no 
easy task. Though Republican and Democratic governors dating back to 1907 had called for 
public ownership of the state’s water resources, proposals had been blocked by the entrenched 
interests of private utility companies and their constituents in the state legislature.  
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 In New York, Roosevelt relied on progressive reformers such as Morris Cooke who had 
been fighting an uphill battle against the power corporations at the federal level for much of the 
1920s. The former director of public works in Philadelphia, Cooke had worked as a policy 
advisor to Gifford Pinchot, the conservationist governor of Pennsylvania, prior to joining FDR in 
New York. As the nation’s leading advocate for affordable public power, Cooke was an 
electrical engineer committed to fostering the role of applied science and technology in public 
planning. A disciple of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s model of scientific management, Cooke 
believed that civic engineers were the real key to long-term progressive reform.
360
 Engineers 
would not only build the infrastructure to provide rural electric power, they would also topple the 
control of private monopolies to make public control of electric power permanent. According to 
Cooke, the time was now, as “widespread rural electrification is socially and economically 
desirable and financially both sound and feasible.”
361
 
 Unable to pass a bill establishing the New York Power Authority (NYPA) in his first 
term, Roosevelt nonetheless won valuable support from national progressives such as Republican 
Senator George W. Norris from Nebraska, a leading advocate for public power. Like Cooke, 
FDR believed that progressive engineers must lead. When the NYPA bill was signed into law 
during his second term in April 1931, FDR called its passage a personal and political “milestone” 
that “marked the end of a 20-year struggle against great odds, for it takes the first step towards 
securing cheaper electric light and power” for the homes, farms, and small businesses of New 
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York through the construction of publicly-owned generating facilities on the St. Lawrence River 
and expansion of the state’s transmission and distribution lines. This was not an elite goal forced 
upon New Yorkers; it was a demand created by what Roosevelt called the “ever-growing, ever-
insistent public opinion” that viewed cheaper electricity as a right and a path to improve the 
state’s economic prospects, its public health, and to “lighten the drudgery of housework” for 
rural men and women.
362
 Though its future was uncertain in1931, the NYPA soon became a 
model for New Deal energy programs in the Pacific Northwest, Tennessee Valley, and Puerto 
Rico.  
 To rural voters across the U.S., who may not have followed the legislative ups and downs 
of the NYPA bill as closely as progressives, FDR argued the case for rural electrification 
throughout the 1932 campaign, making clear his personal conviction that wherever and 
whenever private corporations failed to deliver reliable or affordable electricity, it was the 
federal government’s duty to do so in their place.
363
 As the campaign went on, Roosevelt argued 
that the public ownership of shared natural resources was one of the pillars of the New Deal. In 
September 1932, FDR campaigned in Portland, Oregon that electricity was a necessity to modern 
life, that the “new deal” for the American people would include the regulation or nationalization 
of electric utilities. The generation of new hydroelectric power resources, he argued, would result 
in the ownership of the nation’s “vast water power . . . by the people of the United States, or the 
several States, [and] shall remain forever in their possession.”
364
 The location of his speech was 
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not a coincidence; in 1932, Oregon was a rural state whose population of 950,000 lived mostly 
without electric power or indoor plumbing.
365
 The following month, in October 1932, Roosevelt 
argued to an audience in Atlanta, Georgia that rural electricity was a cornerstone of future 
socioeconomic gains. Here, in the South, which had lagged far behind northern urban centers in 
economic measures such rates of electricity and indoor plumbing, as well as social measures 
such as infant mortality, life expectancy, nutrition, literacy, and education, FDR pledged that 
“our object must be the rebuilding of the rural civilization of America” with an inclusive and 
constructive program to attack monopoly power on every front, including against the water and 




Taking office in March 1933, however, FDR knew that the struggle against the private 
control of water and electric power would prove more complex than his own campaign rhetoric 
had suggested. New Deal strategies were just as complex, and FDR’s attempt to break the power 
of electric trusts posed a series of political dilemmas that were difficult to overcome. As Ellis 
Hawley has argued, the New Deal’s answers “often failed to fit any logically consistent 
pattern.”
367
 While the crusade against monopoly power was popular with the public, Roosevelt’s 
relationship with corporate leaders and organized business associations was more ambivalent, 
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and industry insiders were often included in the drafting of regulatory legislation, much to the 
dismay of progressive New Dealers.
368
 A fitting example is Roosevelt’s selection of Wall St. 
insider Joseph P. Kennedy to head the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Despite 
nearly unanimous concern from progressives, FDR’s political instincts were unusually sharp, and 
Kennedy won nearly unanimous acclaim during his tenure at the SEC.
369
  
The struggle against the electric trusts was particularly difficult as, in the decades prior to 
the Depression, state-level reformers had not been able to prevent or control the growth of 
complex financial institutions that created and protected the private control of electric power in 
the United States. Employing the biggest lobby in Washington, including the Committee of 
Public Utility Executives, the American Federation of Utility Investors, and the public relations 
firm of Lee and Ross—who billed themselves as “physicians” for corporate bodies preyed upon 
by progressive regulations—the power trust had withstood all attempts at reform.
370
 In the words 
of Judson King, the director of the National Popular Government League, by the 1920s the 
power trust had become “now more powerful than the railroads.”
371
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 The New Deal struck against the power trust in a variety of ways, including: 
administration, such as the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Rural 
Electrification Administration (REA); legislation, such as the passage of the Public Utilities 
Holding Company Act; and infrastructure, such as public works construction through the Public 
Works Administration (PWA) and Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA). 
Designed in May, 1933, the TVA provided cheap electricity to parts of seven southern states 
whose residents lived under gas or kerosene light and cooked with wood-burning or charcoal 
stoves. Modeled in part on the NYPA, the TVA was a federally-owned corporation responsible 
for coordinating a wide range of health and economic related improvements to the perennially 
flooded region, including: flood control, electric generation, navigation, soil and forestry 
conservation and rehabilitation, fertilizer production, agricultural diversification, and industrial 
development.
372
 Flooding was endemic in the region, and even urban areas such as Chattanooga 
and Knoxville faced the threat of powerful floods every spring that destroyed, killed animals, 
rotted vegetables, spread diseases such as typhoid and malaria, and limited barge traffic on the 
Tennessee River. In addition, the TVA met regional and national needs by hiring large numbers 
of engineers, scientists, technicians, and construction workers to solve the many logistical 
obstacles to dam construction and electrical generation in the region.
373
 Similar large-scale 
projects—such as Muscle Shoals, Alabama—had been planned since WWI, but were routinely 
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thwarted by the influence of the power lobby; even when legislation was passed, it was vetoed 
by Republican presidents Coolidge and Hoover.
374
   
 For Roosevelt, the TVA was not only a weapon against the power trust, but connected to 
an essentially republican vision of  “small integrated communities in which the workers might 
still be attached to the land and yet have access” to modern conveniences such as electric lights, 
refrigeration, and industrial jobs as a source of supplementary income.
375
 In 1933, however, it 
was not clear where—or even if—the TVA would be an appropriate model for harnessing 
regional water and power resources. Rather than force the Tennessee River model onto other 
parts of the U.S., Roosevelt experimented with other means of democratizing access to electric 
power, including providing PWA subsidies and loans to municipalities to construct cooperative-
run power plants and distribution services, and the creation of the REA in 1935, which was 
designed to supply rural areas with funding to electrify isolated farm communities.   
Led by Morris Cooke, who had followed FDR from Albany to Washington, the REA had 
complete support from the most liberal New Dealers, including Rex Tugwell, Henry Wallace, 
and Harold Ickes.
376
 Similar to other New Deal programs, there was a two-step legal process 
involved in the creation of the REA. While Roosevelt created the REA by executive order in 
1935, Congress empowered it with the passage of the Rural Electrification Act on May 20, 1936.  
The primary function of the REA was to make loans to local governments (including Puerto 
Rico) to build infrastructure and establish electrical cooperatives. It was a very effective 
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program. By 1939, REA loans had helped establish 417 co-ops, providing incandescent light to 
over 288,000 rural households, enabling running water to be pumped into rural houses, and 
improving communication through access to radio. By the end of World War II, 90% of all U.S. 
farms were electrified, up from 10% at the start of the Depression.
377
  
While the REA centered on distributing loans and supervising electrification plans, it also 
worked in tandem with New Deal public works construction agencies such as the PWA and 
PRRA, both administered by Harold Ickes. When Cooke asked Ickes if perhaps the REA and 
PWA should work on joint solutions with the private utility companies, Ickes rejected the idea of 
corporate collaboration, responding in his typically curt manner that he will “have nothing to do 
with the sons-of-bitches.”
378
 In public, Ickes was no less bashful in his support for the creation 
public utilities to service the rural areas of the country. In a lengthy article in the New York 
Times, Ickes argued in support of FDR’s claim that it was the federal government’s duty to 
provide rural electricity, and that the expensive and complex construction of hydroelectric dams 
and power stations would best provide for the “permanent and continuous” public control of 
natural resources.
379
  The New Deal combined new public works and agencies with new 
regulatory laws, and the TVA, REA, PWA and PRRA rural electricity programs were enhanced 
by the passage of both the Federal Power Act of 1935, which established accounting regulation 
                                                 
 
377
 The Rural Electrification Act of 1936, Center for Columbia River History, accessed 
February 16, 2013 http://www.ccrh.org/comm/moses/primary/electrif.html; “Rural 
Electrification” FERI; Next New Deal: The Blog of the Roosevelt Institute, “Rural 
Electrification Act,” February 25, 2011, accessed March 6, 2013, 
http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rural-electrification-administration; Brown, 116-118. 
 
378
 Harold Ickes, quoted in Brown, 40. 
 
379
 Harold Ickes, “In Defense of the New Deal Power Program,” New York Times, 
November 7, 1937. 
 
 193 
and rate control mechanisms in the utility industry, and the Public Utilities Holding Company 
Act of 1935, which forced electric utility holding companies under the jurisdiction of the SEC. 
Holding companies were a major target of the FDR administration.
380
 
Within two years of FDR taking office, the New Deal had developed and implemented a 
combination of regulatory and public works construction programs designed to electrify the 
countryside, improve public health, facilitate greater transportation and communication 
networks, and smash the power of the power trusts. As Ellis Hawley wrote, “in spite of 
numerous difficulties, a new power policy had taken shape” by the mid-1930s.
381
 It was a broad 
and innovative policy that did not end during the “Roosevelt Recession” of 1937 or with the 
onset of WWII, but was rather in its beginning stages. Not limited to the United States, 
Roosevelt wrote a letter translated and read over the radio in Puerto Rico that he was “anxious 
that the Government of the United States shall discharge fully its responsibilities to the Puerto 
                                                 
 
380
 The most egregious of all holding companies was that of Samuel Insull, who began 
investing in electric utilities in the 1890s and, by the end of Herbert Hoover’s New Era, 
controlled a pyramid of holding and operating companies worth over $2.5 billion from his 
offices in Chicago. The collapse of Insull’s financial empire during the Depression cost working-
class investors over $750 million and resulted in his exile to France, Greece, and Turkey to (for a 
time) avoid prosecution. A constant target of FDR and Harold Ickes, Insull had been an advisor 
to and White House guest of Hoover even after the crash of October 1929. Although there were 
many areas of continuity between the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, on the question of 
public power there was a sharp divide separating the New Era and New Deal. See Leuchtenburg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 154-156; Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of 
Monopoly, 325; Christie, “Morris L. Cooke and Energy for America,” 243-244; John F. Wasik, 
Merchant of Power: Sam Insull, Thomas Edison, and the Creation of the Modern Metropolis 





 Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 329, 341. 
 
 194 
Rican people.” Continuing, Roosevelt wrote that “cheap and available electric power” was 




Rural Electrification in Puerto Rico  
 The Rural electrification of Puerto Rico occurred at the same time, in large part due to the 
efforts of a large number of Puerto Rican electrical engineers, administrators, and workers of the 
PRRA. The single most important figure in the electrification of rural Puerto Rico was a 48-year-
old engineer from Ponce named Antonio S. Lucchetti Otero. Similar to Morris Cooke and Harold 
Ickes, Lucchetti was a staunch believer in the ability of liberal engineers to lead the rural 
electrification of Puerto Rico. Aligning with the PRRA in 1935, Lucchetti ensured that the New 
Deal’s fight against the private monopolization of electric power was extended to the island. 
Over the next several years, Lucchetti oversaw the construction of the necessary infrastructure, 
obtained the needed financing, and fought for the permanent public control of the island’s natural 
resources through the legal creation of the Puerto Rico WRA.  
Antonio Lucchetti was born in Ponce, Puerto Rico in 1888. Following his graduation 
from Cornell University with a degree in electrical engineering in 1910, Lucchetti returned to 
Puerto Rico and began a career in public service that lasted until his death in 1952. Like 
Guillermo Esteves, Lucchetti was a central figure in Puerto Rican civil engineering for two 
decades prior to the New Deal. Between 1915 and 1935, however, civil engineers faced an uphill 
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struggle against the power of the large agricultural estates, local politicians who protected their 
interests, and the discrepancy between the size of the public works budget and scale of the 
infrastructural need.  
Because of his work at the Utilización de las Fuentes Fluviales (Utilization of Water 
Resources or UFF), Lucchetti was chosen to head the PRRA Rural Electrification division with 
the explicit idea that he would best coordinate the work of the local government with the ideas of 
the New Deal.
383
 His familiarity with rural electrification proved essential to the relative stability 
of the PRRA program during the political turbulence of 1936 and 1937. It also meant that there 
was stability within the New Deal as well, even as the PRRA went through a major 
organizational change, with the removal of Ernest Gruening and Carlos Chardón in favor of 
Harold Ickes and Miles Fairbank. The New Deal benefited from Lucchetti’s experience in Puerto 
Rican public works, and there was a great deal of continuity between the hydroelectric projects 
undertaken before the New Deal with those after it. This continuity underscores the extent to 
which Puerto Rican public works were products of Puerto Rican vision, dedication, expertise, 
skill, and labor—even if this contrasts with previously held beliefs regarding the colonial 
relationship between the island and mainland.  
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 Despite similarities with rural electrification projects in the U.S., the PRRA rural 
electrification program was locally planned, administered, and built. In fact, its projects were 
designed and built by a far more locally comprised staff than many of its New Deal counterparts 
in the U.S., including the TVA, which hired local laborers but relied on engineers and 
administrators who were brought into the Tennessee Valley from other regions of the country.
384
  
Headed by Lucchetti, the PRRA rural electrification program was one of the largest 
public works projects in the history of Puerto Rico. The overwhelmingly Puerto Rican staff of 
engineers gained essential skills and experience working for the PRRA that assured the net effect 
of rural electrification would outlive the New Deal years. Key members of Lucchetti’s staff 
included: electro-mechanical engineer José R. Mera; resident engineers Pedro Colón and Horacio 
R. Subirá; assistant civil engineers Oscar M. Girod, Miguel A. Quiñones, Orlando R. Méndez, 
Félix Córdova Jr., and Harold Toro; assistant electrical engineers Justo P. Morales, Santiago 
Orsini, and Ulpiano Barnés. In addition, workers were overseen by Puerto Rican managers, 




 The decision for Lucchetti and other Puerto Rican engineers to align themselves with the 
PRRA was a pragmatic one. In 1935, this new federal agency represented the only viable 
opportunity to expand public electric development into rural areas—which had been an 
unrealized goal of the local government. As Lucchetti explained, the PRRA gave “splendid 
impetus to the program of rural electrification which the insular government, under the spur of 
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public demand, had for several years been developing, contemplating its expansion to cover all 
the unserved areas within its territory.”
386
 The PRRA provided the means and capital to make 
these contemplations into concrete reality.  
As head of the PRRA Rural Electrification division, Lucchetti oversaw the completion of 
seven major projects between 1936 and 1942. Funded and constructed by the PRRA for over $9 
million—or nearly $154 million today—the seven projects were “surrendered, relinquished and 
transferred” along with all property, constructions, and lands to the insular government as 
permanent “property belonging to and owned by The People of Puerto Rico.”
387
 Emphasizing the 
public nature of these works, Fairbank expressed his “most sincere wishes that this project will 
materially contribute to the welfare of the People of Puerto Rico and will redound to the ultimate 
improvement of their economic condition.”
 
Comparing hydroelectric power to utilization of local 
materials at the Cataño cement plant, Fairbank continued that it was the PRRA’s “earnest hope 
that this may prove to be another important step in the development of the natural resources of 
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 The PRRA’s first three projects were the enlargement of Toro Negro hydroelectric plant 
No. 1, the construction of Toro Negro No. 2, and of the Carite hydroelectric plant No. 3. Located 
three miles north of Villalba in the southern center of the island, Toro Negro No.1 was originally 
constructed by the insular government in 1925 with a special five-year tax levied on island 
residents. Beginning in 1936, the PRRA refurbished Toro Negro No. 1 with new turbines, 
penstock pipes, canals, transformers, switches, and other control equipment. All of this work was 
complemented by the construction of Toro Negro No. 2 at the headwaters of the Toro Negro 
River, which greatly increased the overall capacity of hydroelectric power generation in the area. 
Both projects, along with Carite No.3, which was located just north of Guayama on the 
southeastern coast of the island, were completed in 1937.
389
  
 The next two hydroelectric plants built by the PRRA, Las Garzas and Dos Bocas, 
required more difficult and challenging feats of engineering. Located on the Río Las Vacas three 
miles southeast of Adjuntas and roughly ten miles northeast of Ponce, the Garzas project 
consisted of constructing the reservoir, hydroelectric plant, and three minor river diversions.
390
 
The centerpiece was a 150-acre lake located 2,415 feet above sea level. It also called for one of 
the more remarkable accomplishments of Puerto Rican engineering. Here, working with a team 
of engineers that included José Benitez Gautier, Heliodoro Blanco, and Emilio Serra of the 
Engineering and Rural Engineering divisions, Lucchetti constructed an 11,700 foot long tunnel 
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to carry water from the wet north side of Mt. Guilarte to the dry south side, creating natural falls 
to generate 24.5 million annual kilowatt hours of power through two 5,000 horsepower water 
wheels.
391
 Just under 4,000 feet, Mt. Guilarte received 98 inches of annual rainfall that had been 
previously unusable for the dry southern part of the island. The Garzas hydroelectric project 
served the dual purpose of irrigation and power generation, as water was diverted and carried by 
gravity to Ponce and surrounding areas for irrigation and power was connected to the local 
government electric system over six 38,000 volt circuits. In addition, the PRRA built ten miles of 
all-weather access roads, 3,000 feet of incline railway for machinery, and a 65-foot diversion 
dam on the Garzas project.
392
  
Similar to Garzas, the construction of the Dos Bocas hydroelectric plant in the north 
central section of the island between 1937 and 1942 created a massive two-mouthed lake that 
covered over 600 acres and extended water surface of more than five miles. Located on the Río 
Grande Arecibo, the Lago Dos Bocas consisted of a concrete dam and two generation units 
directly below the lake measuring a combined 12,450 horsepower of electric power, enough to 
generate more than 30 million kilowatt hours per year.
393
 At the same time, the PRRA was 
enlarging the irrigation, water filtration, and generating plant system at Isabela and building 
more than 100 miles of high-tension transmission lines and 200 miles of distribution lines across 
all sections of the island. In about eight years with the PRRA, Lucchetti and the other engineers 
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and workers of the Rural Electrification division more than doubled the amount of kilowatts 
generated by Puerto Rican hydroelectric plants, from 29.2 million kilowatts in 1936 to 60.2 
million kilowatts in 1941.
394
  
The scale of the project was not lost on historical actors at the time. At the inauguration 
of the Dos Bocas plant on November 19, 1942, Esteves highlighted the public nature of the plant, 
and remarked that Dos Bocas would be administered, maintained, and improved in the future by 
the people of Puerto Rico.
395
 Governor Rex Tugwell, who been appointed by FDR in 1941, used 
the inauguration of hydroelectric power production at Dos Bocas to offer an unusually poetic 
testimony to the Puerto Rican engineers and workers of the New Deal: 
The sun and waters of heaven are here made to operate for the people. This is 
pure gain. Here the energies of men are multiplied; here invisible, untiring 
servants work for everyone to whom the transmission lines can reach. We begin 
something here which is a miracle and which may miraculously go on into the far 
future. It was built with public funds, granted with foresight and wisdom; it will 
be managed by a public authority. It will produce continuous values. Alongside 
them its costs will recede until they are hardly visible. No man will profit from it; 
but all Puerto Ricans will share its services. I dedicate to the use of our people this 




Public works construction on this scale was nothing more than an infrastructural fantasy 
to Lucchetti and other Puerto Rican engineers during the preceding era, as public hydroelectric 
power was not supported by private power companies, the sugar industry they mostly serviced, 
and island political forces that protected the private ownership of electricity. The public nature of 
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these infrastructural projects allows us to view the PRRA outside of the political divide of the 
status issue between independence and statehood that dominated Puerto Rican headlines. As 
never before, Lucchetti and other engineers were able to exploit the middle ground provided by 
the New Deal’s new emphasis on and capital for rural electrification. In Puerto Rico, this 
emphasis began as the relief-based First New Deal—embodied by the Puerto Rico Emergency 
Relief Agency (PRERA) that was replaced by the reconstruction oriented PRRA in 1935. 
 
Lands Acquired for Rural Electrification Projects 
 As important as rural hydro-electrification was, it must be noted that there were human 
complexities and costs involved in the large-scale construction projects as well. One of the most 
complicated issues involves the lands on which the hydroelectric facilities were built. At first 
glance, the issue of land being transferred from Puerto Rican ownership to federal control (from 
private owners to the PRRA) may seem to support the notion that the New Deal was a tool of 
colonial exploitation, one that took by force or swindle the most basic form of property—literally 
the ground beneath Puerto Ricans’ feet. Analysis of the archival record of lands bought by the 
PRRA for its rural electrification program, however, suggests otherwise.  
Far from being a symbol of colonial control, the rural electrification land purchase 
program represented a very real opportunity for Puerto Ricans to pragmatically confront, 
negotiate, and profit from the creation of a new land market in the central mountains. During the 
first half of the Great Depression, there was no market for these mountainous lands due to both 
the global economic slowdown and the environmental destruction wrought by the 1928 and 1932 
hurricanes. While there were significant amounts of small private landowning, there was no way 
for farmers and homeowners to convert their fixed capital into liquid capital. Combined with the 
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high levels of debt incurred by these farmers and homeowners from U.S. and local banks, the 
Puerto Rico Hurricane Relief Loan Section, and from private—sometimes informal—Puerto 
Rican lenders such as large local or absentee estate owners, the inability to sell part or all of 
one’s land was a major burden that underscored the problematic nature of a relief system based 
on emergency aid and private loans. 
The PRRA’s rural electrification program, which was designed to make permanent 
contributions to Puerto Rico’s long-term reconstruction from the Depression, had the ancillary 
effect of creating a new market for land. Rather than a transfer of land and natural resources from 
the colony to the metropole, the group of 97 land purchases by the PRRA Rural Electrification 
division demonstrate that Puerto Ricans who were already in debt and had no immediate 
prospects of obtaining value from their own land. For example, coffee bushes do not mature for 
about four years, meaning investment in coffee cannot be quickly turned into profit.
397
 
Because land is always a contested issue, it will be helpful to establish how the PRRA 
land purchases actually operated. Only then can we establish whether Puerto Rican landowners 
were pragmatic agents of their own destinies who converted fixed assets into liquid capital, or 
powerless victims of an overreaching New Deal state which used the financial crisis of the Great 
Depression to appropriate the only enduring commodity—real estate—from unwitting men and 
women. What we know is that between 1935 and 1942, land was obtained by the PRRA Rural 
Electrification division in two ways: it was either signed over from the local government or 
purchased directly from individual landowners. At no time was land for rural electrification 
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confiscated by force or eminent domain, and by 1942 the PRRA had legally transferred all 
property, constructions, and lands back to the local government to remain forever in the public’s 
possession, as the PRRA had done with other public works projects such as the Cataño cement 
plant.  
In May 1935, immediately after agreeing to head the PRRA’s Rural Electrification 
division in May 1935, Antonio Lucchetti began seeking title to lands owned by the local 
government. By the end of the summer, he had drafted a map of lands required for several 
proposed hydroelectric projects (including Toro Negro No. 1 and No. 2 and Carite No.3) that he 
submitted to Regional Administrator Carlos Chardón.
398
 His twenty-year experience working in 
the Puerto Rican government was very valuable, as Lucchetti was well aware of the political and 
physical topographies of Puerto Rico and was prepared to meet internal resistance. Like New 
Dealers in the United States, Lucchetti had to balance competing forces and desires at the state 
and local level; unlike his U.S. counterparts, he had to balance the partisan political forces of two 
separate governments with three branches each. On the island, Lucchetti faced resistance from 
all sides, including from Blanton Winship, the Puerto Rican governor between 1934 and 1939; 
Coalition leaders in the local legislature; and federal advisors such as James Bourne, the former 
director of the PRERA—which was currently being replaced by the PRRA. Despite this 
resistance, the Rural Electrification division was able to acquire public lands from the local 
government using a very narrow and specific scope. Over the next six years, lands requested for 
rural electrification projects were carefully surveyed, and their direct use explicitly defined, 
whether for large construction or the installation of transmission lines.  
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Land was also purchased directly from individual landowners. Here, the types of lands 
acquired varied considerably. In some cases, the PRRA negotiated for the purchase of complete 
parcels of land—meaning the owner would move. For some, more productive land was made 
available for purchase from the PRRA Rural Rehabilitation division. In other cases, rural 
electrification land options involved small or partial amounts of land adjoining areas owned by 
the local government. These lands were obtained for a variety of reasons, including the 
construction of power transmission lines, service roads and trails, the installation of narrow gage 
tracks or other construction machinery.
399
 In other cases, lands were to be flooded as part of the 
creation of large man-made lakes. While some of the lands acquired by the PRRA were marginal 
or completely unusable for agriculture due to their steep slopes, exhausted soil, or lack of 
irrigation, others were planted with coffee, bananas, and other fruits for either subsistence, 
nutritional supplement, or for sale. The PRRA paid different amounts based on the quality of the 
land. The minimum price paid for lands in the central mountains relating to rural electrification 
projects was about $100 per cuerda (a cuerda is roughly 0.97 acres) and the average payment 
was about $190 per cuerda. In all, 1,037 cuerdas were sold to the PRRA for approximately 
$197,000 between 1936 and 1941.
400
  
 Not only did the type of land vary, the landowners varied considerably as well. While 
some lands were owned by families who held thousands of acres of land on the island, others 
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were owned by small farmers with less than one acre. One question we must ask is if this land 
was not confiscated by force, why would large or small individual landowners sell their land to 
the PRRA? A sampling of the 97 land acquisition case files and title transfers for rural 
electrification projects between 1936 and 1941 provides some answers. For Norberto García 
Jimenez and his wife María Josefa Teresa Roig Casalduc, it had to have been with immense 
sadness that they sold their 26 cuerdas in Rio Abajo, Utuado. While the $2,800 in Depression era 
dollars (over $45,000 in today) surely helped condition the blow, the loss of their wood and zinc 
house and thatch-tobacco drying area to the flood waters of the Dos Bocas dam must have been 
personally painful.
401
 This personal story must be balanced, however, with the fact that Dos 
Bocas was designed to produce 30 million kilowatts of power per year and continues to serve the 
rural residents of Utuado and Arecibo with affordable electricity and fresh drinking water today.  
The Oliver family also sold land to be used on the Dos Bocas project. For the extended 
family, including Andres Oliver, Eduardo Oliver, Isabel Bujosa Oliver, Juan and Aminta Oliver, 
and Juan and Hermina Oliver Maldonado, the sale of approximately 74 cuerdas in Rio Arriba, 
Arecibo returned over $32,000 (over $517,000 today). If the Oliver family was not already 
wealthy, this was an extremely good start. While this fortune may seem to overshadow the 
$244.26 that Estafania Martinez Rios pocketed from the 6.74 cuerdas in Don Alonso, Utuado she 
sold to the PRRA for the Dos Bocas project, it would be a mistake to assume that the money 
meant any less to her. A widow with six girls and two boys, all of whom except the oldest girl 
were below working-age, Estafania used the $1,063.26 she received to pay off a $459 personal 
loan from Manuel Serrano Fuentes and a $360 loan from the Puerto Rico Hurricane Relief Loan 
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Section. With the remaining money (nearly $4,000 today) she was able to begin anew with her 
eight children.
402
 Her indebtedness was most likely caused by the hurricanes. 
The Puerto Rico Hurricane Relief Loan Section, which was not run by the PRRA, had 
been organized by the Hoover administration following the San Felipe hurricane of 1928. Coffee 
farmers in the central highlands—where Estafania Martinez Rios’ land was located—made up 
96% of the Hurricane Relief Loan Section’s 3,033 loans given out between 1929 and 1943. 
Coffee farmers, whose faced a four year window if they replanted coffee on lands destroyed by 
the 1928 and 1932 storms, were loaned $5,209,526 of the $5,673,049 total provided by the relief 
loans. Demonstrating the difficulty of small landowners like Estafania Martinez Rios’ to re-
cultivate coffee (and her case was undoubtedly made more difficult by eight dependent children) 
by 1943, only 37 loans were repaid in full while over 500 loans were rendered completely 
uncollectable because of foreclosures by prior lienholders, when properties failed to sell for the 
amount owed to the holder of the first mortgage. While over 1,000 loans were successfully 
readjusted, these data suggest that there was no land market in Puerto Rico other than those lands 
sought by the PRRA for public works construction. Viewed in the context of the Depression and 
the hurricanes, the evidence suggests that la viuda Estafania would have had little chance at re-
entering the coffee market or escaping her accumulated debt. As with the example of Norberto 
García Jimenez and María Josefa Teresa Roig Casalduc, whose small farm is now at the bottom 
of Lago Dos Bocas, we must balance the personal story of individual families with the 
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improvements in public health, communication, and quality of life experienced by the larger 
society of Puerto Rico in evaluating the impact of these land sales.  
 Like all other lands purchased by the PRRA Rural Electrification division, these three 
purchases were based on surveys conducted by Puerto Rican engineers, negotiated and 
contracted in Spanish, and notarized by local public notaries. While this should not be 
exaggerated, the fact that the PRRA was a bilingual New Deal agency sets it apart from almost 
all other federal agencies at the time. Not only were these land sales conducted in Spanish, but 
Puerto Ricans felt very comfortable contacting administrators directly in Spanish or English with 
requests, complaints, and concerns about PRRA construction projects. All such complaints were 
taken seriously by PRRA officials, who—despite operating outside of the direct political 
pressures of the local legislature or Washington—relied on the support of the Puerto Rican 
people as workers and beneficiaries for the survival of their programs.  
Many letters referenced small damage claims, like that of Gerónimo Fontánes of Saltillo, 
Adjuntas, who wrote that PRRA trucks had damaged his small farm where they were building a 
road on the Garzas dam project. Fontánes also asked for employment on the project. In many 
cases, such as the June 1937 letter of complaint from Manuel V. Torres, which alleged that 
PRRA employees had twice trespassed and caused damage on his property in Peñuelas, senior 
officials were involved in the response. Referencing the Torres letter, Antonio Lucchetti 
personally wrote to Miles Fairbank and Tomás Bernardini Palés, instructing them that while he 
was not familiar with Torres’ name, the general area of the property in question was used to 
build transmission lines between Garzas and Tallaboa. Lucchetti informed Fairbank that he 
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would investigate the matter further to better determine the exact location of the Torres property 
and extent of the damages.
403
 
 Complaints also came in the form of hand-signed petitions that argued that PRRA public 
works—while serving the large rural population—conflicted with previous arrangements for 
irrigation and drinking water to large farmers.  An August 1936 petition, signed by 82 merchants, 
industrialists, and colonos (usually small cane-growing farmers) of Jagua Pasto, Guayanilla, who 
argued that the Garzas project conflicted with previous irrigation arrangements between 
themselves and the local legislature. Located 16 miles west of Ponce, on the southern slope of 
the island, these Guayanilla farmers and entrepreneurs had most likely been served by the Ponce 
Electric Company (PEC) and Puerto Rico Irrigation Service, who had previously supplied 
irrigation water and limited electric power to the southern coast region. While this complaint 
pitted personal interest versus the collective improvement of extended rural electricity, other 
concerns demonstrated the long-standing legacy of environmental activism in Puerto Rico. For 
example, the municipal government of Peñuelas sent a letter to Miles Fairbank on behalf of the 
neighbors and taxpayers of Peñuelas that strongly protested the pollution of the Guiana River 
caused by the Garzas project. Writing that “los habitantes de este pueblo están protestando 
enérgicamente ante esta administración,” the letter continued that “por estar obligados a usar 
una agua sucia que temen ellos pudiera provocar una ruinosa epidemia.” The combined concern 
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for the natural environment and the public health reflected in this letter was common to Puerto 
Ricans in the 1930s, who aligned with the PRRA to combat these issues yet also expressed 





Creating the Water Resources Authority 
 Testifying before the Congress in spring 1940, Antonio Lucchetti declared that the 
formation of the Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority (WRA) was a matter of self-
preservation for all of the hydroelectric facilities constructed by the PRRA and currently 
operated by the Utilización de las Fuentes Fluviales (UFF). When asked repeatedly by 
Republican congressmen such as Fred L. Crawford of Michigan and Charles Hawks, Jr. of 
Wisconsin, if the true purpose of the WRA was to place unfair pressure on the private electrical 
utility corporations in Puerto Rico, Lucchetti answered that the UFF was “struggling to preserve 
our own system. Private interests have been making opposition to [us] . . . by opposing any 
legislation” to raise funds or build new hydroelectric plants. When asked by Crawford if the 
WRA will attempt to move into all parts of the island, Lucchetti replied that he did not and could 
not know what the WRA would do in the future. Exasperated, Crawford exclaimed that the 
private companies would not be able to compete with the public corporation and would most 
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likely be driven out of business or forced to consolidate their business into the WRA. This was 
un-American. Further, the transformation of the UFF into the WRA would “take power out of 
the local legislature and remove it from local political influence.” This was undemocratic.
405
 
Though the TVA had also made the argument that it would not conflict with private power, 
Crawford understood that in Puerto Rico, an island the size of Connecticut, public power would 
have a greater chance of dominating the private industry than in the United States where the 
Tennessee Valley was relatively isolated from other regions of the country.
406
 
Lucchetti had heard these arguments before, and remained undaunted by Crawford’s  
challenge. The idea of a self-financing public authority to control water and electric power in 
Puerto Rico was not new, though it had picked up momentum during the 1930s with the 
successful establishment of the New York Power Authority by Governor Roosevelt in 1931 and 
the Tennessee Valley Authority by President Roosevelt in 1933. Congressman Crawford, who 
had made his money building, financing, and operating beet sugar mills in the United States 
during and after WWI, and would later serve as the director of the Michigan National Bank and 
the Refiners Transport and Petroleum Corporation of Detroit, was one of many opponents of the 
bill.
407
 By 1940, at least three bills to create the WRA had been defeated, largely by the efforts of 
Rafael Martinez Nadal, the President of the Coalition-controlled Senate, whom Lucchetti had 
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publically accused of using his position to advocate on behalf of the private utility companies.
408
 
One bill was vetoed by Governor Winship in 1938, largely for technical reasons. Exactly what 
kind of technical reasons it is hard to say; any bill had to navigate a gauntlet of partisan politics 
in Washington and San Juan, corporate interests, a vigorous public debate in the island’s free 
press, existing laws in Puerto Rico, the Organic Act, and the changing goals and focus of the 
New Deal in context of national and global events.
409
  
New Dealers such as Ickes and Lucchetti remained convinced of the WRA’s importance, 
as did influential politicians to the left of the New Deal such as Vito Marcantonio, the American 
Labor party congressman from East Harlem who called the WRA bill especially good for the 
health of poor families, while also buffering the island from further tree depletion, soil erosion, 
and agricultural underperformance.
410
 But even as public support steadily increased, entrenched 
interests on the island persisted against all proposals to create the public authority. At the start of 
the 1940 hearings, the New York Times warned that the House Committee on Insular Affairs 
expected a “Puerto Rican free-for-all” today as hearings on the WRA were due to begin.
411
 Sugar 
farmers and large landowners, for whom private water and electric service had been catered, and 
who, according to Lucchetti, “owes [their] whole existence to the irrigation service” of the 
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insular government, preferred the status quo. To these large landowners, the Water Authority 
was too closely related to the enforcement of the 500-Acre law, which had been proposed by the 
Chardón Plan, attempted by the PRRA, and now being discussed by Luis Muñoz Marin and the 
newly-created Popular Democratic Party (PPD)—who would win the Senate in the upcoming 
1940 elections. Testifying on behalf of the Juan Serrallés estate and Central Mercedita of Ponce, 
sugar attorney Arthur L. Quinn, who was also the lawyer for the Puerto Rico British West Indies 
Sugar Association, expressed his concerns about the water resources bill, as did the Coalición 
appointed Resident Commissioner Bolívar Pagán of the Partido Socialista. Pagán objected to the 
bill as a matter of principle, and argued that the new law would turn over the water resources of 
Puerto Rico to the “unbridled dictates of one man—the executive director.” Everyone knew that 
Lucchetti would be the director.
 412
  
Called the “Little TVA” or “Puerto Rican TVA” by the U.S. and Puerto Rican press, the 
various attempts to establish the WRA were closely followed by newspapers such as El Mundo, 
El Dia, La Correspondencia, El Imparcial, and the New York Times. These newspapers reported 
that a growing majority of Puerto Ricans had embraced the idea of truly public works, and 
supported the creation of the WRA. In October 1939, El Mundo announced that its editors 
celebrated the recent resolution of the Asociación de Agricultores de Puerto Rico to support the 
bill. The Farmers’ Association, which had not previously supported the bill, appropriated the 
goals of the WRA as their own values by voting on an agreement that declared that “la extension 
de tal servicio a todos los distritos rurales de la Isla es imperiosa para proveer comodidad, 
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difundir cultura, y mejorar el ‘standard’ de vida en los campos de Puerto Rico, lo cual 
constituye una de las principals aspiraciones de los agricultores organizados.” El Mundo agreed 
that the formation of the WRA was the first step to buying out the remaining private utility 
companies on the island, and expressed that it was “en favor del programa de nacionalización 
del servicio hidroelectrico . . . no sólo para los usos corrientes del hogar, sino también para la 
industrialización de los campos.”
 413
  
By February 1940, El Imparcial declared that “There is No Excuse for Not Passing the 
Bill to Create the Water Resources Authority of Puerto Rico,” which had the “thunderous” 
support of the people, who viewed the creation of the WRA as a chance to permanently extend of 
the coordinated work of the UFF and PRRA. For almost two years, the collaboration between the 
UFF and PRRA had increased rural access to power and lowered rates across the island, as the 
investment in public works had forced private companies to lower their rates for the first time. 
As early as August 1938, as construction of the Garzas and Dos Bocas projects was just getting 
underway, José Enrique Colom, the Commissioner of the Interior of Puerto Rico, reported in El 
Mundo that public rates were much lower than the private utility companies, and that new public 
competition would drive private prices down as well. Colom noted that the new hydroelectricity 
projects of the UFF and PRRA were essential to reducing the costs of development across the 
island, as the UFF would sell electricity to the Cataño cement plant at a much lower rate than the 
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private utilities, such as Porto Rico Railway, Light, and Power Company (RLPC), who has 
“flatly refused” to negotiate the price of power service to the plant.
414
  
The WRA was seen by all as a chance to make permanent the gains of public power on 
the island. In March 1940, La Correspondencia expressed hope that “The Joke Will End This 
Year” and that the bill will be passed, as the WRA was urgently needed and would provide a 
crucial service to Puerto Rican farmers by placing the control electric power away from political 
forces and into professional hands.
415
 Over the next year, as WRA legislation continued to stall 
in the local legislature, La Correspondencia lamented the failure of the local legislature to pass 
the WRA bill but expressed concern that the Congress might try to do so from Washington. 
Deeply convinced that the WRA will “greatly benefit the whole island,” the editors warned that 
it would be wrong for the federal government to “humiliate” Puerto Rico by overriding the local 
legislature. Though they granted that the Coalition had some legitimate objections to the bill, La 
Correspondencia argued that many Puerto Rican politicians legislated “following the dangerous 
course of political passion and personal hatred,” the common good was better served by 
disinterested public service that was not motivated to “benefit private persons and private entities 
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[that] injure the social interests of the country.” The failure of the legislature to pass the bill had 
created a “caricature of a democratic system” whereby senators and representatives were 
attempting to govern as executives.
416
 
In the spring of 1941, the “Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority Act” was passed by the 
local legislature and sent to La Fortaleza by new Senate President Luis Muñoz Marin and signed 
into law by Governor Guy J. Swope as Insular Act #83. The law created the WRA as a 
government authority that was owned by the people of Puerto Rico but existed as “a corporation 
having legal existence and personality separate and apart from that of the Government. The 
debts, obligations, contracts, bonds, notes, debentures, receipts, expenditures, accounts, funds, 
undertakings, and property of the Authority, its officers, agents or employees shall be deemed to 
be those of said government-controlled corporation and not to be those of the [local] Government 




A product of the Puerto Rican New Deal, the WRA had both immediate and long-lasting 
effect on the island by lessening dependence on imported fuel, supplying cheap, renewable 
electric power for home and industry, conserving the wood supply in Puerto Rico (which had 
been depleted for use as charcoal), and contributing to improvements in public health. In 
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addition, the WRA was designed to be self-financing through the sale of revenue bonds, which 
allowed it to operate independently from the insular budget and/or credit limit, while also not 
creating new burdens on local or federal taxpayers. As one of the most politically feasible 
models of financing large-scale public works, revenue bonds were the most common method of 
constructing hydroelectric programs in the 1930s.
418
     
The creation of the WRA was the apex of Lucchetti’s long technocratic career in public 
service. Reflecting the same liberal faith in progressive engineering expressed by Morris Cooke 
regarding rural electrification in the United States, Lucchetti commented that the WRA would 
run as an efficient and nonpartisan agency that earned the people’s “good will and patronage 
irrespective of their position in party politics, religion, race, or class.” Its ability to serve all areas 
of the island without discrimination would be essential to its success, just as the UFF was widely 
respected by the people, who, he added, “speak highly of the service it renders, want it extended, 
and want it to grow and to be kept functioning with economic efficiency.”
 419
 Most of all, the 
WRA meant the survival of the gains made during the brief tenure of the PRRA rural 
electrification program and the millions of dollars already invested by U.S. taxpayers. The 
WRA’s autonomy meant that these public works would survive and could be expanded. 
Expansion, autonomy, and increased coordination would save the U.S. the combined investments 
currently put into the UFF by the PRRA, REA, PWA, and Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC). Without the increased expansion and coordination of the island’s power supply, Lucchetti 
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had warned, the large-scale hydroelectric facilities such as Las Garzas and Dos Bocas would fall 
into private hands within a few years for pennies on the dollar already spent.
420
  
Rather than allow this privatization of public works, Lucchetti planned on breaking up 
the private power monopolies that had dominated the electric and water supply on the island for 
decades. As for his earlier testimony that the WRA would not compete with private electricity 
corporations and had no plans for taking them over? It appears to have been skillful, but 
disingenuous lip service paid to the hostile Republican congressmen who were intent on 
protecting corporate interests. When Congressman Crawford informed him that private utility 
rates were falling in Puerto Rico, Lucchetti testified that this was only due to the new public 
competition represented by the New Deal’s rural electrification program (even though it did not 
service urban areas yet). Arguing that the private companies “wouldn’t build a line a half a mile 
long to reach a farmer,” Lucchetti was making his intentions clear even as he testified to not 
knowing what might happen in the future.
421
  
Yet, Lucchetti had a pretty good idea that the WRA would continue to put pressure on the 
private monopolies. The PRRA had already bought out the Ponce Electric Company (PEC) in 
1937, and Lucchetti pursued the other two regional monopolies immediately after the creation of 
the WRA in 1941. Though this pursuit was aided by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1938 decision to 
dismiss a case brought by the Porto Rico Railway, Light, and Power Company (RLPC) against 
the local government and PRRA, Lucchetti was unable to reach agreements with the Canadian-
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owned RLPC or the locally-owned Mayagüez Light, Ice, and Power Company (MLIPC).
422
 
Using the context of U.S. entry into WWII, Lucchetti sought the help of the FDR administration 
to use the War Powers Act to temporarily expropriate both companies. Following a series of last-
minute protests and appeals from these private companies, the WRA purchased the RLPC for 
$10.33 million and the MLIPC for $1.55 million in 1944. The long struggle against the private 
ownership of natural resources, electric power, and water distribution in Puerto Rico was over.
423
 
The WRA continued and expanded the electrification work of the UFF and the PRRA. By 1951, 
more than 35,000 rural families used electricity at home for the first time.
424
 Three years later, in 
1955, the WRA operated 19 hydroelectric-generating stations, four steam-generating systems, 
and 108 distribution stations that sent electricity across thousands of miles of transmission lines. 
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In all, they serviced 294,539 customers in 75 municipalities in both urban and rural areas, which 
meant that about 90% of all Puerto Rican residences had electricity.
425
  
 In addition, the WRA expanded the supply of clean drinking water to all areas of the 
island. In 1942, just one year after its formation, the PPD-controlled Senate passed the Aqueduct 
Act, which was the first step in nationalizing the water supply of Puerto Rico to prevent against 
regional drought or pollution. The law stipulated that any municipal water supply system found 
not meeting the health standards of the insular Health Department, would be turned over to the 
WRA. Almost immediately, declarations were made of the water systems of San Juan, Ponce, 
Mayagüez, Arecibo, Caguas, Aguadilla, Cayey, Juana Díaz, and Vega Baja. When San Juan filed 
an injunction suit against the new law, the law was upheld by the Puerto Rican Supreme Court. 
The water supplies of San Juan and Ponce, the island’s largest, were found to be “wholly 
inadequate, unreliable, and of inferior quality.”
426
 Three years later, in 1945, the local legislature 
passed the “Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority Act,” which was signed into law by 
Governor Rex Tugwell as Act #40 on May 1, 1945. The Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 
modeled on the WRA, completed the work done by the PRRA and made impressive changes to 
the public health of Puerto Rico. In 1945, while 76 of the 77 municipalities had public water 
systems (many of which were unfit to drink at the time), only 42 of the 77 had public sewer 
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systems. Twenty years later, all Puerto Rican municipalities had clean drinking water and 
working sewers.
427
    
 
Conclusion 
 Between 1935 and 1943, PRRA engineers constructed a new rural infrastructure designed 
to make electricity publicly available. Like the cement plant and hurricane-proof public works, 
rural electrification was designed to protect Puerto Rican natural resources (water and electricity) 
from private corporate control. Part of a broader New Deal goal to enhance the quality of life for 
all U.S. citizens, these projects helped foster a new understanding of the “public” in Puerto Rico, 
one that had mass popular support. By 1941, in fact, the Puerto Rican public had earned a seat at 
the New Deal table. As Rex Tugwell reported to Harold Ickes during hearings on 500-Acre land 
law reform featured testimony from four distinct groups: “the sugar corporations, of course as 
the interests chiefly effected; the workers in the industry; the colonos or independent farmers; 
and what was called the ‘public’.”
428
  
The emergence of the public as a potential political force signaled a new era in Puerto 
Rican politics that must account for the popularity of New Deal reforms and reconstruction 
projects. For while the engineering of the New Deal in Puerto Rico distinguished the island from 
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other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, there were also elements of PRRA public work 
construction that brought Puerto Rico closer to its regional neighbors.  
By the beginning of the 1940s, as WWII raged in Western and Eastern Europe and across 
the Pacific, two features distinguished the politics of the diverse nations, colonies, and territories 
of the Caribbean: the emergence of populist government and the unprecedented hemispheric 
solidarity in support of the Allied war effort against Nazism in Europe and Japanese imperialism 
in Asia. As we will see in the following chapters, Puerto Rico displayed an ambiguous 
relationship to the rest of the Caribbean during these tumultuous years, as the creation of public 
agencies like the PRCC and WRA highlight the complex ways in which mass-based support for 
New Deal liberalism corresponded to contemporary political developments in the Caribbean. 
This was particularly so in Cuba and the Dominican Republic—two nations that also had a close 
and conflicted relationship with the United States after 1900—where the Constitution of 1940 
and the rise of Trujillo (respectively) displayed similar elements to the redefinition of public 
citizenship engineered by PRRA public works. At the same time, however, the experience of 
Cuba and the Dominican contrasted sharply with that of Puerto Rico during both the Great 
Depression and World War II. Therefore, no evaluation of the New Deal in Puerto Rico is 








Part 3: Caribbean Contexts: Populism, Patronage, and Public Works in the Spanish 
Caribbean on the Eve of World War II 
 
 
 Between 1935 and 1943, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration built hurricane-
proof public works designed to secure the island from future storms, protect its natural resources 
from private corporate control, and increase physical and social mobility. These capital-intensive 
engineering projects, such as the construction of the Cataño cement plant and the development of 
rural hydroelectricity, attempted to provide short-term recovery from the infrastructural and 
environmental devastation of the 1928 and 1932 hurricanes while, at the same time, making a 
direct intervention into the long-term public good through the construction of a new public health 
infrastructure. Part of the Second New Deal, the PRRA was a locally-run federal agency that that 
brought together new federal reform energy, unprecedented sources of capital for public works 
construction, and a large contingent of Puerto Rican engineers, teachers, nurses, doctors, farmers, 
workers, and parents who conceived, designed, administered, and built the PRRA’s engineering 
projects.  
 As has been indicated previously, this alliance between Puerto Rican and U.S. New 
Dealers was far from an act of colonial domination orchestrated by Washington, but rather was 
based on a series of pragmatic decisions as Puerto Ricans closely followed the unfolding events 
of the 1932 and 1936 elections. Recognizing the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 and 
his convincing reelection in 1936 as a potential for change, PRRA engineers and academics did 
not idly await administrative orders, but actively used the New Deal to implement long-standing 
goals of permanent recovery and reconstruction. To secure this permanence, the PRRA assisted 
the creation of public authorities and corporations such as the Puerto Rico Cement Corporation 
(PRCC) and the Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority (WRA). Made popular by the New Deal 
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in the U.S., publicly-owned agencies guaranteed that the social and economic gains of New Deal 
public works projects would remain separate from the intensely partisan nature of local politics 
in the 1930s. In Puerto Rico, public authorities also provided a means to lessen dependency on 
imported goods—as in the case of PRCC cement—and upend the corporate monopoly on basic 
utility service such as electricity and indoor plumbing—as in the case of WRA hydroelectric 
power.  
 The construction of public works and the creation of public authorities had direct political 
implications in Puerto Rico, as the idea of the “public” emerged as a substantial force in local 
politics by the end of the 1930s. Completed during the chaotic years from 1937-1943—almost 
exactly midway between the political dominance of the Coalition and the Partido Popular 
Democrático (PPD)—the creation of these public works and public authorities stood in stark 
contrast to the breakdown of party politics during the same years. As both a symbol of Puerto 
Rican pride and an unrivaled source of employment during the Great Depression, these projects 
intellectually and physically paved the way for a specific form of Puerto Rican populism that 
was marked by the formation of the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT) and the 
electoral victory of the Popular Democratic Party in 1940.
429
  
Both events were linked to the New Deal. While the CGT was closely connected to the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the U.S., which had been strengthened by the 
passage of the Wagner Act (or National Labor Relations Act) in 1935 that guaranteed organized 
labor’s right to collective bargaining, the PPD was led by Luis Muñoz Marín, formerly of the 
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Liberal Party, who had been one of the New Deal’s loudest champions in Puerto Rico until about 
1937. Beginning that year, during the lingering debate over the Tydings Bill and visceral 
response to the Ponce Massacre, Muñoz Marín skillfully walked a political tightrope in which he 
distanced himself from U.S. policy makers like Ernest Gruening and Governor Blanton Winship, 
yet retained the image of being able to take over the popular PRRA public works and 
resettlement program and expand them into a broader policy of land reform, beginning with the 
enforcement of the 500-Acre law. This balancing act won Muñoz Marín and the Populares a 
narrow victory in the 1940 elections that displaced the Coalition of the Republican and Socialist 
parties, removing the most formidable critics of the New Deal from local political power.
430
 
This victory should not be taken lightly. Like the formation of the CGT, the arrival of 
Muñoz Marín as President of the Puerto Rican Senate marked a more permanent place for New 
Deal public works and local public authorities. Fortified by FDR’s appointment of Rex Tugwell 
to the governorship in 1941, the election of Muñoz Marín allowed for the transfer of PRRA 
programs to local control while giving the PPD control over the powerful patronage mechanisms 
that, as in the U.S., formed the basis of his lasting political coalition.
 
By controlling a patronage 
program that once dwarfed the budget and credit limit of the local government, the PPD 
introduced populist government to Puerto Rico.
431
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 As of New Year’s Day, 1937, the PRRA employed over 52,000 workers and 
maintained a payroll of nearly $1 million per month. Of these workers, only about 5.7 were in 
administrative or bureaucratic positions. Over 90% of PRRA administrators and 99% of all 




While the New Deal in Puerto Rico certainly distinguished the U.S. territory from other 
parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, the rise of Puerto Rican populism also brought the 
island closer to its regional neighbors. This was in part due to the large-scale public relations 
campaign that the PRRA conducted in Latin America. Run by Antonio Cruz y Nieves and John 
W. Thomson, the PRRA Information and Research division published a wide array of publicity 
and propaganda in print media, radio, and newsreels.
432
 Detailing all aspects of PRRA work from 
cattle tick elimination to rural electrification, Spanish-language publicity was printed in 
newspapers and magazines in both Puerto Rico and throughout Latin American and the 
Caribbean. The PRRA Information and Research division distributed publicity to Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
433
  
By comparing the role of patronage and public works in the formation of Puerto Rican 
populism with other areas of the Spanish Caribbean, the following chapter will argue that 
political developments in Puerto Rico paralleled those in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. As 
part of the rising nationalism in Latin America and the Caribbean, the emergence of the CGT and 
PPD displayed an uneven or ambivalent relationship with the rise of Fulgenico Batista in Cuba 
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and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. At the same time, however, Puerto Rican 
populism shared many important characteristics with the development of corporatist populism 
elsewhere in the region during the 1930s and 1940s, such as: its popular, anti-corporate discourse; 
its multi-class alliance and political coalition; its state-oriented nature; its focus on industrializing 
and modernizing key social and economic structures; the ambiguity between state-led populism 
and true representative democracy.
434
 In many ways, the comparison of Batista and the “populist” 
Constitution of 1940 in Cuba or the consolidation of all political and economic power into 
Trujillo’s “populist” dictatorship in the Dominican Republic will complicate our understanding 
of the election of Muñoz Marín and the PPD in Puerto Rico. In other ways, this comparison will 
speak directly to the FDR administration’s construction and maintenance of the New Deal 
coalition in the United States and the similarities between New Deal liberalism and Latin 
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Chapter 7: The Rise of Populism in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic 
During the Great Depression 
 
Puerto Rico 
 The emergence of Puerto Rican populism was signified by two unconnected events in 
1940: the formation of the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) and the electoral victory of 
the Popular Democratic Party (PPD). Although these two organizations were not initially related, 
they soon developed a close relationship. Together, they were instrumental in disrupting the 
power of the Coalition. Whereas the CGT challenged the supremacy of the Federación Libre de 
Trabajadores (FLT) in Puerto Rico’s labor movement, thereby undercutting the political 
leverage of the Socialist Party, the PPD rose from an intraparty rivalry within the Liberal Party in 
1938 and supplanted the Coalition in the closely contested election of 1940.
435
 Capitalizing on 
the paradigm of reconstruction that had been used in PRRA publicity and cemented in place by 
PRRA public works, Luis Muñoz Marín and the PPD secured the support of the “available mass” 
of Puerto Ricans who worked for or benefitted from the New Deal on the island. Using the 
imagery of the countryside, the PPD was able to build a New Deal-style political coalition of 
rural farmers and farm workers, industrial workers, and the urban middle class—who followed 
Muñoz Marín to the PPD after his ouster from the Liberal Party.
436
  
 The PPD victory in the 1940 elections was highly significant as it allowed Muñoz Marín 
to replace Rafael Martínez Nadal as President of the Puerto Rican Senate. Contrasting himself 
with Martínez Nadal, who had been one of the most formidable critics of the PRRA between 
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1933 and 1941, Muñoz Marín advocated for the continuation of New Deal reconstruction 
projects. By constructing a New Deal-style coalition in Puerto Rico, based on party loyalty from 
rural and urban workers in exchange for direct government intervention in employment, land 
reform, and rural rehabilitation, the PPD was able to claim ownership of the large number of 
PRRA public works and public health projects that had been transferred to local control. In the 
tumultuous years surrounding its formation in 1938, when the island was still gripped by the 
assassination of Francis Riggs, the debate over the Tydings Bill, the Ponce Massacre, and the 
imprisonment of Pedro Albizu Campos, the PPD was able to distance itself from the most 
unpopular elements of the federal government. During the campaign in 1940, however, Muñoz 
Marín skillfully presented himself as the most logical heir to the patronage-driven public works 
projects of the New Deal years.  
 During World War II, the CGT and PPD became closer to each other. This period, which 
encompassed “brilliant rise and tragic fall” of the CGT, included a tightening and then fraying of 
their political relationship after 1945.
437
 Like the CIO in the United States, with which it was 
aligned, the CGT can only be understood in the context of the Great Depression, as it grew out of 
a decade of labor organization and strikes that not only challenged corporate capital, but also the 
leadership of the FLT—the dominant craft oriented union that held political sway on the island. 
The Communist Party of Puerto Rico (CP) also assisted labor mobilization between 1933 and 
1940, when workers in tobacco, sugar, grapes, needlework, baking, gasoline, driving, and 
students all mounted serious and successful strikes.
438
 These strikes were not composed of men 
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alone, as women workers played an important role in the mobilization of the tobacco and 
needlework industries. Women were active members of at least nine FLT-affiliated unions in 
needlework by 1934, and later formed the Congreso Obrero de Mujeres (Women’s Labor 
Congress) in support of the New Deal’s Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.
439
  
 The high point of labor mobilization came in January 1938, when over 7,500 
dockworkers went on strike in San Juan—paralyzing the dockyards, threatening island 
commerce, and transforming the organized labor movement in Puerto Rico into what would 
become the CGT in 1940. Leaving nearly 100,000 other workers unemployed for 37 days, the 
dockworkers’ strike solidified the affiliation between the CIO, the Puerto Rican CP, and the 
Puerto Rican labor movement—particularly in areas outside of sugar that had never before 
experienced labor mobilization on this scale.
440
 The strike was actively supported by the CIO-
affiliated National Maritime Union, and the new alliance between the CIO and CGT was widely 
applauded by the Puerto Rican public in two ways. First, Puerto Rican workers gravitated to the 
CGT in large numbers, as the CGT grew to include over 80,000 members in 59 affiliated unions 
by October 1940, and more than 150,000 members in affiliated 159 unions by May 1942.
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Second, the new alliance between the CIO and CGT signified a new dimension of the 
New Deal in Puerto Rico, as the rise of the CIO (while explicitly not a New Deal agency) was 
closely connected to the New Deal’s central goal of broadening the concept of economic 
democracy by enhancing the negotiating power of labor. Although the Wagner Act of 1935 
essentially legalized the bargaining position of labor, it was the General Motors (GM) “sit-down 
strike” of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in the winter of 1936-1937 that forced GM to the 
negotiating table and solidified the position of the UAW and CIO.
443
 It was the CIO that made 
the Wagner Act a reality. 
Like the GM strike of 1936-1937, the Puerto Rican dockworkers’ strike of 1938 
galvanized the Puerto Rican labor movement toward the more inclusive industrial unionism of 
the CIO. The following year, in 1939, Puerto Rican workers in other industries utilized their 
enhanced position within the New Deal coalition to put pressure on the status quo. In the 
changed political atmosphere following the dockworkers’ strike, groups such as the Unión 
Protectora de Desempleados (UPD) or unemployed union, the Puerto Rican CP, and the 
Asociación de Choferes or drivers’ union each called for closer ties to the CGT and for any 
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political organization that could extend the popularly supported slum clearance and hydroelectric 
development programs of the PRRA. As part of a planned “hunger march” in September 1939, 
these groups implicitly called for the extension of several PRRA reforms, demanding that 
“running water and electric lights, first aid stations, schools and school lunch rooms be extended 
to [those] zones where most of our people live. We are against slums; we are for a program of 
building hygienic houses for the people.”
444
 
Due to the breakdown of party politics that was occurring during these years, it was not 
clear who would sustain these public works projects in the future. As a federal agency, the PRRA 
was not designed to be a permanent political institution. In addition, by 1940, FDR was 
transitioning the New Deal towards the impending confrontation with Hitler’s Germany—even 
as Congress was steadfastly maintaining U.S. neutrality. One of the first casualties of the New 
Deal’s preparation for war was the idea of domestic public works, as the two massive public 
works agencies were merged into the Federal Works Agency (FWA) by the Reorganization Act 
of 1939, which consolidated the activities of a wide range of domestic public works agencies 
including the Public Buildings Administration (PBA), Public Works Administration (PWA), 
Work Projects Administration (WPA), Public Roads Administration (PRA), U.S. Housing 
Authority (USHA), Federal Fire Council (FFC), and Bureau of Community Facilities (BCF).
445
 
From 1939 to 1941, the FWA was originally headed by John M. Carmody of the Rural 
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 In the context of the coming war, the New Deal of the 1930s was not a viable vehicle for 
extending its program of public works and public authorities on the island into the 1940s. 
However, the PRRA played a vital role in the re-emergence of Luis Muñoz Marín after his split 
with the Liberal Party in 1938 and his success in the 1940 elections. This was because a large 
number of public officials who had migrated alongside Muñoz Marín from the Liberal Party to 
the PPD were also current or former employees of the PRRA. This included key PRRA 
engineers such as Regional Administrator Guillermo Esteves (who replaced Miles Fairbank as 
Assistant Administrator in 1941), Antonio Lucchetti, and Benigno Fernández García—the new 
Secretary of Labor, who had been the first Puerto Rican Attorney General (and was the brother 
of Rafael Fernández García, co-author of the original Chardón Plan). After the formation of the 
CGT in 1940, Secretary of Labor Benigno Fernández García was instrumental in settling 
disputes with the FLT and positioning the local government behind the strikers against the sugar 
industry—just as he had done in the 500-Acre law cases as Attorney General.
447
 As a “key leader 
of the PPD,” Fernández García’s actions against big sugar helped generate mass popular support 
for the PPD in the election of 1940 and after.
448
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 During the two years leading up to this election, the nascent PPD cultivated a new 
relationship with the Puerto Rican “public.” By turning PRRA public works and land reforms 
into the centerpiece of their platform, the PPD worked to make explicit the popular alliance 
between the PRRA and the public by targeting specific sectors such as CGT-affiliated workers 
(such as público drivers, dockyard workers, and communists), along with women, professionals, 
and religious groups.
449
 Catering its message to farmers, workers, and the professional classes, 
the PPD was led by the charismatic Muñoz Marín and portrayed itself in both personalistic and 
institutional discourse.
450
 For example, the campaign combined popular slogans designed to 
appeal to the rural masses and connect with broader developments in Latin American 
nationalism with explicit bureaucratic promises to continue and protect PRRA public works. 
While the campaign featured the prominent slogan “Pan, Tierra y Libertad” (Bread, Land, and 
Liberty) and embraced the image of the rural farmer or jibaro, it more directly focused on the 




  At the center of the campaign was Muñoz Marín. Personally campaigning through all 
parts of the island with “extraordinary energy,” Muñoz Marín and the PPD gave hundreds of 
speeches at “large and small roadside gatherings” throughout the mountainous interior.
452
 In 
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 On the PPD’s use of Catholicism to further embellish its jibaro image and enhance its 
rural popularity, Villaronga understatedly writes that the Muñoz Marín and the PPD “showed 
little reluctance to use religious values, symbols, and expressions as a source of political 





remote rural areas not yet lit by PRRA electric power, Muñoz Marín’s proxies amplified battery-
powered recorded versions of his speeches, distributed thousands of free copies of the party 
newspaper El Batey, and, during the last days of the campaign, delivered campaign addresses 
over the radio—many of which were written by Lieban Córdova, Muñoz Marín’s personal 
secretary in charge of dictating, writing, and editing many of his speeches, letters, and articles.
453
 
Even the title of El Batey was chosen to appeal to rural farmers and workers, as the word held 
colloquial meaning in Puerto Rico as the rural home of the jibaro.
454
 Breaking out of the closed-
door image of Puerto Rican politics by speaking in “public plazas, streets, cane fields, and 
homes,” Muñoz Marín built a larger than life mythology for himself as he travelled the island 
“by car, on horseback, and by foot” during the campaign.
455
   
 By saturating the countryside with propaganda, Muñoz Marín was able to appropriate the 
“cultural values of the island’s [rural] population” and present himself as the true heir to PRRA 
reform.
456
 While the PPD presented itself as the authentic voice of the jibaro through political 
slogan, visual image, and popular music, however, it should be stressed that the relationship 
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between the rural public and the PPD that was forged during the 1940 campaign was mutually 
negotiated. Indeed, as Emilio González Díaz has written, the relationship between the rural 
public and the PPD “was not an unilateral dragging of the masses by the party, but rather a 
somewhat explicit compromise . . . [that] for the Puerto Rican peasantry, foretold of a 
participation mechanism in defense of their interests.”
457
 This explicit compromise was 
reinforced by the PPD pledge to honor campaign promises in the form of a sworn oath that 
candidates took—such as that at Santurce on September 15, 1940—and in the popular “don’t sell 
your vote” campaign.  
 Positioning the PPD as a New Deal-style party that would both “converge” with the FDR 
administration in the U.S. and stand with “the people” against corporate interests in Puerto Rico, 
Muñoz Marín skillfully constructed a political coalition that included CGT affiliated workers, 
rural laborers, farmers, teachers, and professionals.
458
 Portraying the Coalition as a reactionary 
force, and the election of 1940 as one of dignity against greed and good versus evil, the PPD 
articulated a position on the moral high ground with its “don’t sell your vote” campaign.
459
 As 
Nathaniel I. Córdova has argued, this message was “constantly repeated in two simple yet 
powerful maxims of the campaign: dignity versus money, and, he who sells his vote sells his 
children.”
460
 By coloring himself as incorruptible, Muñoz Marín solidified his personal image as 
leader of the Puerto Rican public while lending credence to the central issue on the PPD 
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platform: the enforcement of the 500-Acre law. To be clear, we do not need to form opinions as 
to the sincerity or duplicitousness of Muñoz Marín’s moral posturing. It was no doubt politically 
motivated. Similarly, we do not need to analyze his own position as a member of the liberal elite. 
It was quite clear. The larger issue for us is that this appeal to the public was more viable after 
the PRRA than ever before. By framing himself as the only political figure capable of extending 
the Puerto Rican New Deal through the political powers of the PPD, Muñoz Marín was able to 
balance resonant cultural nationalism with extending the new Keynesian liberalism of the Second 
New Deal.  
Taking control of PRRA engineering projects—including its popular public works 
program, extensive patronage networks, and land reform platform—was key.
461
 Muñoz Marín 
was able to do this in three ways: by maintaining a very close relationship with new PRRA 
Assistant Administrator Guillermo Esteves; by blurring the lines between the PRRA and the PPD 
in the public eye; and by assuring that federal public works spending was continued even as the 
U.S. economy shifted to defense spending during WWII. During his first three years in office, 
Muñoz Marín was kept up to date on PRRA construction projects through weekly, monthly, and 
yearly reports on PRRA activities. While such reports had been regularly sent to the Washington 
offices of the PRRA from San Juan during 1935 to 1941, there seems to have been a greater 
cooperation—in terms of sharing information—between the PRRA and local government 
following the removal of the Coalition and election of the PPD in 1940. As reporting on all 
activities shifted from impersonal memos about the number of buildings built to the type of 
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minutiae that struck at the heart of the public’s relationship to PRRA projects, Muñoz Marín was 
able to speak about PRRA projects with authority.  
For example, in discussing the progress of the newly constructed Castañer General 
Hospital and Community Center in Adjuntas during July through September 1943, Esteves 
informed Muñoz Marín of: the exact number of patients and treatments (251 new patients 
admitted, 244 discharged, 4 died, 16 of 25 beds currently filled); an ambulance report  (567 
business miles and 1,050 emergency miles); a detailed kitchen report (11,842 total meals served 
comprising 2,964 patient meals and 8,878 staff meals); a recreation report (detailing all kinds of 
new recreational activities, including the construction of cement tennis, volleyball, badminton, 
basketball courts; a horseshoe diamond installed; chairs repaired and painted; grounds and 
playing fields maintained; Recreation Center open every day from 8am to 9pm, with supervised 
children’s hours and organized sports; movies; talent shows; used clothing distribution organized 
and run by the community; sports training classes free from local teacher; classes in first aid,  
English, music including choral singing and private piano lessons; woodshop (youth and adult); 
boys and girls clubs; library with new books in Spanish provided by the Institute de Literature 
Puertorriquena available to patients).
462
 These were exactly the kinds of details that allowed 
Muñoz Marín to connect with the Puerto Rican public for whom there was very little to 
distinguish the PRRA from the PPD, as many people wrote to Muñoz Marín seeking 
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employment on PRRA projects.
463
 In addition, Muñoz Marín helped secure over $51 million 
dollars from the War Emergency Program (WEP) for relief and reconstruction projects outside of 
direct military spending—largely to continue PRRA style projects during the war.
464
 
 Familiarity with the intimate details of these public works projects made Muñoz Marín 
seem like an authority on all aspects the PRRA.
465
 Combined with the “don’t sell your vote” 
campaign, it also strengthened Muñoz Marín’s position on the central issue of his campaign—the 
enforcement of the 500-Acre law. While enforcement had been a political issue throughout the 
1930s, resistance from big sugar companies had curtailed any legal or legislative attempts to rein 
in the landholding power of agricultural corporations, limited companies, partnerships, trusts, 
voluntary associations, or other private organizations—whether owned by local or absentee 
capital.
466
 Even the Coalition’s attempt at limited land reform in 1935 had stalled, as sugar 
corporations challenged the legislation in court.
467
 Following five years of appeals, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 1935 law in March 1940. Through his newspaper La 
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 Villaronga, 163. Villaronga writes that in mobilizing mass support for the PPD, 
Muñoz Marín’s hope for the New Deal was “revived” as it “offered [him] a platform to enhance 
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Democracia, Muñoz Marín praised the decision.
468
 The case, which had been originally brought 
by Attorney General Benigno Fernández García, was quickly capitalized on by Muñoz Marín 
and the PPD. The following spring, when the PPD-controlled Senate established a public 
corporation to enforce the law and oversee the PRRA’s land resettlement program, the 
connections between the Chardón Plan, PRRA, and Puerto Rico Land Authority were made 
explicit as Carlos Chardón was asked to return from Venezuela to run the land program and 
enforce the 500-Acre law.
469
 Modeled on the PRCC and WRA, the Land Authority was 
established to liquidate the PRRA Land Resettlement and Agricultural Rehabilitation divisions 
without giving up the essential services of the PRRA programs.
470
 Speaking, as always, to both 
New Deal administrators in the U.S. and the Puerto Rican public, Muñoz Marín compared his 
version of the Land Law to the Homestead Act of 1862, passed by Radical Republicans during 
the Civil War and signed into law by Abraham Lincoln.
471
 
Even after the PPD passed the Land Law of 1941, however, actual enforcement of the 
law and direct attack on the sugar interests was contingent on a strong working relationship 
between Muñoz Marín (as President of the Senate) and the governor of Puerto Rico. The PPD’s 
position became greatly enhanced in 1941 when Franklin Roosevelt appointed the first New 
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Dealer as Governor of Puerto Rico—Rexford G. Tugwell. Tugwell, who had run the New Deal’s 
Resettlement Administration between April 1935 and December 1936—the agency was 
reconstituted as the Farm Security Administration (FSA) in September 1937—originally viewed 
FSA as the logical heir to the PRRA and began negotiations with Roosevelt and the FSA. After 
taking office on September 19, 1941, however, Tugwell became convinced that the new PPD-led 
government was the optimum successor to the New Deal in Puerto Rico.
472
  
 By the end of 1941, the basic elements of Puerto Rican “populism” were in place. Two of 
the most crucial turning points in establishing a populist-style coalition in Puerto Rico were the 
formation of the General Federation of Workers (CGT) in 1940 and the victory of the Popular 
Democratic Party (PPD) in the 1940 elections. Both were closely connected to the New Deal: the 
CGT to the political economy of the Wagner Act and CIO—which gave industrial labor a new 
seat at the table by protecting the right to collective bargaining—and the PPD to the legacy of 
PRRA public works and land reform. The PPD’s victory was further strengthened by the 
appointment of one of the New Deal’s most progressive champions—Rex the Red—to the 
position of governor. That Rex Tugwell was the last U.S.-born governor of Puerto Rico was not 
the result of his own altruism nor of some enlightened understanding among men, but the 
product of the Puerto Rican populist moment in the 1940s, which arose in convergence with the 
New Deal in the U.S. that Tugwell had helped shape.
473
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 If it was not a “true” populism that existed in Puerto Rico in the 1940s, it is because there 
is no singular “true” populism in Latin American or elsewhere. Greatly dependent on the New 
Deal, political populism in Puerto Rico was also shaped by the limits and possibilities of Puerto 
Rican strategies of recovery from the Great Depression and the 1928 and 1932 hurricanes which, 
as we have seen, included pragmatic alliance with the PRRA. The limits and possibilities in 
Puerto Rico were different from those of other strategies in other places. Although historical 
scholarship of “Latin American populism” continues to be dominated by discussion of Juan 
Perón’s Argentina, Getulio Vargas’ Brazil, and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 
under Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, Antonio Gaztambide-Géigel has called for a more nuanced 
understanding of Caribbean populism.
474
 Using the example of Puerto Rico, Gaztambide-Géigel 
argues that proximity to the U.S. and the North Atlantic economy has had a greater influence on 
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the internal political developments of Caribbean societies than has been widely acknowledged.
475
 
Although a comparison of the emergence of populism in the entire Caribbean region remains 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, the remainder of this chapter will put the experience of 
Puerto Rico into comparative perspective with internal political events in the Spanish Caribbean 
during the late 1930s and early 1940s. As with Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and Cuba 
went through substantial political transformations during the Great Depression in ways that 




Dominican Republic  
 
 Whereas the rise of populism in Puerto Rico was predicated on a popular alliance 
between the Puerto Rican public and the New Deal, which was made possible by the election of 
FDR, its rise in the Dominican Republic is almost solely associated with Rafael Leónidas 
Trujillo Molina. The contrast between Trujillo—notorious for the ruthless dictatorship he headed 
in the Dominican Republic between 1931 and 1961—and the PRRA/PPD public works program 
may at first seem simplistic due to the obviously different contexts and legacies. But a closer 
look reveals many unanticipated similarities. While this section does not intend to give a 
comprehensive overview of the thirty years of Trujillo’s reign or of the complete legislative arc 
of the PPD from 1941 to the present, it will discuss the similar circumstances from which Puerto 
Rican and Dominican populism arose during the Great Depression and the widely divergent 
ways the populist experience was articulated and manifested in power. 
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 A few basic similarities between Trujillo and the PPD are clear. Both originated in 
natural disaster and economic crisis. Both grew out of close ties to the United States. Both took 
advantage of a softening of U.S. foreign policy during the Good Neighbor Policy of Herbert 
Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt. And both, over time, established domestic power over a broad 
coalition of supporters.
476
 However, while Puerto Rico under the PPD achieved political 
autonomy within the framework of U.S. citizenship as the Estado Libre Asociado (Associated 
Free State), the transition to populism in the Dominican Republic was corrupt, violent, racist, and 
blatantly undemocratic.
477
 During both of his official presidencies (from 1930 to 1938, and 1942 
to 1952) and during his time out of office, when the “ceremonial affairs of state [were relegated] 
to puppet presidents such as his brother, Hector Bienvenido Trujillo Molina, who occupied the 
National Palace from 1952 to 1960, and Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo, an intellectual and scholar 
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 Secured by the “efficiency, rapacity, [and] utter ruthlessness,” of his authoritarian police 
force that tightly censored the Dominican public sphere and closely monitored all potential 
political opponents, Trujillo’s rule was also based on institutionalized personalism.
479
 Not only 
was Trujillo’s name and image regarded as the savior of the Dominican Republic in popular 
culture, he was named by (his own) official decree as El Benefactor of the Republic—later 
expanded to Benefactor of the Fatherland.
480
 Referred to as an emperor, saint, super-man, and 
god, Trujillo enriched himself and his family through Dominican development strategies in ways 
that dwarfed even the most corrupt regional governments of the nineteenth century. By centering 
the newly formed Dominican Party around himself, and making membership in that party 
virtually mandatory, Trujillo erased the lines between himself and the state and led an impressive 
and popular development program based on the expansion of state-built “infrastructural works” 
in the fields of education, health, sanitation, communications, agriculture, and roads and 
highways.
481
 As we will see, much of Trujillo’s infrastructural construction program was 
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 Meetz, 39, 42. As discussed above, there is an extraordinary difference between 
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influenced by the New Deal in Puerto Rico, which he followed very closely through both PRRA 
publicity campaigns and diplomatic channels. Unlike the Puerto Rican public works program, 
however, which was based on federal funding, the transfer of all property to local ownership, and 
the formation of independent public agencies and corporations, Trujillo established a personal 
and political monopoly over all major infrastructural constructions and land appropriations.  
 Not only did his family own the natural resources and finished product of Dominican 
industrialization, Trujillo renamed countless new infrastructural works in his honor, from schools 
and hospitals, to irrigation projects, to many new roads and bridges—for which he seems to have 
had a special fondness.
482
 As Eric Roorda has written, four of the first new bridges built by his 
government were named for his mother, father, grandfather, and son. Three others were named 
for himself: the Generalísmo Trujillo Bridge, the San Rafael Bridge, and the Trujillo Bridge.
483
 
His capacity for self-glorification did not end there, as Trujillo placed dozens of statues of 
himself in cities and villages across the island, and renamed the island’s capitol and largest city 
as well as its highest mountain in his own honor; Santo Domingo was rechristened Ciudad 
Trujillo and Pico Duarte renamed Pico Trujillo.
484
 Despite the personal enrichment and self-
glorification of these projects, their larger effect on the development of populist government in 
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the Dominican Republic should not be taken lightly, as Trujillo’s emphasis on infrastructural 
development had major political consequences in the Dominican Republic.  
As in Puerto Rico, the transition toward populism in the Dominican Republic originated 
with a devastating natural disaster that exacerbated all other local aspects of the Great 
Depression. Directly striking Santo Domingo with 100 to 150-mph winds on September 3, 1930, 
the San Zenón hurricane killed between 4,000 and 6,000 people, leveled thousands of buildings 
and other infrastructure in Santo Domingo, and flooded the Ozama River—straining 
communication and transportation while leaving survivors homeless, grief stricken, and facing a 
living “nightmare of bad water, decaying bodies, and shortages of food and medicine.”
485
 The 
Associated Press reported that San Zenón, which was also called the Santo Domingo hurricane, 
left only 400 out of 10,000 buildings standing and that local authorities were forced to cremate 
50 bodies at a time, as newly buried bodies were rising from the flooded cemeteries where 
“coffins float around like corks.”
486
 
Initial reaction to the storm was similar to that in Puerto Rico. Striking Santo Domingo 
only three weeks after Trujillo was inaugurated President, initial relief efforts to San Zenón 
paralleled those in Puerto Rico following San Felipe in 1928 and San Ciprián in 1932, with a 
heavy emphasis on volunteerism, charitable relief, and coordination with the American Red 
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 But, as both Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic looked to redevelop their 
destroyed infrastructure, the similarities faded. Whereas the PRRA fostered the construction of a 
permanent hurricane-proof reconstruction through publicly-owned authorities and corporations, 
Trujillo used the destructive storm to seize nearly absolute control over all aspects the 
Dominican Republic’s redevelopment program. This was not done in secret. In 1950, speaking 
before an international audience of public health officials, Trujillo claimed to have “no reason 
for regrets in my executive program” that begun after the 1930 hurricane, and that he needed to 
establish “strong foundations . . . for a new Dominican ethical code” that would embrace his 
government’s new “duty and responsibility to build roads and bridges, hospitals and schools.”
488
  
To accomplish both of these aims—the political and the infrastructural—Trujillo 
established the Dominican Party, for “without a working institution, without an active 
organization, without a flexible, disciplined, and responsible force identified with the 
government’s constructive aims, the fulfillment of such aims . . . would have never 
materialized.”
489
 Through this party, which might as well have been called the Trujillo Party, 
Trujillo personally led relief efforts while also creating a myriad of new agencies, bureaucracies, 
and corporatist-styled government associations centralized under party rule.
490
 While his initial 
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source of power in the 1920s was based in the U.S.–influenced National Guard, in the aftermath 
of San Zenón Trujillo extended his personal authority over the island through a “vast web of 
controls . . . over the armed forces, governmental machinery, national economy, communications, 
education, intellectual life, and though processes.” During the thirty years of his “democratic” 
dictatorship, “no group, institution, or individual could function independently of [his] 
control.”
491
 In addition, the infrastructural works program created thousands of jobs through a 
system of political patronage. Based largely on his infrastructural works program, Trujillo’s form 
of totalitarian populism differed from nearly all other examples: from that of Nazi Germany, 




Despite the obvious differences between Trujillo’s dictatorship and the New Deal in 
Puerto Rico, there were several convergent points between their programs. Emerging in the 
aftermath of such destructive storms during the Great Depression, Trujillo and the PRRA both 
used the socioeconomic aspects of the natural disaster to begin long-term programs of increased 
public expenditures. Between 1936 and 1970, disbursements from the central government in the 
Dominican Republic rose over 24 times, from $10.6 million in 1936 to $259.6 million in 1970, 
while in Puerto Rico disbursements from the local government increased over 52 times, from 
$18.7 million in 1928 to $975.7 million in 1970.
493
 In both countries, these public expenditures 
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were part of socioeconomic development programs based on investments in infrastructure, 
irrigation, and electricity. But while the increased expenditures in the Dominican Republic were 
“partially financed by a rather high tax burden on the Dominican populace” in part to pay off the 
island’s external debt and in part to maintain its high military expenses, in Puerto Rico the 
development of public works such as the cement plant and hydroelectric facilities was subsidized 
by the creation of self-financing and “semi-autonomous public corporations which also served to 
carry out policy objectives” of the reform-oriented government after 1941.
494
  
As with the PPD, the Trujillo regime combined infrastructural development with agrarian 
reform, which it used successfully in “shoring up political stability and transforming peasant 
practices.”
495
 As Richard Lee Turtis has written, after rising to power through the military, 
Trujillo’s rule was supported by a political coalition that included urban nationalist intellectuals 
and popular support from the agrarian sectors. Demonstrating the connections between 
infrastructure and environment, Trujillo strengthened his populist project through combining 
infrastructural development and agrarian reform, building infrastructural works that would 
appeal to nationalist sentiment, provide popular support for his dictatorship, and grow the 
Dominican economy. For example, the roads, bridges, and irrigation systems he built (and 
named for himself) were “crucial prerequisite[s] for peasants to be able to profitably market their 
surplus crops.” Indeed, political support for the dictator relied upon a successful strategy of 
infrastructural expansion that remained a large component of the state budget.
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In addition, there was another point of congruence between the Puerto Rican and 
Dominican infrastructural works programs. Just as Trujillo sought to ingratiate himself with U.S. 
foreign policy makers from the Good Neighbor Policy to the Cold War, he also sought to 
personally and politically benefit from the expansive and energetic engineering program of the 
PRRA. Whether inquiring about the procurement of Puerto Rican cement after the opening of the 
Cataño cement plant in 1938 or in directly asking for copies of infrastructural, agricultural, and 
architectural blueprints—such as for the PRRA-constructed administration building of the 
University of Puerto Rico or for pamphlets regarding the PRRA preserves canning program.
497
 A 
few years later, after closely following the success of the Puerto Rican cement plant, Trujillo 
sought to build his own, and again sought the assistance of the PRRA, although the project never 
got underway and the Dominican Republic did not have its own functioning cement plant until 
1973, over 10 years after Trujillo was assassinated.
498
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Whether viewed in terms of his personal benefit or in terms of global politics on the eve 
of WWII, Trujillo’s desire to curry favor with the U.S. through acquisition of plans, blueprints, 
and cheap cement from the New Deal in Puerto Rico reflected the long legacy of U.S. 
involvement in the Dominican Republic. Once again, however, this basic point of similarity 
between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic—both felt the pressure of an expanding U.S. 
empire after 1898—reveals a wide gap in the history of U.S. imperialism in the two Caribbean 
islands, and an equally wide gap in domestic history of the two islands as well. The U.S. military 
occupation of the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 1924 was dissimilar from that of U.S. 
territorial rule in Puerto Rico, whose residents acquired U.S. citizenship in 1917. Neither 
experience can be reduced to a framework of “colonialism.”  
Similarly, the experience of public works construction in Puerto Rico and infrastructural 
development in the Dominican Republic cannot be reduced to a simple colonial framework. In 
both cases, state-built construction projects and state-provided patronage jobs grew political 
support. In both cases, this political support legitimated populist rule by the PPD and by the 
Trujillo dictatorship. In both cases, this political support was strongest in the rural countryside—
where the spread of clean drinking water, electricity, and hurricane-proof roads, bridges, sewers, 
storm drains, irrigation canals, houses, schools, hospitals, health clinics, and other public health 
necessities of modern life had their most direct and long-lasting effect. In the Dominican 
Republic countryside, for example, where support for “el Benefactor” remained strong even after 
his demise in an emotionally complex combination of fear and nostalgia, the rural public 
depended on the Trujillo regime to “distribute land, resolve property disputes, and provide 
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agricultural aid and infrastructure,” and this dependence, in turn helped legitimate his rule.
499
 
 Although the same can be said about the growth of populism in Puerto Rico—that public 
works spending and patronage jobs helped legitimate PPD rule—this comparison would be 
incomplete by not analyzing the vast differences between the growth of local political democracy 
in Puerto Rico and the nearly complete absence of it in the Dominican Republic under Trujillo. 
While the words are often used interchangeably, there is a vast difference between infrastructural 
development and public works. Whereas Puerto Rican public works built and financed by the 
PRRA were turned over to public ownership administered by autonomously run public agencies 
and authorities, whose services enhance democracy through increased social and physical 
mobility, infrastructural works developed by Trujillo—even those modeled on the New Deal in 
Puerto Rico—remained the tools of dictatorship. While participation, critique, and benefit from 
PRRA public works transformed the meaning of U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico through the 
establishment of a New Deal style coalition, dependence on infrastructural works under Trujillo 





 In contrast to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, the rise of populism in Cuba is 
closely associated with Revolution of 1933 and the impressively democratic Cuban Constitution 
of 1940. Both were influenced by Fulgencio Batista, the populist President, and later dictator, 
whose personal climb to power in Cuba reveals ambiguous similarities to both Luis Muñoz 
Marín and Rafael Trujillo. This should not surprise, as the rise of institutional populism in Cuba 
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during the Great Depression and 1940s reflects the broader ambiguity about the meaning of 
populism in the Spanish Caribbean. Highlighting some of those ambiguities, this section will 
compare the experience with populism in Cuba with that in Puerto Rico and the Dominican 
Republic. 
The Revolution of 1933 built upon the social changes of the 1920s, when the popular 
classes emerged as a potent force in Cuban politics. During the presidency of Gerardo Machado, 
however, which lasted from 1925 to 1933, these popular classes were largely repressed from full 
political participation. While elite groups debated over how the masses would be incorporated 
into state politics, the revolution interrupted the Cuban political process amid the rapidly 
declining global economy. Occurring during the depth of the Great Depression, the Revolution 
of 1933 introduced a brief and socially progressive period in Cuban politics that undermined the 
regressive oligarchic rule of the previous era.
500
 In the decade that followed the revolution—
which was spurred by social protest from the popular classes and led by a physiology professor 
at the University of Havana named Ramón Grau San Martín—Cuba experienced an 
unprecedented era of democratic reform that included basic labor protections, women’s suffrage, 
and intellectual autonomy for the University of Havana. As will be discussed below, these 
reforms and other protection of civil liberties, social justice, and economic reform were 
institutionalized in the populist Constitution of 1940.
501
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Despite this, the revolution has been largely remembered as an “incomplete and 
frustrated” political exercise that failed to interrupt the long period of “graft, corruption, 
malfeasance, administrative incompetence, and blatant social insensitivity to the lower social 
orders, especially the Afro-Cubans,” that existed in Cuba between 1902 and 1959.
502
 One of the 
primary reasons that this era of democratic reform has been regarded as incomplete and 
frustrated is that the revolution’s statutory legacy—the Constitution of 1940—was enacted 
during the first presidency of General Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, who later became the corrupt 
military leader overthrown by Fidel Castro in the revolution of 1959. Castro himself was in part 
responsible for the historical ambiguity over the meaning of the Revolution of 1933, as he 
consciously framed his government as both the antithesis of the Bastista regime and the 
culmination of “true” Cuban history.
503
  
These interrelated positions, which he articulated in a “large-scale propaganda campaign,” 
contradicted his own use of Batista’s legacy as he initially mobilized “as broad a constituency of 
support as possible by talking only of social justice and a restoration of the democratic and 
reformist Constitution of 1940” throughout the early days of his rule.
504
 He used the memory of 
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democratic reform for good reason, as, by 1959, the 1940 Constitution was a source of both 
lament and pride for Cubans. At the time its passage, it was “hailed as a triumph of civilization” 
that heralded the “end of one age and the onset of another.”
505
 A decade later, in 1952, when 
Batista led a military coup of the democratic government he himself had helped organize, 
collective and national pride in the Constitution of 1940 became a source of “embarrassment and 
humiliation, doubt and diminished confidence.”
506
 Castro’s intentional “forgetting” of the brief 
decade after 1933, however, belies the changing conception of public citizenship that had 
emerged in Cuba and the role of patronage and public works in creating the mass movement 
toward the Constitution of 1940.  
During the 1930s, populism in Cuba blended the democratic with the authoritarian. In 
this, certain similarities bind the populist experience in Cuba with that in both Puerto Rico and 
the Dominican Republic. If this seems to be a historical paradox, it is the fault of Fulgencio 
Batista, the enigmatic leader of Cuban populism between 1933 and 1959 whose hold on power 
included terms as: military strongman who influenced Cuban politics from behind the scenes 
from 1934 to 1940; democratically elected President from 1940 to 1944; President following his 
military coup from 1952 to 1959.
507
 While Batista’s rule was based on his control of the military 
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and police, which he used to enforce his doctrine of social harmony, Robert Whitney has argued 
that his power was also derived from a pragmatic and astute political sense, and a corporatist and 
patronage-driven economic development program.
508
 Combined with the use of heavy-handed 
repression, which assured that the popular classes did not enjoy any real political autonomy, 
Batista’s reliance on patronage and public works was redefined in the Constitution of 1940 as a 
new form of mass or public citizenship guaranteed by the state.  
While Batista used these guarantees to help secure power, Cubans from many 
backgrounds viewed the new constitutional guarantees as the fruits of hard fought campaigns for 
a new relationship between the people and the state defined by social justice, public citizenship, 
and a new nationalist identity. Two groups that most influenced the rise of this new relationship 
were organized labor and Afro-Cuban activists. During the Great Depression, these two 
groups—sometimes united in Communist-led unions—had become “major actors” in Cuban 
politics whose political militancy and cross-race class identity “extracted significant concessions 
from [both] employers and the state,” culminating in the new Cuban Constitution at the end of 
the decade.
509
 But, as Alejandro de la Fuente has argued, while the Constitution “symbolized the 
culminating battle of the 1933 revolution,” it also marked a new departure in the struggle for 
racial equality in Cuba.
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 Indeed, noting the Nazi expansion across Europe between 1939 and 
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1940, Afro-Cuban activists called for a new sense of national unity against racism at home and 
abroad and used the 1940 constitutional convention “as an opportunity—if not the opportunity—
to legislate effective equal rights for blacks, turn racial discrimination into a punishable crime, 
and effectively eliminate racism from the island.”
511
  
Though the Constitution of 1940 did not “eliminate” racism from Cuba, it did 
institutionalize a wide range of political rights directed at the cross-race, cross-class section of 
the Cuban public through a comprehensive and lengthy (286 Articles) series of Constitutional 
guarantees. Recognizing that “All Cubans are equal under the law,” the Constitution asserted 
“any discrimination by reason of sex, race, color, or class, and any other kind of discrimination 
destructive of human dignity, is declared illegal and punishable.”
512
 After enumerating a series of 
specific guarantees in terms of legal and penal rights, freedom of speech, religion, family life 
(including motherhood and marriage), primary education, and access to universities, the 
constitution’s populist provisions are detailed in a section on labor rights. 
In Section 6, concerning labor and property, the Constitution of 1940 makes several 
guarantees to Cuban workers regarding wages, social insurance, and working conditions. This 
section, which is premised on the idea that “labor is an inalienable right of the individual,” 
contains many provisions that—in the U.S.—were managed by the U.S. by the New Deal. For 
example, Section 6 defines the right to a minimum wage based on changing standards of living; 
federal pensions for workers against illness, old age, unemployment, or other exigencies of labor; 












social insurance against occupational hazards, injuries, and diseases; the eight-hour day and 
eleven-month work year; a ban on child labor; and the protected right to organize and strike.
513
  
Similarly, during the New Deal, Roosevelt’s administration attempted to tackle some of 
these populist issues in a wide range of measures, laws, regulations, and new government 
agencies, ranging from the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Federal Emergency 
Relief Agency (FERA) to the Social Security Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Wagner Act, and 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). By not attempting to amend the U.S. Constitution to 
protect these rights, however, Roosevelt chose a more conservative route on these labor issues 
than Batista’s Cuba. Although critics from his left and right denounced his use of executive 
power, FDR deliberately chose to not pursue constitutional amendments to enhance the New 
Deal, believing that such amendments would never be approved by three-fourths of the state 
legislatures rapidly enough to produce desired results.
514
 While FDR needed to persuade 
American workers that his use of executive power was being used to strengthen mass democracy 
and economic recovery, Batista was able to present the Cuban Constitution as a more immediate 
populist document in terms of labor rights. 
On the issue of women’s rights, Batista’s Cuba went much farther than the New Deal was 
willing or able to go, and the Cuban Constitution of 1940 makes explicit commitments to women 
that are missing from virtually any New Deal legislation. While the Social Security Act of 1935 
deliberately excluded millions of women from its benefits (and nearly all African American 
women)—women working in agriculture, domestic service, or laundry service for example—the 
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Cuban Constitution made no such exclusions in its social insurance provisions and, further, 
declared that there would be no wage differential between married and single women workers 
and guaranteed basic protections for pregnancy, such as paid leave before and after childbirth 
and extra break time for nursing.
515
 Guarantees such as these, that respected the rights of women, 
were unknown to the New Deal, which was crafted with the support of the southern wing of the 
Democratic Party. Congressmen and Senators from the South (as well as others from the North 
and West) were able to shape New Deal labor policy along strict racialized and gendered lines in 
order to protect and enhance Jim Crow segregation in the United States.
516
 Roosevelt, who based 
much of his political coalition on the support of the southern Democrats, grounded the New Deal 
on a working-class populism that championed “pocketbook issues” but was far more ambiguous 
on social and cultural issues. He did not attack segregation or support women’s rights directly.
517
 
The Cuban Constitution of 1940 codified several developments related to patronage and 
public works that were simultaneously occurring in Puerto Rico through the PRRA. There are 
three primary similarities between the Cuban Constitution and the PRRA program: 1) the 
construction of low-cost housing and a public health infrastructure; 2) direct government 
employment of education and health workers; 3) the establishment of worker owned 
cooperatives in agriculture, industry, and commerce. Article 79 of the Cuban Constitution 
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declares that the state “shall support the creation of low-cost dwellings for workers,” and that the 
construction and maintenance of all essential services such as schools, hospitals, and health 
clinics would be now regulated by law. While the Cuban government would provide these public 
works in the urban centers, all private enterprises employing workers outside of urban areas were 
required to do so.
518
 As we have seen above, the construction of hurricane-proof housing was a 
central aspect of the PRRA engineering program. Between 1935 and 1943, thousands of concrete 
houses and apartments—manufactured with locally-produced cement products—were built in 
both rural and urban areas of the island and made available to workers through highly subsidized 
rents and mortgages. Some structures, like the el Falansterio complex in Puerta de Tierra, 
surpassed nearly all low-cost housing constructions of the New Deal in the U.S. in both 
durability and design.  
While Article 79 attempted to regulate the construction of a new public health 
infrastructure, Article 80 focused on the employment of education and health workers, requiring 
the government by law to establish and allocate funding for doctors, nurses, medical examiners, 
and all other public health positions. In Puerto Rico—though it was not required by law to 
provide employment in these areas as in the Cuban example—the PRRA was a massive 
employer during the Great Depression in all types of work, including health services. While its 
employment rolls peaked in November 1936 at 58,238 persons (over 90% of all administrative, 
supervisory, and clerical personnel and 99.9% of all other workers were native-born Puerto 
Ricans), by January 1939 these workers had completed more than 108.6 million man-hours of 
work, the vast majority of it on long-term reconstruction projects in housing, education, 
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sanitation systems, and public health.
519
 For example, at least 57.7% of these man-hours were 
devoted to rural rehabilitation projects such hurricane recovery, agricultural development, and 
worker housing. An additional 25.8% of these man-hours were dedicated to long-term, capital-
intensive reconstruction projects such as the construction of the Cataño cement plant and the 
rural electrification program.
520
 Dedicated to non-long-term projects, the remaining 16.5% of 
PRRA man-hours included an extraordinary number of direct public health interventions by male 
and female doctors, nurses, and administrators employed by the PRRA. As discussed above, 
these interventions included the treatment of over 500,000 Puerto Rican patients (over 1/3 of the 
island’s population of 1.8 million) for a variety of medical and dental aliments and issues ranging 
from malaria, intestinal parasite (hookworm), smallpox, and typhoid fever treatments to 
thousands preventative tooth cleanings and/or extractions.
 521
 Additionally, the PRRA employed 
thousands of elementary teachers in urban and rural areas of the island, many of them women.
522
 
 In addition to similarities in public works and patronage employment, the Cuban 
Constitution of 1940 paralleled developments in Puerto Rico coordinated by the PRRA in its 
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attempts to establish worker-owned cooperatives in agriculture, industry, and commerce.
523
  
Though not the focus of this dissertation, which has instead concentrated on the engineering 
program, the establishment of worker or public-owned cooperatives was a major focus of the 
island’s long-term rural rehabilitation program. In Puerto Rico, the focus on cooperatives was 
directly tied to the environmental and economic crises causes by the San Felipe and San Ciprían 
hurricanes of 1928 and 1932. According to Guillermo Esteves, Regional Administrator (later 
Assistant Administrator) of the PRRA, the Rural Rehabilitation and Land Tenure Program was 
established in 1935 with three interrelated goals: to directly aid coffee, tobacco, and fruit farmers 
whose land had been destroyed by the 1928 and 1932 hurricanes (and who “had also suffered 
seriously from the results of the economic depression that followed the First World War”); to 
provide opportunities of work to thousands of unemployed agricultural workers, who suffered 
“because of the fact that there was no work available in these farms of the highlands of Puerto 
Rico and the fruit growing regions along the sea coast” due to the hurricanes; and to “create 
subsistence and small sized family farms and make them available to agricultural laborers and 
small farmers who had lost all they had, in order to offer them the facilities of permanent 
homesteads and improve their social and economic position.”
524
 The establishment of these small 
farms overlapped with PRRA public works programs, as the Rural Rehabilitation division of “the 
PRRA built neat and hurricane-proof, concrete, brick, or rammed-earth houses, thus creating 
subsistence farms where agricultural laborers have been installed as resettlers.”  
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 The Rural Rehabilitation program also attempted to instill a new sense of economic 
citizenship in the Puerto Rican countryside, through the establishment and promotion of 
agricultural and commercial cooperatives.  Coordinated by the Cooperative division of the 
PRRA, the focus on cooperatives in sugar, coffee, vanilla, fruits, and other agricultural products 
produced mixed results. The program, which involved the resettlement of large numbers of 
Puerto Rican workers who had been displaced by the storms and depression, resulted in the 
replanting of over 15,000 acres of food crops and 3,000 acres of cash crops by resettled workers. 
Two noteworthy examples of the PRRA experiment in cooperative farming are the Casteñer 
Cooperative and the Central Lafayette.  
 Located on 1,645 acres of land in the in municipalities of Adjuntas, Lares, and Yauco, the 
Casteñer Cooperative attempted to rehabilitate large-scale coffee farming on a hurricane-ravaged 
land. Combining a focus on soil conservation with crop diversification, large-scale land 
utilization, and scientific management, the cooperative was essential to coffee’s recovery; as 
coffee bushes take about four years to mature, it was improbable that the coffee growers of this 
region could have recovered without an enormous private investment. Nearly 200 agricultural 
workers were resettled at Casteñer, each provided with a PRRA-purchased one-acre homestead 
and hurricane-proof house. The cooperative not only helped revive coffee, but diversified the 
agricultural output in this region as well. Of the 1,163 acres of crops and seed beds planted at 
Casteñer, 63.4% was in coffee, 5.7% in sugar cane, 4.8% in vanilla bean, 1.7% in citrus, and 
24.3% in banana, tannia roots, and other subsistence vegetables, seed beds, and pasture.
525
 In 
1943, the PRRA coordinated the construction of the first-ever rural hospital in rural Puerto Rico 
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at Casteñer, which provided free service to both cooperative resettlers and other rural workers, 
and developed an important education and disease prevention program in the area as well.
526
 
 The Central Lafayette, which was established on 9,738 acres (4,427 acres owned by 12 
newly formed land cooperatives and 5,311 acres owned by the PRRA), was designed to operate 
as a cooperatively owner sugar mill. It was a massive failure. Begun in 1936 when the PRRA—
fulfilling one of the earliest goals of the Chardón Plan to break up (absentee-owned) corporate 
sugar estates—purchased nearly 10,000 acres of land in Arroyo, Patillas, and Maunabo owned by 
the Fantauzzi family, which had planted sugar in the area since the nineteenth century. Financed 
by the PRRA, various land and mill sugar cooperatives formed the Lafayette Industrial 
Cooperative and purchased the Lafayette Central for $4,414,943.11 in 1936.
527
 In addition to 
providing the capital for the purchase of the mill, the PRRA also subsidized and performed a 
series of engineering tests and services at Lafayette—surveying, deep well testing, pumping for 
water supply, pumping, ditch cleaning, leveling, rendering, mapping, blueprinting, and 
constructing ten workers camp units.
528
 Despite the project’s complete failure—marked by its 
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 Although the failure of the Lafayette project reminds us of the New Deal’s limitations, 
the establishment of modern, hurricane-proof hospitals at Casteñer and Lafayette suggests that 
even these failures produced lasting legacies of increased physical security and social mobility 
through the construction of a new public health infrastructure.
530
 Puerto Rican populism, which 
emerged as the PPD presented itself as sole heir to the PRRA public works, patronage programs, 
rural rehabilitation, and land reform, was in large measure built upon these public health legacies. 
While sharing some similarities with other forms of Latin American and Caribbean populism 
that took root in the region during the Great Depression and World War II, this Puerto Rican 
populism based on the expansion of New Deal liberalism stands in contrast to the experience of 
populism in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. In Cuba, the promises of the Constitution of 
1940 reflected many PRRA programs and impulses but ultimately failed to increase democracy 
or expand economic citizenship. When General Batista—who served as Cuba’s first president 
under this constitution—overthrew the government in a military coup and led as dictator from 
1952 to 1959, the unlimited promise of a new Cuban era was destroyed and replaced with a 
decade of longing and self-loathing, which was itself replaced by a new era of hope and 








 For a provocative examination of the Lafayette Central as a failure of “New Deal 
technocratic, high-modernist populism” mired in the colonial mindset of PRRA administrators, 
see April Merleaux, “Land, Labor and Sugar in New Deal-era Puerto Rican Reconstruction,” 
unpublished paper presented at the American Society for Environmental History Annual 




 On Cuban disappointment during the Batista regime’s rule in the 1950s, see Pérez, On 







 As the 100-year anniversary of the Jones Act of 1917 approaches, the study of the New 
Deal in Puerto Rico takes on greater significance. As one of the most important turning points in 
American politics during the twentieth century, the New Deal contrasted with the laissez faire 
political economy of Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover—Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s three Republican predecessors in the White House. In doing so, the New Deal 
altered the meaning of U.S. citizenship by enhancing the ability of the public to benefit from a 
more democratic economy. These benefits covered a wide scope of daily life, including changes 
to U.S. law such as the Wagner Act which guaranteed labor’s right to collective bargaining; 
efforts to regulate the financial industry through the establishment of the Security and Exchanges 
Commission; and the construction of large-scale, capital-intensive public works projects and new 
interventions in public health through a variety of federal agencies—including the Public Works 
Administration (PWA), Works Progress Administration (WPA), Farm Security Administration 
(FSA), and Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PPRA). As Morton Keller has argued, 
the “flood of new laws, government action, and social planning after 1932” produced long-
lasting effects, as “never before—save in wartime—had the activities of the [federal] 
government had such profound and far-reaching consequences for the way of life” of U.S. 
citizens.
532
 Due to the unprecedented federal activity on the island during the FDR years, Puerto 
Ricans—U.S. citizens since 1917—also experienced the New Deal’s “profound and far-reaching 
consequences” whether they were born in the U.S. or on the island. 
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 The New Deal in Puerto Rico was as transformative on the island as it was in the United 
States. Exacerbated by the San Felipe and San Ciprián hurricanes of 1928 and 1932, the Great 
Depression was the most disruptive event in the history of Puerto Rico during the twentieth 
century—surpassing even the trauma of 1898 when the island was transferred from Spanish to 
U.S. military control in the aftermath of the Cuban-Spanish-American War. During the 1930s, 
the destruction wrought by these hurricanes combined with the global economic collapse of the 
Great Depression to alter nearly all aspects of Puerto Rican life. From the widespread 
infrastructural, agricultural, and environmental damage of the storms to the fracturing of partisan 
politics, the Depression years in Puerto Rico witnessed a crisis in public housing and 
deterioration in public health. As this dissertation has argued, these adverse conditions were 
partly the result of a failed political economy of relief that had strengthened the position of 
private and corporate interests from the Spanish colonial system of the nineteenth century 
through the era of laissez faire individualism of the 1920s. Insufficient before the 1930s, the 
system of voluntary relief was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the Great Depression. Lasting 
recovery did not begin until the emergence of the PRRA in 1935. 
 The PRRA was a very unique and yet very representative New Deal agency. One of the 
least studied aspects of the entire New Deal, the PRRA was fueled by local labor and ideas and 
was the most creative and significant federal endeavor to ever take place on the island. As a 
locally-run federal administration operating out of San Juan after 1937, the PRRA employed 
over 58,000 workers at its peak in November 1936. Among these, roughly 98% were Puerto 
Rican, comprising at least 90% of all administrative, supervisory, and clerical personnel and 99.9% 
of all other workers. Somewhere between 90% and 95% were hired directly off of relief rolls of 





 This hiring not only mobilized local labor resources, but also formed a 
direct relationship between the federal government and Puerto Ricans that had lasting effects. 
 The PRRA spent unprecedented amounts of money on public works, as Puerto Rican 
engineers spent $32.6 million on capital-intensive projects in infrastructure, utilities, housing, 
roads, sewers, and buildings. This figure—which was about 40% of the total figure of $82 
million spent by the PRRA between 1935 and 1955—equates to over $543 million today (of a 
total budget equating to $1.36 billion today).
534
 The bulk of these engineering projects were 
constructed between 1935 and 1943 and transferred to complete local public control regardless 
of the island’s future political status, which, during the 1930s, was highly uncertain. Dollar 
amounts alone, however, do not tell the story of the PRRA. The real measure of the PRRA’s 
value to Puerto Rico was its role in transforming the life expectancy and economic opportunity 
of the island’s citizens.  
 To that end, the public works projects of the Engineering division made concrete 
contributions to the physical security of millions of Puerto Ricans through the construction of 
hurricane-proof houses, schools, and hospitals connected to modern water supply and waste 
disposal systems. From a public health standpoint, this construction amounted to a revolution in 
the island’s built environment, understood today as one of the primary keys to increasing life 
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expectancy across socioeconomic lines.
535
 Likewise, improved public transportation and 
communication networks expanded the physical mobility of rural and urban Puerto Ricans alike, 
increasing the public’s ability to move from one area of the island to another in search of better 
paying jobs, educational opportunities, health care, or social services for themselves and their 
families.   
  By building the island’s first truly public works and establishing its first public 
authorities to administer them, the PRRA constructed a hurricane-proof infrastructure capable of 
addressing three interrelated goals: increasing life expectancy through concrete interventions in 
public health; providing more egalitarian public access to a safer built environment; and limiting 
the power of private corporate holdings on the island’s natural resources. This dissertation has 
demonstrated that these goals were addressed in three primary ways: 1) the construction of the 
Cataño cement plant in 1938 and creation of the Puerto Rico Cement Corporation in 1939; 2) the 
slum clearance program and construction of a new public health infrastructure; 3) the rural 
electrification of the mountainous interior of the island and creation of the Water Resources 
Authority in 1941. 
 The PRRA was a unique New Deal program run by a local staff and administered to the 
island’s specific needs in the wake of the hurricanes and Depression. At the same time, the 
PRRA was highly representative of the New Deal’s effort to provide immediate solutions to the 
most critical problems of the day while attempting to make permanent changes to social and 
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 In Puerto Rico, this effort was reflected by the shift from a paradigm of relief to 
one of reconstruction. Related to the New Deal’s larger goals of expanding the public’s 
opportunity to take part in a more democratic economy, the New Deal in Puerto Rico produced 
one of the most significant contributions to the overall social mobility of Puerto Rican citizens in 
the island’s history.   
 While the political status of Puerto Rico as a U.S. territory has occupied the bulk of 
historical scholarship on island’s relationship with the United States, the status of Puerto Ricans 
as U.S. citizens is crucial to understanding the extraordinary extension of New Deal capital and 
energy to the island. As former Assistant Administrator Miles H. Fairbank summarized, the 
PRRA was a “vigorous and unprecedented” federal program designed to reduce immediate 
suffering and begin long-term economic planning in agriculture and industry. While unique to 
the island, it was part of the New Deal’s effort to improve the lives of all U.S. citizens. As 
Fairbank continued, although it “was only a small part of an over-all national picture, [Puerto 
Rico] was not overlooked.”
537
 Comparing the New Deal to the mere “palliative” relief efforts of 
the Hoover administration, Fairbank and Harold Ickes (Administrator after 1937) viewed the 
PRRA as an unparalleled “opportunity to . . . make more bearable some of Puerto Rico’s more 
serious economic and social problems.”
538
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  Like the New Deal in the U.S., the New Deal in Puerto Rico was not able to meet all of 
its goals. Faced with political opposition, legal obstacles, and chronic funding shortages, the 
New Deal was not an efficient and monolithic program instituted from the top-down. Sometimes 
legislated through Congress, other times created by executive order, its agencies were diverse, 
fluctuating, and oftentimes run by local officials. Emphasizing central planning, it also 
encouraged private investment; seeking to regulate corporate power, it also created new 
opportunities for American big business. For these reasons the New Deal looked different in 
California than in Mississippi, in New York than in Puerto Rico. Despite its complex and 
sometimes chaotic nature, however, the New Deal worked for the public good. While making 
substantial contributions to social and economic life, it also expanded public access to politics in 
the form of the New Deal coalition. In the U.S., the New Deal coalition created new “seats at the 
table” of the federal government for groups that had been largely excluded from formal politics, 
including women, African Americans, and organized labor. Contoured by the advantages and 
limits of Keynesian liberalism, the New Deal was often restricted by the conflicting interests of 




 In Puerto Rico, the New Deal also had profound political consequences. By the end of the 
1930s, two new organizations with close ties to the New Deal had emerged. Nearly coinciding, 
the formation of the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) and the electoral victory of the 
Popular Democratic Party (PPD) both occurred in 1940; together, they marked the beginning of a 
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particular form of Puerto Rican populism based on the support of a New Deal-style coalition of 
farmers and workers. Largely predicated on the promise of agricultural rehabilitation and land 
reform, the rise of the PPD electoral coalition was also based on the massive amounts of new 
public works construction and patronage jobs associated with the PRRA. The rise of a CIO-
affiliated union and a new mass-based political party in control of the local legislature signaled 
the end of the political domination of the Coalicíon between the Republican and Socialist parties 
that had lasted most of the decade.  
Even though the PRRA was slowly phased out in favor of defense spending following the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and official U.S. entry into World War II, the defeat of the 
Coalition—the New Deal’s most prominent local adversary—ensured the transition from a 
federally organized reconstruction to one that was locally controlled and operated. As if 
recognizing this transition, Roosevelt appointed Rex Tugwell to be Governor of Puerto Rico in 
1941. As the first “New Dealer” to be Governor, Tugwell recognized the considerable overlap 
between the PRRA’s goals and projects and the political platform of the PPD. Tugwell and Luis 
Muñoz Marín, the leader of the PPD and President of the Puerto Rican Senate after 1941, 
developed a close and fruitful working relationship through 1946. That year, President Harry 
Truman replaced Tugwell with Jesús T. Piñero, a close ally of Muñoz Marín in the PPD and the 
first (and only) Puerto Rican to be appointed Governor of the island. During the Piñero 
administration, the PPD successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress for greater political autonomy 
through the direct election of the governor.
540
 The Elective Governor’s Act, signed by Truman 
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the next year on August 5, 1947, guaranteed Puerto Rico’s right to elect its own governor for the 
first time.  
 The following year, in November 1948, Muñoz Marín convincingly won the election by 
taking 61.2% of the popular vote and sweeping 76 of 77 municipal districts.
541
  On January 2, 
1949, he was sworn in as the first locally elected Governor in the island’s history. In office, 
Muñoz Marín moved Puerto Rico closer to political autonomy within the U.S. territorial system, 
finally resulting in the establishment of the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (Associated 
Free State) or Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on July 25, 1952, about three years before the final 
liquidation of the PRRA.
542
  
 These future events, however, were not a referendum on the New Deal. The emergence 
of Puerto Rican populism, election of Muñoz Marín, and establishment of the Commonwealth 
were developments of the 1940s and 1950s that cannot be reduced solely to the influence of the 
New Deal. Similarly, the PPD’s postwar industrialization program, run by the Puerto Rico 
Industrial Development Company and known as Fomento or “Operation Bootstrap,” was a 
product of the changing conditions of the global postwar economy of the late-1940s, 1950s, and 
1960s rather than a direct development of the Depression-era New Deal.
543
  While they were not 
directly associated with the New Deal, however, these transformations in Puerto Rican social, 
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economic, and political life would have been impossible without the extraordinary investment in 
public works and public health by the PRRA during the Depression’s darkest years. It was this 
investment that assisted, in part, in the rapid transformation of Puerto Rico from an export-
dependent agricultural economy to a fully industrialized one in about twenty years. 
 The construction of the Cataño cement plant is an apt example. Just as its construction 
was not possible prior to the influx of new federal financing for public works during the New 
Deal, the later industrialization program of the PPD would not have functioned without the high 
volume of locally manufactured cement produced by the Puerto Rico Cement Corporation. This 
does not imply that the cement plant was created with the express purpose of future 
industrialization. This dissertation has argued otherwise, demonstrating that the Cataño plant was 
central to a locally-driven response to the infrastructural and public health crises of the 
hurricanes and Depression.  
 While its original purpose was to assist in the construction of hurricane-proof houses, 
schools, hospitals, and other public infrastructure and serve as a weapon against epidemic 
disease, the Cataño plant’s broader legacy includes its centrality to military construction during 
WWII and the industrialization program of the postwar years. Without exaggeration, it is 
reasonable to credit the PRRA—through the financing and construction of the island’s first 
cement plant—with a substantial contribution to the Allied defense of the Caribbean Sea Frontier 
from Nazi U-boat and potential Luftwaffe campaigns. As Gaylord Kelshall has argued, Puerto 
Rico was central to both Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic and the defense of over 
500,000 sq. miles of the western hemisphere, ranging from the Caribbean and Panama Canal to 





 These future events were unknown to New Deal administrators and workers 
during the 1930s. 
 Analysis of the New Deal in Puerto Rico has major implications to the study of 
citizenship and national identity in the U.S., particularly as U.S. historians have consistently 
failed to consider the role that Puerto Ricans played in the New Deal and World War II or 
analyze the effects of New Deal and wartime policy on U.S. citizens living on the island. As 
Louis A. Pérez, Jr. has argued, the failure of U.S. historians to consider the archives or 
historiographies of Latin America and the Caribbean has stunted historical knowledge of how 
U.S. policy has impacted the world and how the world has impacted U.S. policy. The result, 
according to Pérez, has been a “self-possessed—to say nothing of self-contained—
historiography, given to the conviction that it alone has raised all the relevant questions and, of 
course, provided all the appropriate answers, and the rest of the world has little useful to add.”
545
  
  This study has taken a different approach to that criticized by Pérez, and has found in 
Puerto Rico—a small Caribbean island with distinct and persisting social and cultural ties to 
Latin America despite its political relationship with the United States—new ways of 
understanding the New Deal. At the same time, this study has utilized federal archives to shed 
new light on Puerto Rican and Latin American history during the Great Depression. In analyzing 
the public works and public health projects of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, 
this dissertation has argued that the New Deal was central to widespread and enduring 
transformations in Puerto Rican social, economic, and political life since 1935. These 
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 276 
transformations add texture not only to the lives of the millions of Puerto Rican citizens who 
have experienced them, but more broadly to the study U.S. citizenship as well. As the Latino 
population of the United States continues to grow—currently estimated to make up nearly 30% 
of the total U.S. population in 2050—the study of the New Deal in Puerto Rico will help provide 









 For data on the rising Latino population in the U.S., see “Latino Data Project,” Center 












PROJECT COST 1938 (USD) COST 2014 (USD) %  
Rural Electrification   9,240,493.72 $153,864,706.10 28% 
Reforestation  3,408,487.70 $56,755,187.99 10% 
University of Puerto Rico School of 
Tropical Medicine  2,868,817.28 $47,769,063.11 9% 
Highways, Roads, Streets  2,366,687.92 $39,408,039.47 7% 
Construction of Schools  1,935,664.52 $32,231,010.76 6% 
Public Health Dispensaries 
Construction and Operation  1,889,357.49 $31,459,946.16 6% 
Eradication of Cattle Tick  1,751,036.02 $29,156,736.72 5% 
Drainage and Land Fill for Malaria 
Control  1,743,439.94 $29,030,253.37 5% 
Soil Conservation  1,677,448.23 $27,931,416.52 5% 
Cataño Cement Plant 1,444,831.14 $24,058,078.01 4% 
Vocational Schools, Construction and 
Operation  1,058,779.33 $17,629,877.30 3% 
Public Utilities  824,262.09 $13,724,899.13 3% 
Public Buildings  757,238.20 $12,608,875.31 2% 
Investigations, Studies Regarding 
Cooperatives, Census of Farm Debts, 
Mortgages, and Liens  418,084.09 $6,961,574.52 1% 
Home for Orphan Children  399,991.17 $6,660,306.87 1% 
Parks and Recreational Facilities  164,989.39 $2,747,260.57 1% 
Surplus Food Distribution 162,842.10 $2,711,505.75 -1% 
Eradication of coconut bud-rot  125,443.12 $2,088,770.29 -1% 
Sewing Centers and Training 90,104.73 $1,500,346.00 -1% 
Canning Centers  85,163.35 $1,418,066.42 -1% 
Irrigation Canal, Isabela 81,158.46 $1,351,380.45 -1% 
Home for the Aged, San Juan  46,492.36 $774,150.55 -1% 
Marketing Centers  26,077.46 $434,219.30 -1% 
Historic Manuscripts  21,455.86 $357,264.42 -1% 
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Home for the Poor (repairs), Ponce  17,068.65 $284,212.39 -1% 
Compiling Puerto Rico Guide 12,065.16 $200,898.60 -1% 
    




Total PRRA Funds: 
 
SOURCE AMOUNT 1938 (USD) AMOUNT 2014 (USD) 
Congress Appropriated  $69,741,843.32 $1,161,280,830.85 
PRRA-Generated Revolving Fund $12,321,859.80 $205,172,947.40 


























Marco Tomas Caneja  n/a  $20,311.54  Guaynabo  n/a
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Petronila Aguesanta Salaverria 
 n/a   
$1,192.78  
Barrio Jagua, 
Penuelas Garzas  
Clemente Bartolomei y Luiggi and 
Ignacio Bartolomei y Luiggi   




Los Esposos Don Lucas Candelaria y 
Dona Maria Medina   
n/a   
$433  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Aquilino Hernandez Rivera   
n/a   
$5,300  
Barrio Rio Arriba, 






Jose Junoz Uncion 
9.84 
  
Arecibo on east 
bank of Rio 
Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Federal Land Bank of Baltimore 7.63 $2,500  Utuado  Dos Bocas 
Federal Land Bank of Baltimore 
15.46 
$1,546  
Barrio Ala de la 
Piedra, Orocovis  
Toro Negro 
#2 
Juan y Herminia Oliver Maldonado 
7.91 
$2,700  
Barrio Rio Arriba, 
Arecibo  Dos Bocas  
Benigno Olivieri y Olivieri 
  
$454  
Barrio Ala de la 
Piedra, Orocovis  
Toro Negro 
#2 
Juan Campagne and Epifania 
Olivieri y Olivieri 
9.789 
$978.90  




Angel Lugo Serrano y Margarita 
Carbonell Fernandez 
23.47 
$3,550  Arecibo Dos Bocas 




Utuado Dos Bocas 
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 Marco Tomas Caneja lived in Spain, and was represented in Puerto Rico by Juan 
Martino Gonzalez. This land was possibly acquired for the electrification of the Cataño cement 




Belen Jimenez y Ramirez de 









Tomas Jimenez y Ramirez de 
Arellano y su esposa Isabel Becerra  
4.275 
$427.50  
Barrio Rio Arriba, 
Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Camilo Rodriguez Serrano y 
Petronila Maldonado 
 
24.85 $3,869.14  
Barrio Saltillos, 
Adjuntas  Garzas 
Isabel Rodriguez y Monserrate 
Quinones 
 
0.17 $17   n/a Garzas 
Luciano Rodriguez y Carmen 
Irizarry 
19.2 
$2,370  Adjuntas Garzas 
Victoriano Ruiz 5.77 $777  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Aurelio Serrano y su esposa Juana 
Bautista Molina Diaz 
 
9.48 $953.20  
Barrio Garzas, 
Adjuntas  Garzas 
Victor Toledo y Maria Rosario 
Olivieri   
 
3.46 $346  
Barrio Ala de la 
Piedra, Orocovis  
Toro Negro 
#2 
Angela Torre Ortiz  
 
19.157 $1,600  
Barrio Garzas, 
Adjuntas Garzas 
Juana Torres Candelaria and her 8 
children  
 
29.188 $700  Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Francisco Vega Quinones y Faustina 
Navarro 
 
14.5 $1,650  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Domingo Vivaldi Pacheco 1.73 $50  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Domingo Vivaldi Pacheco 12.9 $1,750  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Jose Bujosa Jaume  
 
206.26  $8,184.58 
Utuado and 
Areciba  Dos Bocas 
Secundino Candelaria y su esposa 
Rosa Candelaria 
 
4   
Barrio Limon, 
Utuado Dos Bocas  
Osvaldo Figueroa y Alejandrina 
Alayon 
 
25 $1,200  
Barrio Rio Abajo, 
Utuado  Dos Bocas  
Norberto Garcia Jimenez y su esposa 
Maria Josefa Teresa Roig Casaldug 
 
26 $2,800  Rio Abajo, Utuado  Dos Bocas 
Norberto Garcia Jimenez  n/a  $2,500  Rio Abajo, Utuado  Dos Bocas 
Tomas Garcia Moya y Georgina 
Santoni 
 
44.88 $14,772.32  Rio Abajo, Utuado   Dos Bocas 
Aurele M. Gatti 28.72 $7,500.00  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Pedro Gines Ocasio  
 
11.5 $1,900  
Barrio Don 
Alonso, Utuado Dos Bocas 




Arecibo  Dos Bocas 
Juan Irizarry 
 
18.11 $2,011  
Barrio Saltillo, 
Adjuntas Garzas 
Francisco Jaume Farr  11.92 $5,200  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Francisco Jaume Far(r) y Fermina 
Tapia 
 
 $3,325  
Barrios Limon y 




Juan Ines Lugo 
 
9.5 $2,000  
Barrio Caniaco, 
Utuado  Dos Bocas  
Luis Rivera Lugo 4.62 $627.50  Rio Abajo, Utuado Dos Bocas  
 

















Dos Bocas  
Jaime Jaume Santiago  2.36 $300  Utuado Dos Bocas 
 Belen Jimenez y Ramirez de 
Arellano 
 
4.275 $897.22  
 Rio Arriba, 
Arecibo  Dos Bocas 
Tomas Jimenez y Ramirez de 






Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Angel Marengo Poggi  
 
1.44 $161.50  
Barrio Limon 
Utuado Dos Bocas 
Ramon Medina Rodriguez  3.51 $1,847.32  Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Sabino Mont y su esposa Paula 
Candelaria 
 
1.86 $194.25  Limon, Utuado  Dos Bocas 
Gregorio Mont 3.5 $400  Limon, Utuado  Dos Bocas 
Jose Montanez Medina 2.89 $1,500  Caniaco, Utuado Dos Bocas 




Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Jose Domingo Ocana Huertas  9.99 $1,299.25  Limon, Utuado  Dos Bocas 
Gregorio Ocana Serrano y su esposa 
Ramona Candelaria Sanchez 
 
0.33 $25  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Antonio Ocasio Santana  0.63 $47.25  Utuado Dos Bocas 




Limon and Don 
Alonso, Utuado Dos Bocas 
Andres Oliver  
 
8.58 $870  
Rio Arriba, 
Arecibo Dos Bocas 
 Eduardo Oliver  
 
53.63 $26,000  
Rio Arriba, 
Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Isabel Bujosa Oliver y su esposo 
Eduardo Oliver   
 
n/a  $750  Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Juan y Aminta Oliver  2.86 $1,850  Rio Abajo, Utuado Dos Bocas 
Juan y Hermina Oliver Maldonado  
 
7.91 $2,713.03  
Rio Arriba, 
Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Benigno Olivieri  
 
4.54 $454  




Epifania Olivieri Olivieri y Juan 
Campagne  
 
9.789 $978.90  




Rafael Ongay Miranda 3.05 $302.50  Rio Abajo, Utuado Dos Bocas 
Buenaventura Ortiz Rivera  
 
1.92 $500  
Barrio Caniaco, 
Utuado Dos Bocas 
 
 282 
Manuel U. Padro  0.31 $62  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Passalacqua y Santiago hermanos 
 
16.27 $813.50  










Maria Jacinta Rivera Candelaria  1 $113  Limon, Utuado Dos Bocas 
Geronimo Carmen y Genaro Rivera  4.4 $3,000  Caniaco, Utuado Dos Bocas 
Manuel Rivera Rivera y su esposa 
Maria Candelaria Ramirez  
 
0.88 $88 Limon, Utuado  Dos Bocas 
Francisco Robles 
 
0.35 $43.75  
Barrio Jagua, 
Penuelas Garzas 
Isabel Rodriguez Rivera y 
Monserrate Quinones  
 
0.17 $17  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Luciano Rodriguez y Carmen 
Irizarry  
 
11.67 $2,370  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Camilo Rodriguez Serrano   
 
9.4 $582.80  
Barrio Garzas, 
Adjuntas Garzas 
Camilo Rodriguez 24.85 $3,869.14  Adjuntas Garzas 
Victoriano Ruiz y Francisca Mendez  5.77 $777  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Ramon Santiago y Candida 
Montalvo  
 
1.04 $250  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Auralio Serrano  
 
9.48 $953.20  
Barrio Garzas, 
Adjuntas Garzas 
La viuda Estefania Martinez Rios y 
sus 8 hijos 
 
6.74 $1,063.26  
Don Alonso, 
Utuado Dos Bocas 
Jeronimo Serrano  22.15 $8,295.25  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Jose y Delia Serrano  
 
0.37 $37  
Barrio Limon, 
Utuado Dos Bocas 
Manuel Serrano Lafuente y Calixta 
Caldelaria 
 
2.07 $288.75  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Pedro Jose Serrano Muniz  1.19 $101  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Rafael Soltero Palermo  
 
4.94 $1,000  
Rio Abajo, 
Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Victor Toledo y Maria Rosario 
Olivieri   
 
3.46 $346  Orocovis 
Toro Negro 
#2 
Tomas Toro Lagare  2.58 $655.52  Utuado Dos Bocas 
Angela Torre Ortiz  
 
19.157 $1,600  
Barrio Garzas, 
Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
 Maria Matilde Maldonado y 
sucesion de Antonio Torres  
 
3.23 $398.50  Caniaco, Utuado Dos Bocas 
Buenventura Torres Gonzalez  2.09 $650  Caniaco, Utuado Dos Bocas 
Juana Torres Candelaria Vda. 
Gallardo  
 
3 $700  Arecibo Dos Bocas 
Vicente Valentin Torres y Teodora 
Irizarry  
 
0.54 $54  
Barrio Don 




Dionisio Vega Quinones y Alfonsa 

















Manuel Vinas Caamano y Josefa 
Vales y 12 otras Vales  
 
28.29 $4,423  Canicao, Utuado Dos Bocas 
 
Manuel Vinas Caamano y Josefa 













Domingo Vivaldi Pacheco y Antonia 
Brigranti Lacorte  
1.73 
$50  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
Domingo Vivaldi Pacheco y Antonia 
Brigranti Lacorte 
12.9 
$1,750  Saltillo, Adjuntas Garzas 
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